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Abstract
If the possible ends of art criticism are taken to include not only the
provision of a detailed evaluation of the artwork, but, cognately, an elaboration
upon how one has been, or believes oneself to have been, changed by a
particular artistic encounter, then the very praxis of art criticism stands to benefit
from a theoretical elucidation of the possible nature of the subjective
transformations that may flow from the critical appreciation of art. We are
entitled to enquire, in particular, into the conditions under which, and indeed the
extent to which, such putative change at the personal level can be explicated in
moral epistemological terms. It is pertinent in this context also to investigate the
phenomenal character of the experiences that have been operative and their
essential structures; to enquire, in short, into the phenomenology of the
transformative artistic encounter. In this thesis, the bearing, in particular, of
intersubjectivity upon the content and modalities of disclosure in a literary
context will be investigated. It will be shown how an understanding of the
relevance of intersubjectivity to the phenomenology of literary experience can
inform an assessment of the claims of literary aesthetic moral cognitivism.
Yet the intention to clarify the connection between literary experience
and intersubjectivity also requires reflection upon what it is in the first place to
encounter someone else, and to apperceive a foreign subjectivity and its
motivations. For this reason, the contributions of Edmund Husserl and Edith
Stein to the investigation of the phenomenology of empathy will be discussed
and evaluated. This discussion will in turn be shown to be of assistance in
clarifying the role of the imagination in the apperception and comprehension of
another person’s mental life. The thought of Jean Starobinski will prove to
elucidate the question of why the insights of the phenomenological tradition are
highly pertinent to the investigation of literary experience, and to the
development, in particular, of a conception of an imagined ‘Other’ who is (in a
sense that will be clarified) embedded within the literary text, a person, that is, to
whom one might coherently refer as the “implied author”.
For reasons which will emerge in the course of this study, it will be
argued that authentic empathy, in its fulfilling explication (in the Steinian sense),
is given to the empathising consciousness in the manner of a semblance, and,
consonantly, that the phenomenological structure of authentic empathy is
characterised in its mature phases by an homological relation to picture-
consciousness. The epistemological significance of literature’s capacities for
moral suggestion will be explicated principally in terms of the unfolding of
values within the human personality, and in terms of the disclosure of the
phenomenal character and structures of virtuous experience. It will be explained
why the structure of empathy has implications for the aesthetic value of
literature. The question of the relation between aesthetic and ethical value will
be clarified. In this context, it will be argued on phenomenological grounds that
the appresentation of moral virtue in an implied author could contribute to the
aesthetic value of a literary work, although it will also be shown that implied
authorial moral virtue could conflict irremediably with other qualities like moral
doubt and uncertainty, which may themselves be important sources of aesthetic
value. For this reason, the thesis will conclude by challenging the ethicist view
that an aesthetically relevant ethical flaw in a literary work must count as an
aesthetic flaw.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction: Keats, Truth, and the Bearing of
Intersubjectivity upon Disclosure and Revelation in a Literary
Context
At one level, Keats’s sonnet entitled On Peace (1814) is full of
philosophical certainties. The speaker believes, for example, that a nation’s
people have a right to live in freedom under the rule of law, and that the rule of
law should be applicable to everybody. Political and philosophical commitments
of this kind do not seem to be called into question in this poem, or made the
subject of an enquiry. On the contrary, it is as though we are confronted with
somebody who, in certain central thematic respects at least, appears to know his
own mind.
At a different but no less important level, however, this is surely a poem
which is pervaded by uncertainty. The startled opening “Oh Peace!” is
juxtaposed with interrogative doubt.1 Some kind of glimmer of “peace” may
have flickered in the war against Napoleon, but its significance and signification
within the terms of the poem remain manifestly open to question. (The year,
after all, is still only 1814.) The speaker may be experiencing joy, but he still
yearns for it to be “complete[d]”.2 Just how this incipient “peace” is to unfold
remains a question whose answer is conspicuously deferred, with the poem’s
historical consciousness in the closing line straining somehow to bridge a void
between “horrors past” and a highly indeterminate “happier fate”.3 The poem
thus ends by invoking the kind of liminality of thought – between presence and
absence, between the “now” and the “not yet” – that so often seems to constitute
the result (I do not say conclusion) of Keats’s poetical ruminations.
1 Lines 1-4.
2 Line 7.
3 Line 14.
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Page 2 of 302
We find, then, that while part of what this poem discloses can be
adequately paraphrased (e.g. certain moral and philosophical stances), part of it
cannot. The poem conveys not only the intellectual content of a certain state of
mind, but something about that state of mind itself as a lived experience. If we
are entitled to assume that certain aspects of experience are common to all
human subjects (I want to concur with Edmund Husserl’s view that we are), then
we are entitled, too, at least to broach the possibility that a poem could disclose
important aspects of experience in general. This in turn must lead us to take
seriously the possibility that poetry, and perhaps literature more generally, could
be pertinent in substantive respects to the field of phenomenology.
Even at this early stage, we can see that a number of interconnected
philosophical and literary theoretical lines of enquiry seem to be presenting
themselves. It should help if I briefly outline those of them that I intend to form
the underlying agenda for this thesis as a whole. Firstly, if we are interested in
literary disclosure and revelation, then there is the question of what kinds of
content can be disclosed. I want to focus on the possibilities that literary
disclosure could be affective, could be phenomenological, and could be moral.
But we also need to think about how these different kinds of content might be
inter-related, and whether there is something about literature which might make
it especially conducive to affective, phenomenological, and moral disclosure.
We also need to start to think about the kinds of claim we might be able to
make, and under what conditions, about the epistemic status of such disclosures.
Secondly, there are questions about value, and in particular about the
relation between aesthetic and ethical value. An initial formulation of these
questions might put them as follows. If an artwork conveys thematically relevant
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moral truth by artistic means, is that in itself a reason to value the artwork
aesthetically? And if an artwork contains an ethical flaw which is pertinent to
the determination of its aesthetic value, should it be deemed in that regard, and
to that extent, to be aesthetically flawed? These questions, which focus on the
question of ethicism, indicate the direction of one the central enquiries of this
thesis.
Thirdly, there are questions about the modality of disclosure in a literary
context. Deductive reasoning is a perfectly good example of a modality of
disclosure, but it is not one which is characteristic of literary experience, which
is not to say that literature has no role to play in wider processes of rational
enquiry, but that is a separate matter. Very often, however, it does seem to be
appropriate to say of literary experience that it is as though one is encountering
the particularity and uniqueness of another mind. Indeed, it is difficult to think
of a work of literature for which this is not the case. In reading Keats’s On
Peace, it is as though one is encountering another mind expressing complex
emotion in a unique and personal way. Intuitively, then, it seems right to say that
there must be some kind of connection between intersubjectivity and the
modalities of literary disclosure. Yet it is much harder to explicate just how a
literary text could take us to another mind. Is the speaker in On Peace a
construct of the imagination, or a construct of the text? I want to suggest that
this is a question which is proper to the discipline of phenomenology. I have
already suggested that the content of literary disclosure could be
phenomenological. I now add the observation that phenomenology is
unmistakably, and arguably by definition, the most appropriate means by which
to explore the modalities of literary disclosure.
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Page 4 of 302
Fourthly, questions about the modality of literary disclosure seem to lead
on to questions about indeterminacy of meaning. I remarked earlier on how
aspects of the meaning of Keats’s On Peace seem to be indeterminate. The
opening exclamation “Oh Peace!” could express desire or surprise, or both. It
seems to some extent to be up to the reader to surmise the degree of each
emotion that is involved. The poem ends by looking forward to an unspecified
“happier fate”, but do we not value this closing line’s indeterminacy precisely
because there is something essentially indeterminate about yearning? We are
also entitled to ask if literary interpretation in general has an ineluctable moment
of indeterminacy. Is there always a gap between poetical self-expression and
self-disclosure? What is the phenomenological relation between the experiences
that we comprehend in artistic expression and the artistic phenomena
themselves? My intention is that seeking answers to these questions should
clarify the relevance of intersubjectivity to indeterminacy in art, and the
relevance of such indeterminacy to aesthetic value.
Fifthly, any project which attempts to theorise in a sustained fashion
about the nature of literature will almost inevitably bring some meta-theoretical
questions in tow, and not undesirably so. For academic scholars of literature, the
impulse to theorise about literature is often strong, and in many respects
appropriate. Sometimes it is desirable within academic discourse to seek to
make claims about art in general, or about literature in general. One such claim,
for example, is that it can be fruitful and illuminating to construe the encounter
with a literary work in intersubjective terms, and this is a claim that I want to
broadly sustain. Yet it is also widely recognised that there is something about
literature which makes it curiously resistant to theory; that literature is
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continually in a process of transforming itself; that bold claims about the nature
of literature sometimes seem to invite or provoke the surfacing of counter-
examples. I am not going to foreground the theory/anti-theory debate in this
thesis, but I don’t deny its importance. It may even be constitutive of the study
of literature itself. The main way in which it will manifest itself in what follows
will be that I shall make every effort to refrain from purporting to make claims
about “the essential nature of literature”, and from assuming that the term
“literature” refers in the end to something historically stable and self-identical.
Keats certainly revelled in poetry’s capacity to surprise those of a
theoretical disposition, as his oft-quoted remark that “What shocks the virtuous
philosopher delights the chameleon poet”4 seems to suggest. Nonetheless,
Keats’s understanding of this putative poetry-philosophy polarity did not prevent
him from thinking abstractly about poetry. Indeed, some of the concerns of this
introductory chapter stem from the observation that Keats, a poet whose genius
is as undisputed as his canonical place in the history of English literature, also
bequeaths to us, in the text of his posthumously collated letters, a sophisticated
body of meta-poetical writing, and a complex implicit theoretical understanding
of his chosen art.
One of the subsidiary aims of this introduction is to examine the extent to
which a coherent theoretical understanding of poetry may be extracted from
Keats’s meta-poetical thought. I propose to examine the text of Keats’s letters in
order to assess his account of the nature of poetry and its relation to truth, as
well as his explanatory account of how poetry and poetical effects are produced.
My principal conclusion will be that Keats’s implicit theoretical understanding
4 Letter from John Keats to Richard Woodhouse, 27 October 1818. Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.387.
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Page 6 of 302
of poetry, though sophisticated and coherent, also raises a number of important
questions which require further investigation.
Keats, as I have just indicated, was not a philosopher. However, this is
not to say that he did not think about philosophy. Quite to the contrary, it is clear
that Keats thought a great deal about philosophy, and indeed came to conceive
of his own poetical project as being essentially opposed to philosophical
thought. This oppositional configuration, conveyed, as we noted, in Keats’s
desire to confound “the virtuous philosopher”, also turns out, as I intend to
elaborate below, to be congruent with his yearning “… oh for a life of sensations
rather than of thoughts!”.5
If this latter, and deceptively straightforward, remark is to be properly
understood then an initial clarification of Keats’s terminology is now necessary.
It should immediately be pointed out that Keats does not intend, in this
apparently heartfelt exclamation, to disparage thought in general. We shall,
indeed, soon explore in more detail the particular poetical significance that
Keats attaches to thought as such. Instead, Keats has in mind in this context (i.e.
his letter of 22 November 1817 to the theology student Benjamin Bailey) a
particular type of cognitive activity, namely logically deductive, or what he calls
“consequitive”,6 reasoning. Rational argument, not unreasonably, is what Keats
takes to be the proper business of philosophy.
We must also be wary of the fact that Keats has a particular conception
of “sensations” which goes beyond any usual meaning of the term, and this
notion is elaborated in his letters in some detail. In a poetical context, the
5 Letter from John Keats to Benjamin Bailey, 22 November 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.185.
6 Ibid., p.185.
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“sensations” in which Keats’s interest lies are also referred to as “passions”,7
and Keats takes the “passions” to encompass not only the emotions (as the term
is normally understood) but, perhaps most importantly, to include a faculty that
Keats calls the “imagination”. We must ask why this “imagination” should be
construed as a “passion”. The reason implicit in Keats’s letters is clear: the
imagination is both creative and intense. For example - a century before Proust
did the same - Keats reflects upon the intensely evocative and synaesthetic
powers capable of being invoked by a sensory fragment. (Keats’s chosen
example, an auditory precursor of Proust’s Madeleine cake, is an old melody.)8
It is via this notion of spontaneous intensity that Keats finds a conception of
beauty. Intense passions are held to be “sublime”, and it is precisely in this
sublimity that they are “creative of essential beauty”.9 For this reason, Keats
reaches the view that “[t]he excellence of every art is its intensity”.10
For Keats, however, the powers of the imagination are not only artistic
but capable of engaging with truth. This is not to say that Keats wishes to
abolish any philosophical sense to the term “truth”. Though he admits to
difficulty in seeing how deductive reasoning could give rise to truth, he
nevertheless appears to concede (hesitatingly) this possibility. (“… I have never
yet been able to perceive how anything can be known for truth by consequitive
reasoning – and yet it must be.”11 (My italics.)) Indeed, he concludes his letter
with a remarkably even-handed suggestion that Bailey strive for an harmonious
combination of poetical and philosophical truth, accommodated by a
7 Ibid., pp.184, 186.
8 Ibid., p.185.
9 Ibid., p.184.
10 Letter from John Keats to George and Tom Keats, 21 December 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958)
Vol.1, p.192.
11 Letter from John Keats to Benjamin Bailey, 22 November 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.185.
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[…] complex mind, one that is imaginative and at the same time
careful of its fruits, who would exist partly on sensation, partly on
thought – to whom it is necessary that years should bring the
philosophic mind. Such an one I consider yours and therefore it is
necessary to your eternal happiness that you not only drink this old
wine of heaven, which I shall call the redigestion of our most
ethereal musings on earth, but also increase in knowledge and
know all things.12
Keats is evidently content to permit a dual conception of truth. On the one hand,
there is truth apprehensible by the “consequitive” deductive “philosophic
mind”,13 and it is clear that knowledge of this kind of truth – a philosophically
substantive knowledge – is not something that Keats necessarily discourages. On
the other hand, there is what Keats calls
[…] the truth of imagination. What the imagination seizes as beauty
must be truth, whether it existed before or not. For I have the same
idea of all our passions as of love: they are all in their sublime,
creative of essential beauty.14
This imaginational truth, then, is constituted in the imagination as beauty. We
shall shortly have cause to return to the subtleties of the above passage, but I
wish to highlight at this point the facts that, firstly, for Keats the imagination is a
creative force, and secondly, the beauty it creates is not contingent or projected,
but, in being “essential”, is ascribed by Keats a certain ideality. Furthermore,
imaginational truth, in contradistinction to its philosophical counterpart, is
portrayed as “ethereal” and associated with “heaven”.15 Keats, indeed, is
12 Ibid, p.186.
13 Ibid., p.186. Keats borrows the phrase “philosophic mind” from Wordworth’s Ode:
Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood, line 189.
14 Ibid, p.184.
15 Ibid., p.186.
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convinced of the “holiness”16, no less, of the “heart’s affections”, the “passions”
or intense emotions of which the imagination is counted as one.
Keats goes on to suggest that the apprehension of imaginational truth as
truth is conditioned, firstly, by the apprehension of beauty by the imagination,
and secondly, by an emergence or awakening of the subject from the
imaginational mode of consciousness, for “[t]he imagination may be compared
to Adam’s dream: he awoke and found it truth”.17 Knowledge of imaginational
truth as truth thus becomes conceived as the (dispassionate) correlate of the
(passionate) apprehension of beauty. In the sense that sleeping as such involves
the immanent possibility of awakening, the disclosure of imaginational truth for
Keats is necessarily latent within the apprehension of beauty.
Philosophically speaking, the fact that Keats sets up a dichotomy
between “philosophic” propositional truth and imaginational artistic truth itself
seems to require some further explanation. Keats, the poet, presumably saw
nothing unsatisfactory in elaborating upon the polysemous nature of the word
“truth”. Yet the following question seems difficult to ignore. What is it about
poetical beauty that leads Keats to suppose that it has an essential connection
with truth? What, to put it another way, makes Keatsian truth truth?
One possible explanation (an hypothesis that I shall shortly reject) is that
Keats supposes that poetry engages with an unchanging metaphysical realm, and
derives its truthfulness from such putative fixity. The prima facie evidence to
support this idea is Keats’s use of precisely the kind of quasi-religious
terminology that I have already remarked upon. However, this line of
explanation is undermined by the fact that Keats equivocates on whether beauty
16 Ibid., p.184.
17 Ibid., p.185.
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exists before it is apprehended: the imagination seizes beauty as truth “whether
it existed before or not”.18 Indeed, the imagination is hardly a passive observer
of pre-given metaphysical entities, but instead “creative of essential beauty”.19
The striking feature of Keats’s account of the apprehension of beauty is
the way in which he inverts the Platonic priority of essence over actuality.
Indeed this reversal provides us with the direction for a more promising
explanation for Keats’s claim that poetry has a necessary relation to truth,
namely that Keats believes poetry’s truthfulness to be attributable to a certain
relation it has with the real world. More precisely, poetry, for Keats, is not truth-
bearing because it necessarily tells us something about the world, but rather
because it can invoke for the reader the content of real-world experience. For
this reason, it seems to me, the Keatsian account of poetry is inextricably bound
up with the role of consciousness. Let us examine more closely the way in which
Keats implies a connection between consciousness and truth.
It is understandable, but perhaps not entirely unremarkable, that Keats
should use the word “heart”20 – a metaphor, commonplace enough, for the
emotions – to signify the locus of those aspects of experience he calls “the
passions”21. Perhaps “heart”, in implying a separation from the brain, reinforces
the idea of Keats’s proposed opposition between philosophical and poetical
truth. Nonetheless, the drawback of this trope, in my opinion, is that it gives the
misleading impression that Keats considers the passions to be devoid not only of
18 Ibid., p.184.
19 Ibid., p.184.
20 See, for example, Letter from John Keats to Benjamin Bailey, 22 November 1817, Letter from
John Keats to John Hamilton Reynolds, 3 May 1818, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1., pp.184, 281-2,
and Journal-Letter from John Keats to George and Georgiana Keats, 14 February to 3 May 1819,
Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.2, pp.103-4.
21 Letter from John Keats to Benjamin Bailey, 22 November 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
pp.184, 186.
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deductive reasoning, but of thought in general. This surely is not Keats’s view.
The imagination, after all, is itself conceived as one of the passions. And, as we
have seen, it is the imagination, according to Keats, which apprehends certain
experiences as beautiful.
Moreover, the generalised notion of thought as such turns out to be
significant in relation to Keats’s understanding of the emotions. The absence of
thought, in Keats’s view, corresponds to a nondescript state of nascent
consciousness that he calls the “infant or thoughtless chamber”.22 It should not
go unremarked that Keats has almost nothing to say about this condition, other
than to configure it as a transient phase of pre-cognitive immaturity. The
significance of the “infant chamber” lies simply in the fact that it is a primal
state from which we find ourselves “imperceptibly impelled by the awakening of
the thinking principle within us”.23 Thought, or the “thinking principle” is an
immanent awakening in which consciousness finds itself in a second chamber,
apparently full of “pleasant wonders”,24 and with which we are initially
“intoxicated”.25 However, the paradoxical nature of this chamber of thought is
such that it lends acuity to our understanding of “the heart and nature of man”,26
and “convinc[es] one’s nerves that the world is full of misery and heartbreak,
pain, sickness, and oppression”.27
The allegorical fashion in which Keats portrays the forms of
consciousness (in terms of chambers in a mansion) serves the purpose of
marking out a relatively clear trajectory of discrete mental states. From an initial
22 Letter from John Keats to John Hamilton Reynolds, 3 May 1818, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.280.
23 Ibid., p.281.
24 Ibid., p.281.
25 Ibid., p.281.
26 Ibid., p.281.
27 Ibid., p.281.
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state of cognitive limbo, consciousness comes, through thought, to an
understanding of the world, and from there to a recognition of suffering in
others. Furthermore, Keats goes on to suggest that the awareness of suffering in
the world gives rise to a state of depressed subjectivity, as the “chamber of
maiden thought becomes gradually darken’d”.28
Keats’s image of the darkened chamber signifies an obscured condition
of partial knowledge, for in it “[w]e see not the balance of good and evil. We are
in a mist. We are now in that state. We feel the ‘burden of the mystery’”.29
However, this darkening of consciousness, that Keats considers to be an
inevitable result of thought, is not an eventuality that Keats proposes to avert
through some kind of poetical line of flight. On the contrary, it is precisely the
exploration of this depressive “chamber”, and the “dark passages” onto which it
opens, that Keats considers to be an undertaking of profound poetical
significance. For this reason, the Wordsworthian quality that Keats picks out for
praise is that his “genius is explorative of those dark passages”.30 And Keats
attributes the epistemic power implicit in the idea of such exploration to
Wordsworth’s cognitive gift for “think[ing] into the human heart”.31
This idea of the poetic exploration of suffering further illuminates the
connection Keats makes between poetic beauty and truth. The poetry that Keats
calls for is “true” in the sense of being grounded in real-world experience; and
what could be more real, more earthly, than our apprehension of “misery and
heartbreak, pain, sickness, and oppression”?32 The combination of Keats’s
28 Ibid., p.281.
29 Ibid., p.281. The phrase “burden of the mystery” is a quotation from Wordsworth’s Tintern
Abbey, 39.
30 Ibid., p.281.
31 Ibid., p.282.
32 Ibid., p.281.
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conviction that poetry is truth-bearing with his commitment to the poetic
importance of real-world experience is strongly suggestive that Keats believes
the apprehension of poetic beauty to have an important recognitional aspect.
An important paradox now presents itself in Keats’s conception of poetic
truth. How is Keats’s proposed sense of rootedness in the world to be reconciled
with his conviction about the “holiness of the heart’s affections”?33 A dialectical
emergence of the heavenly from the earthly is indeed one of the central motifs of
Keats’s thought, both theological and literary. From the “mist” of anxiety
associated with suffering, in which “[w]e see not the balance of good and
evil”,34 there emerges (according to Keats’s theological view)35 the (non-
spatiotemporal) soul, an identity forged only by the heart. This pattern of an
immanent permanence within transience – an ideal “beyond” accessed precisely
through a vicissitudinous actuality – is replicated in Keats’s account of poetic
beauty and truth. For from the poetical engagement with the experience of
suffering, according to his meta-poetical position, comes the imaginational
apprehension of poetic beauty, and a realisation of its truth.
The Keatsian cognition of beauty centres on a moment of “seizing”
which manages at once to be both a form of creation (for, as we noted earlier,
the imagination is “creative of essential beauty”)36 and, I suggest, a special kind
of recognition. The idea of a recognitional aspect to the apprehension of beauty
is of assistance in rendering intelligible Keats’s otherwise somewhat puzzling
33 Letter from John Keats to Benjamin Bailey, 22 November 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.184.
34 Letter from John Keats to John Hamilton Reynolds, 3 May 1818, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.281.
35 For some of Keats’s theological views, see the Journal Letter from John Keats to George and
Georgiana Keats 14 Feb - 3 May 1819, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.2, pp.102-4.
36 Letter from John Keats to Benjamin Bailey, 22 November 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.184.
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claim that the experience of beauty in art is connected in some essential way
with truth. But in suggesting that the recognitional experience of beauty is also
simultaneously creative, Keats seems to be implying that such an experience is
to be phenomenally differentiated in some important way from a more
straightforward perception or apperception of something ostensibly pre-given or
prior to the artistic encounter itself. What seems to be missing from Keats’s
account is some further and more detailed explication of what it means, and why
it should be plausible, to think that the “recognitional” and “creative”
dimensions of aesthetic experience should co-exist in such an intimate way.37
Although Keats does not fully elucidate this matter directly in his letters, he does
go some way toward attempting to explain poetic effects. He does this, however,
neither through appealing to textual considerations, nor through addressing
cognitive matters relating to the reader. Instead, Keats focuses upon the
cognitive skills possessed by the poet. It is to this aspect of Keatsian thought that
we shall now turn our attention.
According to Keats, the paradox of beauty we have just considered is
made possible by the feature of poetic genius that Keats aptly calls negative
capability:
Several things dovetailed in my mind, and at once it struck me
what quality went to form a man of achievement, especially in
literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously. I
mean negative capability; that is, when a man is capable of being
in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching
after fact and reason.38
37 In the chapters toward the end of my thesis, which engage with the relation between literature
and moral knowledge, I shall return to this question by exploring the idea that the aesthetic
experience of a literary work can involve the unfolding of personal moral values in the reader.
38 Letter from John Keats to George and Tom Keats, 21 December 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958)
Vol.1, p.193.
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It is, as Keats’s wording implies, an existential rather than an epistemic talent,
for it is “being in uncertaint[y]” (my italics). And this being is not distracted or
interrupted by “any irritable reaching after fact and reason”. The implication of
Keats’s description is that negative capability is a non-fleeting, sustained
dwelling within uncertainty. The sense of stability thus implied provides the
ground for the elevated certainty of beauty that Keats believes great poetry
intimates. As Keats suggests, doubt is swept aside when “with a great poet the
sense of beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all
consideration”.39
In one sense, which illuminates Keats’s understanding of the relation
between poetry and philosophy, the “uncertainties” Keats has in mind can be
understood to include the kind of paradoxes and equivocations that philosophy
often sets out as a matter of course to disentangle. In this respect, Keats
conceives of poetry as preceding philosophy, and as residing precisely in the
questions that straight-talking philosophical argument purports to answer, or at
least examine rationally. In a different, more practical sense, however, the
uncertainties that interest Keats also include the real-world anxieties inherent in
human suffering. Indeed, Keats admires Wordsworth, as we have seen, precisely
for elucidating such “dark passages” of consciousness. Yet Keats’s attitude
towards Wordsworth’s poetry is ultimately ambivalent. Perhaps Keats’s most
central worry is that Wordsworth’s poetry has the tendency to draw attention to
the narrator’s own mental activity, at the cost of an immersion in lived
experience. Wordsworth, in Keats’s view, gives the poetic self, its imaginative
powers and mental prowess, an undue conspicuousness. In a letter of 3rd
39 Ibid., p.194.
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February 1818 to John Hamilton Reynolds, Keats goes so far as to imply that
Wordsworth’s self-consciousness is ultimately both intrusive and constrictive:
Poetry should be great and unobtrusive, a thing which enters into
one’s soul, and does not startle it or amaze it with itself but with its
subject. […] Why should we be owls, when we can be eagles?40
The owl, Keats seems to suggest, holds forth (however wisely) as a self-
conscious intellect; preferable, by implication, is the eagle soaring instinctively
and unreflectively.
Keats therefore opposes his own conception of poetry not only to
philosophical enquiry as such, but also to the Wordsworthian predilection for
explicit cognitive introspection. The Keatsian alternative entails a dissolution of
poetic self-identity, an effacement of subjecthood brought about through an
inhabitation, so to speak, of the objects of contemplation. In a privileging of
difference over identity, Keats conceives of the poet as exemplifying a protean
changeability. Indeed,
[t]he poetical character […] is not itself – it has no self – […] What
shocks the virtuous philosopher delights the chameleon poet. […]
A poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence, because he
has no identity, he is continually in for – and filling – some other
body.41
Keats thus proposes a displacement of an authoritative poetic voice by an
ostensible merging of poetic consciousness with its field of contemplation.
Let me briefly recapitulate the progression of Keats’s ruminations on
what it is to be a poet. Keats appears to inaugurate his notion of Negative
40 Letter from John Keats to John Hamilton Reynolds, 3 February 1818, Rollins (Ed.) (1958)
Vol.1, p.224.
41 Letter from John Keats to Richard Woodhouse, 27 October 1818, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
pp.386-7.
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Capability in his famous 1817 letter to his two younger brothers, in which, in the
important claim I quoted earlier, but which bears repeating, he describes the true
poet as “capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any
irritable reaching after fact and reason”.42 Yet subsequently, as we have seen,
Keats continues to reflect upon the true character of the poet, perhaps most
notably in his equally celebrated letter to Richard Woodhouse in which he
elaborates upon the “chameleon” character of the poet who “has no self”.43
In his book Keats the Poet, S.M. Sperry seems ready to assimilate all of
Keats’s musing and speculation about the poetical character into an expanded
conception of Negative Capability,44 even though Keats does not always invoke
this term explicitly. In this chapter I am not primarily concerned with the
hermeneutical question as to whether Keats conceives of Negative Capability as
actually encapsulating the poetical character, or instead considers Negative
Capability to be a particular aspect of it. It is important, however, that we do not
blur the distinction between two different claims about the capabilities of poetry.
On the one hand, there is the claim that the poet has a capacity for empathic
identification to such a degree that the subject-object dichotomy collapses. On
the other hand, there is the idea of the poet dwelling in ambiguity and paradox,
an expressive mode that Keats places in opposition to rational argument. Let us
examine these two aspects of the poetic character in more detail.
The claim that the poet must be capable of empathic identification is, of
course, hardly controversial. Who would suggest that a poet can do without an
imaginative understanding of human nature, a sense of what it might be like to
42 Letter from John Keats to George and Tom Keats, 21 December 1817, Rollins (Ed.) (1958)
Vol.1, p.193.
43 Letter from John Keats to Richard Woodhouse, 27 October 1818, Rollins (Ed.) (1958) Vol.1,
p.387.
44 Sperry (1973), pp.243-4.
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be somebody else? Yet the striking feature of Keats’s position is the degree of
subject-object identification that he requires. In Keats’s view, the adequate
poetical treatment of others and otherness requires a complete effacement of the
self. For Keats, furthermore, poetry effects an important transformation of
subjectivity. The transformation which begins in self-negation finds its
consummation in the percipient creative discovery of new identities to inhabit
and animate what was previously locked in alterity. Keatsian poetic
consciousness not only empathises with its objects, but actually becomes them,
and this is made possible only through a dissolution of the self.
This is indeed a bold literary claim, and Keats, rather than attempting a
theoretical explication of how this might be possible, instead sets up
Shakespeare as the paradigm, an exemplar of Negative Capability whom Keats
strives to emulate. Spurning the self-conscious Wordsworthian cogitations,
Keats seeks to emulate instead the Shakespearean demonstration of a
comprehensive range of human sympathies, and perhaps most significantly for
Keats, Shakespeare’s sympathy for human suffering. The theoretical question
remains, however, as to how a transformation of consciousness, of the kind
Keats describes, could be so complete as to annihilate one’s own identity. In this
sense, while Keats’s elaboration in his letters of the concept of Negative
Capability is theoretically suggestive, he ultimately appeals to the concrete
historical context of English literature rather than explicitly theoretical
considerations.
Our analysis of the Keatsian understanding of poetic empathy has led us
to a preliminary sketch of the kind of cognitive acrobatics that Keats implicitly
advocates, and I have configured this as a kind of transformation of
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consciousness. The other Keatsian claim that we have identified, which pertains
to dwelling within “mystery”, relates not only to the cognitive requirements that
Keats places upon the poet, but also to the Keatsian conception of the production
of poetic meaning. In many ways, Keats’s theoretical understanding of poetic
meaning emerges from his postulated opposition between poetry and
philosophy. An important aspect of this opposition is conveyed in Keats’s
vigorous stipulation that
We hate poetry that has a palpable design upon us – and if we do
not agree, seems to put its hand in its breeches’ pocket.45
The poet, in other words, must renounce the didactic disposition prevalent in
philosophical argument. In its place, ambiguity and indeterminacy take root, not
as undesirable consequences of loose, unrigorous thinking, but as the
unpremeditated outcome of the empathic transformation of consciousness.
Indeed, it is clear from Keats’s admiration for Shakespeare that Keats takes such
indeterminacy, which may “crystallise a paradox”,46 as Sperry puts it, or, I might
add, give rise in many cases to a proliferation of possible meanings, to be a
hallmark of the canonical work. Yet Keats leaves a further theoretical question
unanswered. If a poetical consciousness can dwell within existential uncertainty
and anxiety, can anything be said in theoretical terms about the nature of such an
experience, and about its relation to the poetic text?
In this chapter I have sought to assess the extent to which a theoretical
understanding of poetry may be extracted from Keats’s meta-poetical thought.
Keats turns out to take a deeply cognitive approach by providing a detailed
45 Letter from John Keats to John Hamilton Reynolds, 3 February 1818, Rollins (Ed.) (1958)
Vol.1, p.224.
46 Sperry (1973), p.247.
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account of both the nature of poetic experience and the special creative talents
peculiar to the poet of true genius. His description of the latter goes some way to
explaining certain aspects of the former. However, in emphasising the particular
abilities of the poet, Keats tends to remain causally upstream of a theoretical
explication of how the literary text itself produces its effects.
Keats’s discussion of the poet’s capacity for empathic identification
helps to explain why he believes poetry has an essential connection with truth,
by implying that poetry in some sense collapses the subject-object dichotomy.
The implicit notion of subject-object identity renders Keats’s account deeply
philosophically suggestive, but unfortunately this important poetical matter does
not receive, at Keats’s hands, the kind of theoretical elaboration I suspect it
deserves. In this respect, Keats is more inclined to tell us what poetry can
achieve than specify precisely how, either in purely textual terms, or in terms of
the reader’s cognition of the text.
Keats’s idea of the poet dwelling in uncertainty coheres with his view
that poetical thought is alien to philosophical reasoning, and that poetry has the
capacity to realise complex emotion by evoking real-world pre-reflective
experience. However, in the absence of any cognitive elaboration, it remains
ultimately mysterious as to what Keats thinks it might mean, existentially, to
“be” in such uncertainty, and how such “being” might be invoked by the poetic
text. While not rejecting the notion of propositional truth, Keats believes that
poetry has an essential relation to a different, non-propositional form of truth.
One of the aims of this chapter has been to explore the degree of justification,
implicit or explicit, that Keats provides for this view. I have discounted the
possibility that Keats believes poetry to engage with an unchanging
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metaphysical realm on the grounds that Keats equivocates on whether poetic
beauty exists before it is apprehended. Keats is committed to the ideality of both
poetic beauty and truth, but remains metaphysically neutral. I have argued that a
more likely explanation, though not explicitly articulated by Keats, is to be
found in the importance Keats attaches to real-world experience, and that the
truthfulness of Keatsian truth consists in the poetic role of experiential
recognition. The resulting double aspect to poetic truth, its Janus-like relation
with ideality and actuality, is a paradox that Keats certainly registers but does
not fully explain.
While Keats’s notion of Negative Capability is certainly primarily
concerned with explicating the abilities required of the true poet, it would be
mistaken to think that Keats attaches little theoretical significance to the role of
the reader. On the contrary, it is clear from Keats’s account of aesthetic value,
and the nature of the apprehension of beauty and its relation to truth, that the
reader of poetry is not conceived as a passive and humble admirer of the poet’s
craft, but instead turns out to be inseparable from the Keatsian understanding of
poetry itself. The reader, and more precisely, the role of consciousness, are
implicated in the very constitution of beauty.
Considerations of poetry’s oppositional relation to rationality contribute
to Keats’s suggestion that poetic beauty can emerge in a context of
indeterminacy of meaning. In a very particular sense, a sense easily
misconstrued, this position liberates the reader from a felt obligation to
somehow master a text’s meaning, an obligation which amounts in itself to a
dialectical domination of the reader by the text. Accordingly, the reading act
itself can come to be conditioned by an a priori acceptance of the possibility of
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multiple readings. It may seem tempting, if slightly overwrought, to characterise
this as some kind of transcendental emancipation of the reader. The necessary
possibility of different readings certainly seems to emerge naturally from
Keats’s thought. Nonetheless, we must not forget that Keats also places
formidable demands upon the reader. As I have argued, Keats implies that
readers only apprehend poetic beauty by accessing aspects of their own real-
world experience in a recognitional encounter with the text; by exploring the
depressive “dark passages” of consciousness; by being in uncertainty, suffering,
anxiety. The Keatsian vocation for the reader is to live the emotion of the text,
and to recognise certain of its aspects as one’s own. It is, in this sense, a call to
empathy.
The trajectory of my thesis, then, has begun with, and found part of its
motivation in, the meta-poetical thought of John Keats. I have begun to describe
the way in which Keats intimates a distinctive theoretical position which
configures questions relating to affectivity, the imagination, and intersubjectivity
as being ultimately constitutive of the encounter with a work of poetry. As I
intend to elaborate, from a theoretical perspective, one of the most arresting
features of Keats’s meta-poetical thought is the way in which it connects with
some of the central concerns of twentieth-century phenomenology. It will be the
work of subsequent chapters to enlist the resources of phenomenology to
investigate some of the theoretical questions Keats raises. It is therefore
important that we now turn our attention to the phenomenological understanding
of intersubjectivity and the imagination developed by Edmund Husserl and
Edith Stein.
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Chapter 2 - Husserl and Intersubjectivity
A review of the work on intersubjectivity which Husserl either published
in his lifetime, or else explicitly authorised for publication, yields two principal
texts. Ideas II, largely completed in 1928 but published posthumously in 1952
by the Husserl Archive, contains a relatively brief outline of Husserl’s
fundamental conception of the constitution of the Other in empathy
[Einfühlung], an account of his important concept of motivation [Motivation],
and a delineation of a secondary kind of empathy understood as the perception
and understanding of another person’s motivations. Husserl’s Cartesian
Meditations, published in 1931, contains a more detailed analysis of the primary
form of empathy and its consequences, notably the constitution of transcendental
intersubjectivity and the objective world.
It is, however, also known that there is much more to Husserl’s
understanding of intersubjectivity than that which he explicitly authorised for
publication. Husserl’s voluminous literary remains speak of an abiding interest
in the question of intersubjectivity which began as early as 1905. Even after the
publication of Cartesian Meditations, it is now clear from Husserl’s working
manuscripts that he continued to grapple with the problem, at least until 1935,
just three years before his death at the age of seventy-nine.
A moment’s reflection will show that the question of how seriously
Husserl’s unpublished working manuscripts should be taken is not one which
should simply be glossed over. Two related considerations, I would suggest,
must give us cause for caution in this context. Firstly, it is known that Husserl
was inclined to continuously subject his ideas to revision, and this process was
evidently supported and facilitated through his prolific daily writing routine.
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Secondly, I think it is worth remembering that the decision, in the life of any
philosopher, to authorise a text for publication, to have it subjected to the rigours
of public scrutiny, surely in itself counts for something, hermeneutically
speaking. And if one accepts this latter premise, then, conversely, the absence of
any evidence of an intention to publish a given manuscript can hardly be said to
be hermeneutically irrelevant.
On the other hand, we should also remember that Husserl was serious
about having his manuscripts preserved, and that in 1935 he permitted Eugen
Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe to systematically classify them. It would be
incorrect, then, to claim that Husserl did not believe the manuscripts to represent
the potential basis for further (possibly posthumous) publications. Indeed, Dan
Zahavi points out that in a letter of 1931, Husserl writes that he believes his
most important work to be contained in the manuscripts. But such an informal
claim, at once both grand and vague, is hardly illuminating. Which parts of the
40,000 handwritten pages, mostly in shorthand, did Husserl have in mind? In the
same letter, we should also note that Husserl concedes that the manuscripts are
“scarcely manageable because of their volume.”1 The Husserlian Nachlass, it
would seem, presents us with an hermeneutical enigma, an enigma which
demands both interest and caution.
The Nachlass manuscripts help to underscore the fact that Husserl
investigated a variety of forms of intersubjectivity. For example, in PI III,
Husserl considers the empirical fact that a newly born baby readily imitates the
expression of its mother. From a phenomenological perspective, one of the
interesting aspects of this interaction is that it is by no means clear that the infant
1 PI III, lxvi. Trans. Zahavi (2001b), p.xx-xxi.
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of a few hours understands, at any level, its mother as possessing both her own
separate subjectivity and her own perspective on the world. This is to say that
we are at least entitled to call into question the presumption that empathy, in the
Husserlian sense of Ideas II and the Cartesian Meditations, has taken place. Yet
it seems apparent that some form of intersubjectivity is nonetheless at work. The
baby is aware of the mother, and aware too, at some level, of an interaction
taking place. This leads Husserl to suppose that there is such a thing as
instinctive intersubjectivity, and that the intersubjective instincts may precede
empathy. The idea that the human subject may be primordially intersubjective
leads to questions regarding the priority of empathy in relation to other forms of
intersubjectivity, and the priority of subjectivity in relation to intersubjectivity,
questions that we shall consider in more detail in this chapter.
At least one further form of intersubjectivity will be drawn into our
discussion. We shall discover in what follows that the empathic path to
transcendental intersubjectivity compels the subject towards a transformed
understanding of perceptual objects as the objects of transcendental co-
constitution. As a consequence of this transformation, averted aspects of objects,
such as the back of a building, carry a certain sense of being available in
principle to an indeterminate Other. Husserl calls the indeterminate subjectivity
correlated with an object’s range of possible appearances open intersubjectivity.
Although the prima facie implication of Cartesian Meditations is that
empathy manifestly precedes open intersubjectivity, it has been suggested,
notably by Zahavi, that there is a quite different Husserlian story to tell.2
According to Zahavi, a serious engagement with the Nachlass manuscripts
2 Zahavi (2001b).
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shows that Husserlian thought is ultimately orientated toward an intersubjective
transformation of phenomenology, and that empathy is necessarily conditioned
by open intersubjectivity. The obvious bearing of this claim upon our
understanding of the Husserlian account of empathy requires us to examine
Zahavi’s position carefully, and this will be pursued in the latter half of this
chapter. Let us turn now to the question of empathy, before considering its
possible inter-relations with other forms of intersubjectivity.
Part of the achievement of the transcendental reduction is to keep alive
Husserlian aspirations for a properly rigorous philosophical foundation for the
sciences. Yet a price incurred for the project of transcendental phenomenology
is that the threat of the objection of solipsistic self-enclosure would seem to be
effectively programmed in from the start. Is the transcendental ego, disclosed by
the epochē as the static subject transcending the flux of experience, ultimately
isolated epistemologically from other egos? Husserl himself certainly recognises
the force of this concern. Indeed, he proposes to enquire as to whether
[…] we, as phenomenologists, [can] do anything but […] say: “The
Nature and the whole world that are constituted ‘immanently’ in the
ego are only my ‘ideas’ and have behind them the world that exists
in itself. The way to this world must still be sought.”3
An indispensable part of the response to this question will appeal to
Husserl’s conception of the “noematic-ontic mode of givenness” of others as
objects of knowledge, arguing that the noema gives to consciousness neither a
mediating sense in the style of Frege, nor mere representation of the intentional
object, but precisely the object as it is intended. The epistemic value of this
transcendentally constituted noema is held to be sustained by virtue of its being
3 CM, §42, pp.89-90.
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intersubjectively verifiable in principle. Yet this “noematic” response to the
objection of solipsism now leads us to a more basic problem for the
transcendentally meditating phenomenologist: what is the origin for
consciousness of the notion of intersubjectivity? How could it come about that
the very idea of “someone else” should become thinkable for the post-epochē
transcendental subjectivity? It is to this fundamental question that Husserl turns
his attention in §§43-47 of Ideas II and in more detail in the fifth of his
Cartesian Meditations.
It is surely worthy of some reflection even at this early stage, and
without any explicit mention of the Other’s interior life or affectivity, that
Husserl considers that a certain conception of empathy [Einfühlung] is already
operative in such a way that its construal as empathy is not strained beyond
credibility. Husserlian empathy, in the first instance, may be said to be formal
rather than material. By this I mean that the accomplishment by transcendental
subjectivity that interests Husserl in the Fifth Meditation is not primarily the
grasping of the content of a foreign consciousness, but instead the necessary
precondition for such an act: precisely the “perception” (in a broad sense of this
term that we shall later make more precise) of a foreign consciousness. As
Husserl specifies,
[…] the problem is stated at first as a special one, namely that of
the “thereness-for-me” of others, and accordingly as the theme of a
transcendental theory of experiencing someone else, a
transcendental theory of so-called “empathy”.4
It is understandable that Husserl, in predicating “empathy” with “so-
called”, should register at this point some degree of equivocation in categorising
4 CM, §43, p.92.
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the experience of the “thereness-for-me” of others as empathy, for it is, after all,
simply the experiencing of someone else as there being someone else present. If
I were to inform you that I had consciously apprehended you as someone who is
not me, would you conclude that I had empathised with you? I doubt it. Indeed, I
may very well have been unable to empathise with you in any ordinary non-
phenomenological sense of the term.
In fact, contrary to what our everyday pre-philosophical intuitions might
perhaps incline us to believe about what is entailed by the concept of empathy,
Husserl underscores a sense of essential subject-object disjunction in the
empathic act, by arguing that the Other’s subjective processes are in principle
inaccessible to the empathising subject’s primordial experience.5 Nonetheless, it
will also become clear that Husserl does ultimately have justification in
configuring the bare apprehension of a foreign consciousness as a genuine
instance of empathy. The Other is not ultimately locked in alterity, but instead
comes to be understood at a certain fundamental level, and in a sense that we
shall shortly explore, as another “I”, an intentional modification of myself. For
Husserl, this pure moment of sameness, between a pure “I” and an apparent alter
ego, is a condition for the possibility of the constitution of the Other.
As Iso Kern helpfully points out, the three Husserliana volumes of Zur
Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität help to illuminate an important
stratification in Husserl’s overall conception of empathy by making explicit the
distinction between what I have just referred to as formal and material empathy.6
Husserl’s corresponding terms are inauthentic [uneigentlich] and authentic
[eigentlich] empathy. Inauthentic empathy is the basic, formal empathy of the
5 Edith Stein concurs with Husserl on this point, arguing that a so-called “feeling of oneness”
should not strictly be aligned with the concept of empathy. (Stein (1989), pp.16-18.)
6 Bernet, Kern & Marbach (1995), p.165.
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Fifth Meditation, which involves, as we shall soon see in more detail, a kind of
empty appresentation. Authentic empathy, on the other hand, is somewhat closer
to an everyday sense of “empathy”. It addresses, but is not limited to, questions
of affectivity, and is configured by Husserl as a genuine intuition of the other
person’s “motivations”. The problem of authentic empathy is one pursued in
more detail by Husserl’s assistant Edith Stein, and we shall benefit from her
important work, On the Problem of Empathy, in a later chapter. For the time
being, however, it is important that we turn our attention to the explication of
“inauthentic” empathy that Husserl provides in the Fifth Meditation.
The clarifying power exercised in the phenomenological reduction is
something that Husserl seeks to harness in a particularly focussed way in his
engagement with the problem of empathy. If the sense of the natural attitude’s
“external world” is ultimately sublated, in Husserl’s thought, as the intentional
correlate belonging to transcendental constitution, could it be that a more
bespoke reduction could clarify, or redeem in a higher sense, a particular aspect
of the natural attitude fundamental to intersubjectivity, namely the very
distinction between myself and others? The possibility of a rigorous elucidation
of the phenomenological origins of the apprehension of otherness leads Husserl
to undertake a fresh reduction which, prior to being performed, presupposes the
post-epochē transcendental attitude and its constituted world, a methodological
starting point that Husserl calls the “universal transcendental sphere”.7
Let us remind ourselves of the nature of this “universal transcendental
sphere” into which the epochē delivers us. Husserl may be understood as
implying that the epochē brings about a reduction in the scope but not the depth
7 CM, §44, p.93.
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of one’s cognition of the world. Let me clarify what I mean by this. The
reduction in scope stems from the suspension of ontic presuppositions bound up
with the Natural Attitude. Instead of being posited as existing in absolute
transcendence, intentional objects are apprehended as phenomena. This
restriction to phenomena qua phenomena means that “the world” as such
becomes tied to the intentional life of transcendental subjectivity. To adopt a
methodological perspective, the scope of my world is now delimited, as Husserl
puts it, to “that portion of the world which holds good by the measure of my
experience”.8 Nonetheless, the depth of my world-cognition is not degraded, in
the sense that perceptual objects qua phenomena carry a noematic-ontic mode of
givenness. The apple tree in my garden, as experienced, remains a public object,
and is not suddenly assimilated into my stream of really-inherent content. This is
to say that a certain intersubjective sense that Husserl articulates as
“experienceable by everyone” is retained.9
Although Husserl may appear to speak in Cartesian Meditations of a
single reduction from the universal transcendental sphere to the sphere of
ownness, there are good grounds for believing that two quite distinct
methodological steps are actually at work in Husserl’s account. These steps are
not methodologically equivalent, and cannot be regarded conceptually as mere
restatements of one another. On the one hand, there is the idea of including (and
only including) in my world all that is originally given to consciousness. On the
other hand, we find present in Husserl’s thought the idea of an expressly
solipsistic reduction, that is, a reduction which brackets intersubjectivity in
general, and acts of empathy in particular.
8 PI II, 51. Trans. Bernet, Kern & Marbach (1995), p.159.
9 CM, §44, p.93.
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In the combination of these two steps, we accomplish the “abstraction
from everything that transcendental constitution gives me as Other”.10 The
individual, in bracketing others, has bracketed cultural, communal, and societal
predicates from its experiences. In this sense, it becomes impossible to ask the
question “Who am I?”, if being a “who” means being such for others. A more
meaningful question, for the phenomenologist at this juncture, is to ask “What
am I, in and for myself?”. To this we have an immediate, and for Husserl, quite
certain answer: I am the static self-identical subject which transcends the flux of
its experience, the pure “I” disclosed by the original epochē. Husserl conceives
of this transcendental ego as “the identical Ego-pole of my manifold ‘pure’
subjective processes, those of my passive and active intentionality”.11
Yet the presence of the transcendental ego does not exhaust the content
of my individuality. The aggregation of my experiences also compels me, on the
grounds of consistent verification, to conclude that I am embodied. Husserl
shows us that the sense of this embodiment is continuously confirmed in a
number of ways. For example, my body determines my centre of orientation, the
spatial origin from which my perceptual acts are performed. I am not able to
separate myself, spatially, from the locus of my body. I may, of course, be able
to imagine doing so, but such imagined experiences are not posited as being real.
Husserl reminds us that the body is the locus of sensation, and that
sensation may be used as a way of perceiving the zone of one’s own body and
its boundedness. If I touch a surface with my hand, only to find that I sense the
surface but do not sense being touched by my hand, then, subject to consistent
confirmation, I conclude that the sensed region does not belong to my self, but
10 CM, §44, p.93.
11 CM, §44, p.98.
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to otherness. Otherness has now become disclosed to consciousness as a
consequence of the constituted boundedness of my body.
If otherness is now thinkable, we are surely substantially closer to being
able to apprehend someone else as someone else. Yet this is still not a
phenomenologically trivial step to take, especially as we have, as yet, no
conception of the objective world. The remaining phenomenological explication
of empathy envisaged by Husserl involves, firstly, perceiving another body as
just a body [Körper], and then realising that it is also a living body [Leib], an
animate organism. Husserl emphasises that the Leib is not to be conceived as an
assemblage comprising two essentially separate components. Instead, Leibe are
given as “two-fold unities […] of things and subjects, along with the subjects’
psychic life.”12 The significance of the embodiedness of subjectivity is an
Husserlian theme to which we shall have cause to return later in this chapter.
The central concept employed by Husserl in accounting for the
perception of another human body as such is that of “pairing” or “coupling”
[Paarung]. This “pairing” does not only occur in the context of empathy, but is
understood by Husserl to be a general phenomenon of intentional life. Pairing is
conceived as the phenomenological founding of a “unity of similarity” by two
phenomenally similar data, in which there takes place an “overlaying” of each
with the sense of the other.13 As we shall shortly observe, it turns out to be
important to note that, for pairing to occur, the two data involved do not need to
be interchangeably identical in appearance. Instead, pairing may well be
founded on a partial likeness, and the extent of the consequent overlaying of
12 Ideas II, §43, p.170.
13 CM, §51, pp.112-3.
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sense will be determined by the moments of similarity between the respective
phenomena.
Husserl classifies pairing, thus conceived, as an example of passive
synthesis, and more specifically, of association. As such, pairing is no deliberate
act of the intellect, but a primordial feature of consciousness, which, precisely in
its primordiality, resists further phenomenological explication. As Natalie
Depraz puts it, Husserlian Paarung is “the grounding process of empathy,
without which no further intersubjective experience is possible”14. Certainly, as
far as the Fifth Meditation is concerned, the appeal to Paarung is explanatorily
foundational. It provides the conceptual source of the sense of affinity between
subject and object whose explication must be regarded as indispensable to any
satisfying account of empathy.
As I intend to elaborate in what follows, if we proceed to examine
carefully the way in which Husserl employs this concept in the Fifth Meditation,
then it will emerge that two distinct functions are involved. This is to say that
two distinct cognitive gains would seem to be taking place, even if pairing itself
only occurs once, or, perhaps more plausibly, is occurring continuously during
the encounter with the Other. The concept of pairing helps to clarify how, in the
first place, the notion of “someone else” becomes thinkable for consciousness.
Beyond this, however, it also helps to explain how someone else as such comes
to be perceived. We turn now to the first of these two roles.
Having elaborated intensionally upon the concept of pairing, Husserl
proceeds to observe that in the phenomenology of empathy “pairing first comes
14 Depraz (2001), p.173.
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about when the Other enters my field of perception”.15 The significance of the
encounter with a body sufficiently similar to mine such that pairing occurs, and
especially the first such encounter, is that consciousness is awakened
extensionally to the very idea of someone else. Paarung’s overlaying of sense
associates the presenting body with my own, and, consequently, the sense
ascribed to myself of “animate organism” is transferred.
The concept of Paarung, we must remember, involves an overlaying of
each phenomenal datum with the sense of the other. We are therefore relying
upon the assumption that the subject’s body is necessarily simultaneously given
at the time of such an encounter. Is this justified? If my attention is directed
towards the Other, what reason is there to suppose that I am aware of myself?
Husserl’s answer is that I can be aware of myself without paying attention to
myself. In fact, Husserl claims that
I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in
my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay
attention to myself and turn toward myself with some activity or
other. In particular, my live body is always there and sensuously
prominent […].16
Husserl’s claim here is an important one, not least for his immediate
purposes of describing how basic empathy always stems from a primordial
pairing of bodily appearance. A claim broadly to the effect that my body is
somehow always on hand or available for the requisite pairing would indeed
seem to be called for, if Husserl’s account is to succeed. Yet the rather brief
formulation of this view quoted above seems to require some unpacking, and
might even seem at first glance to be overtly paradoxical. In what sense could I
15 CM, §51, p.113, italics mine.
16 CM, §51, p.113.
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be said to be “prominent” [abgehoben] for myself in the case in which I do not
“pay attention to myself”?
Clearly, part of the significance of the above passage lies in its
implication that there is something more to the structure of Husserlian
intentionality than that of straightforward volitional conscious directedness of
attention. The absence at this point in the text of any explicit elaboration upon
the exact nature of the mode of intentionality that Husserl has in mind seems to
invite, on the face of it, two alternative interpretations. On the one hand, we
might conclude that Husserl believes that the conscious subject always has an
awareness – either reflective or pre-reflective - of his or her own body. On the
other hand, Husserl may be referring to a kind of background awareness
conditioned by an antecedent reflective moment of bodily self-awareness. Let us
consider these possibilities more closely.17
At issue for us here is the question of whether conscious human subjects
always have pre-reflective bodily self-awareness. It seems to me particularly
difficult to sustain this idea. Convincing counter-examples can draw upon the
phenomenology of being engrossed in abstract thought. If I am seated in a
comfortable armchair and deeply absorbed in a mathematical problem, then I
become utterly oblivious to my bodily sensations, and they play no part in the
cognitive activity in progress. In this scenario, from time to time I may well
develop a pre-reflective awareness of some sensation or other, such as the
texture of the fabric of the armchair, but through an act of concentration such
temporary intrusions soon recede, and I am once again “lost” in my abstract
thoughts.
17 In this context, I am using the term “reflection” in the strict Husserlian sense of the
thematisation of an occurrent or retained lived experience.
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Of course, it is just possible that Husserl does mean to say simply that
conscious subjects are always bodily self-aware, pre-reflectively or otherwise.18
Yet in the light of such considerations as my counterexample above, this seems
to me unlikely, even though Husserl accepts the phenomenological possibility of
having pre-reflective awareness of lived [erlebt] experiences.19 Another
possibility is that Husserl means to say that conscious subjects engaged in
perceiving the world are always bodily self-aware, pre-reflectively or
otherwise.20 Finally it is also plausible to suppose that Husserl is proposing that,
simply by virtue of my acquaintance with my being always already embodied
(an acquaintance made phenomenologically explicit in the discoveries following
the reduction to the sphere of ownness), I necessarily carry with me and retain a
background awareness of myself as a living organism. In such a background
reflected awareness (and I am distinguishing here between “reflected” and
“reflective” awareness), the proprioceptive givenness of my own body as a
persistent component of my primordial sphere is apprehended as always present
and available to me, should I so choose, through a simple alteration in the
direction of my attention.
Husserl may be said to be describing an objectifying background
awareness even if the sense of objectivity is not yet mature. The objecthood of
my living body at this point lies somewhere between the bare objecthood
possessed by all intentional objects [Gegenstände], and the intersubjective
objectivity of Objekte towards which Husserl’s investigation is currently
18 Edith Stein seems close to this view when she says that bodily sensations are “impossible to
cancel”. (Stein (1989), p.42.)
19 For evidence of the Husserlian acceptance of the possibility of non-conceptual conscious
content, see Poellner (2003), p.48.
20 For evidence that Husserl believes that direct perception involves at root a buried belief in, and
commitment to, the subject’s embeddedness within a causal external world, see Poellner (2007).
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directed. The objecthood of my Leib seems to consist both in its being
consistently reidentifiable as “my body”, and in its being apprehended as a
contiguous bounded portion of my constituted world.
We are moving closer now towards a justification for Husserl’s
considered position that pairing occurs when a body sufficiently similar to mine
appears in my primordial sphere, but we must not overlook the need to
interrogate the perspective from which the putative similarity is being implicitly
judged. If the only perspective from which this similarity can plausibly be said
to be apprehended is that of some notionally transcendent point of view situated
outside of both bodies, and capable in principle of observing them objectively,
then Husserl’s entire Fifth Meditation would seem to face the threat of
circularity. The principal motivation, after all, behind Husserl’s investigation
into the problem of empathy is to show that empathy, in Husserl’s basic sense,
turns out to be a condition for the possibility of the constitution of the objective
world.
It is slightly surprising, therefore, that Husserl does not devote just a few
more lines, notably in §51, to explicitly articulating the implied similarities
between the proprioceptive givenness of my own body and the exteroceptive
givenness of the Other’s. I believe, however, that a coherent justification for
believing there to be such a phenomenal similarity can, in fact, be inferred from
what has gone before. Firstly, the passage in which Husserl qualifies his
description of Paarung by stating that “complete likeness” is but a “limiting
case”21 now becomes particularly significant. Partial coincidence is now clearly
understood to be a sufficient condition for pairing to occur. Pairing is not
21 CM, §51, p.113.
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necessarily triggered by some all-encompassing congruence, but instead
essentially takes place on the basis of moments of similarity, for the mutual
transfer of sense occurs “so far as moments of sense actualised in what is
experienced do not annul this transfer with the consciousness of ‘different’.”22
In the particular case of the pairing that takes place in empathy, of
course, it is precisely the moments of difference upon which we must rely for
the disclosure of this presenting somebody as somebody else. The salient
differences between the givenness of my own body and that of a different body
are traceable to the original distinction that my body belongs to my sphere of
individuality, while any different body is situated in my sphere of otherness: I do
not govern the other body’s movements, and its surfaces are not a source of
primordial tactile sensation for me. I, as transcendental ego, am situated inside
my body, not the Other’s.
What, then, are the moments of similarity that Husserl has in mind?
Perhaps most obviously, certain parts of my body, such as my hands, are
visually accessible to me in such a way that they present an image similar to that
of the exteroceptive givenness of the corresponding parts of the Other. But
perhaps more significantly, because the entire surface of my body is in principle
accessible to me through the sense of touch, I am able to apprehend, entirely
proprioceptively, my own bodily topography. My bodily appearance, though not
entirely accessible to me through primordial visual perception, is nonetheless
made non-primordially accessible to me in an appresentation founded upon
primordial tactile sensation. It seems to me that this discovery, made without the
benefit of any external transcendent perspective, is sufficient to provide me with
22 CM, §51, p.113.
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an immanent phenomenological basis for the apprehension of a morphological
similarity between another body and my own. With its concomitant mutual
overlaying of sense, the pairing that occurs in the primal encounter with the
Other thus harbours a moment of disclosure for consciousness: before, my grasp
of my external appearance was founded on proprioceptive givenness, but now I
can conceive, for the first time, of the nature of the primordial content of an
exteroceptive perception of myself. In this sense, the Other may be said to have
displaced me from my sphere of individuality. As Husserl observes, the
appearance of the Other’s body “brings to mind the way my body would look ‘if
I were there’”.23 Perhaps this “bringing to mind” falls just short of what could
properly be called a moment of intentional meaning fulfilment: there is no
exteroceptive primordial self-perception such as that which occurs when one
observes oneself in a mirror. It is, nonetheless, a moment of recognition,
manifested in a pairing between my previously apperceived self-body-image and
my primordial perception of the Other’s body.
The aspects of Husserl’s thought that we have considered thus far work
to explain how the notion of “someone else” becomes thinkable. The overlaying
of sense involved in the spontaneous pairing that Husserl describes configures
the Other as an intentional modification of myself, that is, as an animate
organism whose body is co-present with mine and understood to be governed by
a foreign transcendental “I”, my “alter ego”. A spontaneous moment of
associative passive synthesis, however, is not sufficient to compel the Husserlian
transcendentally meditating phenomenologist to posit the existence of the Other.
The existence of intentional objects, according to the necessary rigour of
23 CM, §54, p.118.
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Husserl’s method, may only be posited on the basis of harmonious and
continuous verification. Let us now turn to the question of how such verification
might occur.
When Husserl speaks of “a body similar to mine” presenting itself “as
outstanding in my primordial sphere” and “a body with determinations such that
it must enter into a phenomenal pairing with mine”,24 it is easy to presume,
especially for those of us with the gift of sight, that Husserl has in mind only the
body’s visual appearance. Granted, Husserl observes that the appearance of the
Other’s body calls to mind the way my body would look if it were to be seen
exteroceptively. But is it any less true that the sound of the Other’s voice calls to
mind the way my voice would sound if heard exteroceptively? And is it any less
true that the experience of touching the Other’s body calls to mind the way my
body would feel if touched exteroceptively? Even if Husserl’s examples do
sometimes display a visual bias, I find no evidence that he privileges, in any
phenomenologically substantive sense, visual perception over the other sensuous
modes. When Husserl speaks of the subject’s primordial “appearances”, it
should not be forgotten that phenomenal appearances can sometimes be auditory
or tactile (or, for that matter, olfactory or palatal). My point here is that this
generality inherent in the terms “perception” and “appearances” is itself
indicative of one respect in which Husserl implies verification of the perception
of an Other may occur. Under conditions of semi-darkness, for example,
touching a face may confirm that what is seen is human and not a statue; hearing
a voice may confirm that what is touched is human and alive.
24 CM, §51, p.113.
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However, Husserl’s interest in the verification of the existence of
someone else is not limited to corroboration between the sense modalities.
Instead, a further important avenue of verification lies in the intuition of
precisely that aspect of the Other which remains necessarily inaccessible to my
primordial stream of experience, namely the foreign “I” and the really-inherent
content of its conscious intentional life. Husserl’s concept of appresentation
again becomes relevant here, not because it explains in itself the phenomenology
of empathy, but because it describes formally what takes place: there is a non-
primordial making present which is founded upon primordial experience –
sensuous perception in this case – of the Other. As we saw earlier, empathic
experience, for Husserl, can never be properly construed as straightforwardly
primordial. It is, instead, always mediated by what is originally given to the
empathising consciousness.
This indirected or distantiated structure involving an objectifying
containment of a posited primordial experience is similar to that which is liable
to occur in the context of other intentional acts in which a primordial experience
itself becomes an intentional object, such as remembering, expecting, or
imagining. In fact, the imagination is necessarily implicated in Husserl’s
understanding of empathic intentionality, for time and again Husserl explicates
the apperception of a foreign consciousness as a spontaneous act of imaginative
self-transposal. Consider the progression of the following examples:
[The appearance of the Other’s body] brings to mind the way my
body would look “if I were there”.25
25 CM, §54, p.118.
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[The other ego] is appresented as an ego now co-existing in the
mode There, “such as I should be if I were there”.26
[The other’s primordial Nature] is my primordial Nature. It is the
same Nature, but in the mode of appearance: “as if I were standing
over there where the Other’s body is”.27
From the sensuous perception of the other Körper, the passive synthesis of
Paarung guides us not only to the apprehension of a foreign Leib, but to the
apperception of both the alien “I” and, finally, its primordial world. In a non-
primordial analogue of my “original intuition” of my own transcendental ego, I
now have a non-original intuition of the Other’s transcendental ego, and this
intuition coincides with the categorial judgement that there is someone else
present.
The repeated counterfactual “if I were over there”, whose motivation
stems from the original pairing of bodies, signals precisely the direction of the
Husserlian method of empathic verification. My ability, in principle, to move
spatially over to the Other’s centre of orientation, to make the Other’s “Here”
mine, is what renders possible, again in principle, the intentional meaning
fulfilment of my empathic act of the imagination. Conversely, the perceived
absence of a continuous spatial path from me to the Other would seem to
preclude the possibility of empathy taking place. The imagination, then, is
operative in Husserlian empathy, but in an heteronomous fashion, constrained
by the immanent factual domain. The distinctive, even paradoxical, feature of
empathy is that while there is, in epistemic terms, something to be got right and
verified, the only route to doing so is via the imagination.
26 CM, §54, p.119.
27 CM, §55, p.123.
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We are now in a position to observe a particularly striking
phenomenological consequence of the accomplishment of empathy. Constituted
in the Other’s primordial world is the Other’s own body, defining the centre of
orientation from which the Other’s world is experienced. But this body is the
same body that is constituted in my primordial sphere as the Other’s body, the
body into which I imaginatively transpose myself during the empathic act, in
which I apprehend a continuous spatial path from my own body to the Other’s.
In empathy, then, the Other’s primordial world is apperceived both with the
sense “my primordial world as experienced if I were to go over there”, and with
the sense “the Other’s primordial world”. I am compelled to conclude that I and
the Other share the same world.
Husserl shows us that empathy is epistemically transformative. It
transforms my verifiable understanding not only of others but of myself and the
world. The Husserlian description of the path towards the accomplishment of
empathy is a demonstration of the overcoming of the phenomenological problem
of solipsism. Empathy, far from being an autonomous act of the imagination
(though the imagination is involved as we have seen), is instead conceived as a
veridical intuition of an alien subjectivity. As Husserl remarks, “[In empathy]
[s]omething that exists is in intentional communion with something else that
exists”.28 This “intentional communion” is what explicates the sense of self-
transcendence in his conception of empathy: I may be said to displace or
transpose myself into the experience of the Other.
In empathy, I discover that I am but one individual among other
individuals. I apprehend myself (just as I apprehend the Other) as a closed unity
28 CM, §56, p.129. Husserl’s italics.
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of body and transcendental ego. Husserl calls this an “objectivating equalisation
of my existence with that of all others”29, and as such it entails the realisation
that my perspective is not privileged. In this way, Husserl’s Fifth Meditation
clarifies the sense of “objectivity” and “the Objective World”. The Objective
World is now grasped for the first time as the identical world shared by all
“monads”, where a “monad” is understood to be the concrete conjunction of a
transcendental ego, the associated individual person, and his or her
transcendentally constituted world. In the sharing of the constituted world, a de
facto community is formed, with the “objectivity” of intentional objects now
understood as precisely the property of being transcendentally co-constituted.
When one appreciates that Husserl understands such “objectivity” to be
precisely the sense of “being”, it becomes intelligible for Husserl to announce
that the intentional communion of transcendental intersubjectivity “makes
transcendentally possible the being of a world, a world of men and things”.30 In
this transcendental finding, empathy itself comes to be revealed as the necessary
route to the real world.
The phenomenological accomplishment implicit in Husserl’s account of
empathy and its role in the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity, if it is
to be broadly accepted, is that it provides us with a way of explicating the sense
of relatedness to others that we carry around with us, often as a kind of lived
intersubjectivity, in the natural attitude of everyday life. Our relatedness to one
another turns out to consist to a large degree in our understanding ourselves to
be coordinate subjects sharing a co-constituted world.
29 CM, §56, p.129.
30 CM, §56, p.129.
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One of the advantages of Husserl’s approach in the Fifth Meditation is
that by effectively undertaking a rational interrogation of cognitive processes
which are implicitly understood to be verifiable by the phenomenologically
reflective reader, Husserl ostensibly side-steps an engagement with the
primordial mysteries of human instinctual life. This is not to say that Husserl has
no interest elsewhere in the idea of an expressly primal kind of intersubjectivity.
His Nachlass manuscripts indicate that the question of primal intersubjectivity
was one he took seriously. Zahavi points out that Husserl’s manuscripts
sometimes refer to a “persisting primal aliveness of the totality of monads”
which Husserl characterises as a kind of temporally “streaming
intersubjectivity”.31 Yet Zahavi also tells us that this occurs after a monadic
communalisation of temporalities has taken place, which would seem to imply
that streaming intersubjectivity is conditioned by the thematisation of
transcendental intersubjectivity.32
Leaving aside the concept of streaming intersubjectivity, it is nonetheless
clear from other parts of the manuscripts that Husserl was intrigued by the idea
that transcendental subjectivity may at root be conditioned by some kind of
instinctive or drive-based intersubjectivity. As Zahavi puts it, Husserl intimates
the idea of “the being on hand of a pre-theoretical […] interconnectedness
[Verbundensein] of subjects”.33 According to this hypothesis, the apprehension
of transcendental intersubjectivity is to be understood as a disclosure of an
influence already at work within transcendental subjectivity, rather than as a
genuine transition from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. But it has to be said that
the view of the empathic path to transcendental intersubjectivity as disclosure
31 Zahavi (2001b), p.70.
32 Zahavi (2001b), p.70.
33 Zahavi (2001b), p.74.
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rather than transformation is at odds with the Fifth Meditation. The very nature
of the content of Husserl’s published work indicates that he felt his investigation
into intersubjectivity had more success explicating and thematising implicitly
rational cognition rather than essentially primordial drives and instincts.
Husserl’s overall approach seeks to distil what is essentially true of our
experience of the Other and ultimately of our grasping of an objective world. In
this sense, both empathy and the awareness of transcendental intersubjectivity,
though often occurring as background experiences, are always essentially
thematisable, and they are not understood to be necessarily conditioned by a
more basic, prior form of intersubjectivity.
Zahavi adopts a different interpretation, and his detailed account of
Husserl’s understanding of intersubjectivity draws upon an impressive
knowledge of Husserl’s Nachlass manuscripts. Zahavi argues that, understood in
its entirety, the Husserlian analysis of intersubjectivity cannot be understood as
being committed to the phenomenological priority of transcendental subjectivity
over transcendental intersubjectivity, but instead as holding that transcendental
subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity turn out to be equiprimordial.
The world-experiencing subject is a priori intersubjective, independently of its
factual encounter with other persons.
This interpretation colours Zahavi’s understanding of the Fifth
Meditation, in which the solipsistic subject ostensibly precedes all forms of
intersubjectivity. Zahavi’s proposed resolution to this discrepancy is to argue
that while the Fifth Meditation describes the thematisation of both empathy and
of transcendental intersubjectivity, a form of intersubjectivity is already
performing an anonymous constituting role prior to such thematisation. As
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Zahavi puts it, “constituting intersubjectivity founds constituted
intersubjectivity”. The route by which Zahavi attempts to substantiate this claim
is to argue, firstly, that horizonal intentionality is essentially intersubjective, and,
secondly, that, even following the ownness reduction, the experience of an alien
body is still horizonal. It is time for us now to consider Zahavi’s case more
closely. And in responding to Zahavi’s position, it will prove illuminating for us
to do some phenomenology for ourselves.
First of all, I believe it may be helpful for us to reflect briefly upon what
happens to the nature of the experience of transcendence when we move from
the natural to the transcendental attitude. In the Natural Attitude, the sense of the
transcendence of objects is loaded with ontological baggage: I take certain
objects to transcend me ontologically, in the sense that they do not depend upon
me for their existence; I can entertain without difficulty the idea of the world
containing objects of which I am unaware, and the idea of objects existing prior
to my birth and after my death.
Yet in the wake of the transcendental reduction the experience of
transcendence itself is not bracketed. Instead, the sense of transcendence, purged
of ontological content, is now understood purely in terms of the subject’s
intentional life. In the transcendental attitude, the sense of the transcendence of
an intentional object is not conceived in relation to me as psycho-physical
individual, but in relation to my intentional act. One and the same intentional
object may be understood to be amenable to being apprehended in separate acts
located across a set of perspectival and temporal positions. In the sense that the
set of perspectival and temporal positions may be said to form an intentional
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horizon, transcendent objects are said to be grasped as such in acts of horizonal
intentionality.
I believe it will also prove useful to distinguish at this point between two
types of transcendence, both of which may be apprehended within the
transcendental attitude. Firstly, there is what we might call “purely subjective”
or “solipsistic” transcendence. In cases of purely subjective transcendence,
although the intentional object is given horizonally and transcends the individual
intentional acts in which I experience it, the intentional object is nonetheless
exhausted in the aggregation of possible acts in which I experience it. Let us
suppose, for the sake of an example, that I am a carpenter and I have in mind an
innovative design for a chair. Then I may imagine perceiving an instance of such
a chair horizonally, and find that the imagined chair transcends any given
perspective I have of it. Yet this chair is not a public object, and it is exhausted
in my imagining it. This absent “public” quality now leads us to the second type
of transcendence, which we might call genuine transcendence. Genuinely
transcendent objects are not only given horizonally but also carry the sense
“experienceable by everyone”. Genuine transcendence, thus defined, coincides
with the full sense of Husserlian “transcendence within immanence” in the
transcendental attitude.
The subjectivity correlated with the range of perspectival and temporal
positions associated with a purely subjectively transcendent object is simply my
transcendental subjectivity. On the other hand, there is something essentially
intersubjective about the subjectivity correlated with the intentional horizon of a
genuinely transcendent object, for such an object effectively refers to an
indeterminate or “open” plurality of subjects. As I indicated earlier, Husserl calls
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this concept of indeterminate intersubjective correlated subjectivity Open
Intersubjectivity.
The matters considered thus far relating to horizonal intentionality would
seem to point to the conclusion that genuine transcendence is essentially
intersubjective while purely subjective transcendence is not. Zahavi, however,
argues that this is not the case. The view that Zahavi proposes, and which he
regards as authentically Husserlian, is that horizonal intentionality itself is
intrinsically intersubjective. This is by no means obvious at this point. Indeed, in
due course I shall argue that Zahavi’s position is incorrect. At present, however,
it is important that we examine more closely Husserl’s own understanding of
horizonal intentionality. Does Husserl believe horizonal intentionality to be
intrinsically intersubjective, or are his writings on this matter compatible with
the more moderate view that genuine transcendence is essentially intersubjective
but that purely subjective transcendence is not?
There are undoubtedly some passages in Husserl’s work suggesting that
he was at least drawn to the idea of intersubjectivity performing a constitutive
role in horizonal intentionality. In these passages, the constituting contribution
of a foreign subjectivity (or, in a phrase which carries a slightly less rigid sense,
“alter ego”) is brought in, to some extent quite plausibly, to resolve an apparent
paradox centring on the question of the co-presence of absent aspects. On the
one hand, my experiencing of any given profile of a particular intentional object
in itself entails the absence (or, to put it more precisely, precludes the primordial
presence) of certain other profiles of the object. For Husserl, this is not merely a
matter of contingent anatomical constraint, but ultimately a necessary feature of
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all intentionality associated with spatio-temporal objects.34 On the other hand,
the averted sides of the object, though absent or excluded from the subject’s
direct experience, are nonetheless understood by the subject to be co-present
with the available profile. There is a grasping by the subject of the simultaneous
availability in principle – to an indeterminate subjectivity - of all aspects
belonging to the object’s intentional horizon. But how can a particular profile –
an averted one - be both available in principle to an indeterminate subjectivity
and unavailable in principle to me? The answer that Husserl sometimes seems to
favour is that averted co-present aspects must be available in principle to a
foreign subjectivity, and that, in this case, horizonal intentionality relies at root
upon an essentially intersubjective constituting contribution. But we must note
that the factual co-presence of aspects does not rest upon a factual co-presence
of a plurality of subjects simultaneously observing the same object. The subject,
after all, may happen to be solitary. Instead, the co-presence at work in horizonal
intentionality is co-presence for me, in which averted sides are made non-
primordially present in appresentation.
It certainly seems permissible to adopt this understanding of co-present
aspects, at least in relation to instances of genuine transcendence, in which
intersubjectivity is already implicated in the structure of the kind of
transcendence involved. Indeed, when it comes to genuine transcendence, there
is no doubting Husserl’s position: genuine transcendence is essentially bound up
34 It seems to me worth noting that the following two propositions are not incompatible. Indeed,
I see no reason to think that Husserl would deny that both in fact obtain. (1) For any given pair
of profiles of an empirical object, such as the front and back of a building, which are in principle
incapable of being simultaneously originally experienced by a human subject, it is always
possible to imagine an embodied subject, with a different anatomical structure, not being so
constrained. (2) For all imaginable subjects, regardless of anatomical structure, the experience of
any given profile, or combination of profiles, of a perceptual object will necessarily preclude the
experience of certain other profiles of the object.
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with a foreign subjectivity’s experience. In the Other, we find the Husserlian
source of all genuine transcendence. But are we compelled to generalise this
conclusion to purely subjective transcendence, or is there instead a purely
subjective way of accounting for horizonal intentionality? Husserl informs us,
after pairing has occurred in the Fifth Meditation, that all objects of
appresentation are correlated with an appresented alter ego, an intentional
modification of myself.35 This alter ego is ipso facto not myself, and in that
sense foreign. But the option remains to interpret this “alter ego” as a
counterfactual imagined “myself if I were over there”. Surely that too, plainly, is
not me. Such a view is indeed consonant with Husserl’s thought, and I intend to
show in what follows that such an understanding of horizonal intentionality is
both coherent and plausible.
Let us begin by reminding ourselves that the term horizonal
intentionality designates a particular kind of object-directed experience which
involves a belief on the part of the subject in the object in question being
amenable to intuition across a range of perspectival and temporal positions.
Now, it seems to me that if we jump straight away to the idea of an
indeterminate foreign subjectivity being in principle available to take up any
given perspective (if, in other words, we presuppose open intersubjectivity) then
we may actually miss something important about horizonal intentionality itself.
For the present purposes, therefore, let us bracket open intersubjectivity and
attend for ourselves to the phenomenology of horizonal intentionality as
experienced by an expressly solipsistic subject. In restricting the correlated
subjectivity of possible appearances of the object to only myself, I find that the
35 CM, §52, pp.115-6.
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simplest and most natural way of grasping the range of appearances is in a
sequential fashion, that is, by correlating them with smooth and continuous
movements, either by me in relation to the object, or vice-versa. Indeed, it is
clear that the only way for me to experience a variety of perspectives is precisely
for there to be relative movement between me and the object. As solipsistic
subjects, we discover of necessity an important dynamic quality to horizonal
intentionality which is far less salient if open intersubjectivity is presupposed: in
occurrent acts of horizonal intentionality, the object’s aspects are not isolated
discrete views, divided among numerous observers, but instead always inter-
connected by smooth spatio-temporal pathways, in principle observable by a
solitary mobile individual.
Two important observations must now be made about the significance of
movement for the accomplishment of horizonal intentionality. Firstly, the
subject must be able to control, to the extent necessary for the purposes of the
verification of absent aspects, which relative movements take place, and when.
If I stand before a building then it is part of my horizonal apprehension of it that
the back of the building will be given to me whenever I decide to walk round to
the back. Absent aspects, for the careful phenomenologist, may only be posited
as existing (as opposed to merely hypothesised) on the basis of their ability in
principle to be confirmed. Secondly, the cognition of a smooth unfolding of
aspects depends upon the subject being aware that relative movement is taking
place. Without such awareness, the experience of an object’s changing aspects
may be rendered either unintelligible (perhaps as a puzzling kaleidoscope of
changing patterns) or simply uninformative (e.g. a rotating white sphere may be
erroneously grasped as a stationary white disc).
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These questions of control over, and awareness of, relative movement
between (objectivated) subject and object inform the importance that Husserl
attaches to our being embodied, and in particular to the role of kinaesthetic
awareness, in horizonal intentionality. In Thing and Space, Husserl goes so far
as to suggest that bodily self-locomotion and the associated kinaesthetic
awareness turn out to be conditions for the possibility of horizonal
intentionality.36 The thought behind this claim is that the continuous appearance
of new aspects of an object is implicitly correlated with the kinaesthetic
sensation of corresponding bodily movements by the observer. The
appresentation of averted aspects comes to be motivated by the thought of the
associated kinaesthetic sequences. “The rear aspect of this building” is
understood as precisely “the view of this building if I were to go round the
back”.
The expressly dynamic conception of horizonal intentionality just
described has the advantage of explicating the sense of absent aspects without
requiring an inflationary departure from the solipsistic attitude in which our
current investigation began. The absent aspect is not correlated with a foreign
subjectivity, but instead is understood as an unfulfilled intention of mine. As
such, it belongs to the horizon of my own capabilities. A possible concern,
however, about such a strictly solipsistic explanation of horizonal intentionality,
lies in the idea that it may be unable to account for the absolute co-presence of
aspects. If the subjectivity correlated with an object’s intentional horizon is a
solitary ‘I’, is it ultimately coherent to understand the perspectives associated
with mutually exclusive standpoints (e.g. the front and back of a building) as
36 Husserl (1997), 176 & 189.
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being temporally co-present? I intend to argue that a commitment to the co-
presence of aspects is in fact compatible with a strictly subjective understanding
of horizonal intentionality. This will involve some further reflection on the
implications of the “dynamic” account of horizonal intentionality that we have
developed thus far.
Let us suppose once again that, at a particular moment in time that we
shall call T0, I am standing facing the front of a building. Then, because of my
understanding of the horizon of my own capabilities, I am able to imagine a time
T1 in the future at which I would be in a position to observe for myself the back
of the building. Similarly, I am also able at T0 to imagine a time T2 after T1 at
which I would once again be in a position to view the front of the building. Now
the interesting feature of T2 is that at T0 I could also imagine viewing the back of
the building at T2. This would occur if I were to remain stationary between T1
and T2. It now becomes clear that at time T2, the front and back of the building
are both in principle equally available to me: they are therefore, in this sense, co-
present at T2. But now suppose that I imagine myself carrying out precisely this
same thought experiment at a certain moment in the past, specifically at time T0
– T2. Then my conclusion would be that the front and back of the building turn
out to be co-present at T0. This is precisely the result we are looking for. At any
given time, a solitary subject may grasp any two perspectives belonging to an
object’s intentional horizon as being co-present, on the basis of performing an
appropriate sequence of acts of the imagination.
Let us reflect now upon the question of the priority of empathy. Is
empathy the way in which the conscious subject originally enters into a state of
relatedness to others, or is there already something intersubjective about our
Chapter 2 - Husserl and Intersubjectivity
Page 55 of 302
conscious experience which precedes the factual encounter with others? In
answering this question, we must be careful to distinguish between factual and
necessary precedence. Husserl purports to demonstrate in the Fifth Meditation
that there is no necessary precedence of intersubjectivity, in any form
whatsoever, over the taking place of an act of empathy. I have argued in this
chapter that, with careful analysis and elaboration upon what is not always
explicit in the Husserlian text, it is possible to defend Husserl’s fundamental
published position that the primordinally37 reduced solipsistic subject is capable
of discovering empathy in the basic sense of experiencing someone else as
someone else, and, furthermore, that such empathy provides the necessary
pathway towards the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity and its
thematisation as an open community of monads.
In order to sustain Husserl’s position, it has been necessary to address
some potentially serious concerns about his account. Firstly, there was a possible
objection that Husserl might be seen to be implying that the sphere of ownness
already contains what it was supposed to found, namely intentionality towards
others. On my reading of the Fifth Meditation, however, this objection is dealt
with through a clarification of Husserl’s conception of the ownness reduction as
involving two distinct steps: a reduction to the sphere of originality, and an
expressly solipsistic reduction. Secondly, there was the problem of circularity,
encountered if the subject is presumed to apprehend the foreign body
objectively. We noted, however, that Husserl’s position is resilient to this
danger, and that pairing may take place on the basis of the non-objective
37 I shall follow Iso Kern’s lead and use “primordinal” (rather than “primordial”) in relation to
the sphere of ownness. In the original German, Husserl on certain occasions adopts the
neologism “primordinal” in relation to the sphere of ownness, but this innovation does not seem
to have propagated into Dorion Cairns’s English translation.
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phenomenal appearance of the other’s body in my primordinal world. Finally,
we faced Zahavi’s objection that open intersubjectivity turns out to exert an
anonymous constituting influence on the experience of the foreign body prior to
the apperception of the foreign subjectivity. In this sense, Zahavi believes that
Husserl’s overall position, understood in the context of the unpublished
manuscripts, implies that transcendental intersubjectivity is already at work prior
to its thematisation. This leads Zahavi to advocate a complex, contextualised
interpretation of the Fifth Meditation, according to which the nature and scope
of the ownness reduction is ultimately understood to be less absolute than
Husserl’s account in the Fifth Meditation, on the face of it, would seem to
suggest. Pace Zahavi, his argument on this matter, in my view, is not
compelling, not least for the fact that in his published work, Husserl chooses not
to register any suspicions that empathy is at root conditioned by a buried form of
intersubjectivity. I have also shown that there is a technical reason for rejecting
Zahavi’s argument: Zahavi relies upon the premise that horizonal intentionality
is essentially intersubjective, a view that I have argued is false.38
If intersubjectivity does not precede empathy necessarily, does it precede
it factually? This possibility seems more promising, and there are very strong
grounds for thinking that Husserl himself believed as much, notably in his
treatment of the human instincts and what he calls drive-intentionality
[Triebintentionalität]. Yet even here, Husserl always falls short of asserting that
intersubjectivity strictly precedes subjectivity, in the sense of positing a pre-
egoic collective consciousness into which the individuated subject subsequently
taps. Husserl suggests instead that intersubjectivity turns out to be woven into
38 In many other important respects, of course, my debt to Zahavi (2001b) is considerable.
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the fabric of human subjectivity, that the instincts bring about, as Zahavi puts it,
“an inter-monadic interpenetration of egoic life”.39 This primordial
intersubjectivity, though pervasive, is not in itself self-sufficient, but is
ultimately conditioned by the plurality and diversity of concrete subjectivities.
The question of the primordiality of intersubjectivity with respect to
subjectivity is the locus of an important divergence between the Husserlian and
Schelerian understandings of inter-human relations. According to Scheler, the
being of man (the human subject) is essentially both being-self and being-with,
but that the Thou is always fundamental and prior to the I. This is explained by
our being embedded in a neutral stream of experience which founds one’s own
experiences and those of others. This Mitwelt is what grounds our experience of
others, and makes possible a sharing and participation in the other’s feeling-
state. But this is precisely the radical form of empathy that Husserl rules out.
Husserl never permits a confluence of primordial experience, because the
disjunction of subjective processes is constitutive of the other being other.
In ruling out a radical togetherness or Mitwelt, Husserl is obliged to
provide an alternative explanation of the fact of intersubjectivity. I have argued
in this chapter that the Husserlian alternative essentially revolves around acts of
the imagination. Acts of imaginative self-transposal explain how any perceptual
object, including the other’s body, may be understood horizonally without
appealing to the idea of a foreign perspective. And they explain how a foreign
subjectivity and its primordial world come to be apperceived. The imagination,
then, is ultimately what bridges the intersubjective subject to others. The
imagination is prior to intersubjectivity, and makes intersubjectivity possible.
39 Zahavi (2001b), p.75.
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Chapter 3 - Husserl and the Imagination
The discussion in chapter 2 (‘Husserl and Intersubjectivity’) about
horizonal intentionality and empathy provides us with an indication of just how
important the notion of mediated or non-primordial intuition turns out to be in
the context of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology. By 1923/4, Husserl
believed that questions to do with the stratification of experience into layers of
varying immediacy turn out to be constitutive of Transcendental Subjectivity
itself. In a lecture contained in Erste Philosophie II, Husserl goes so far as to say
that
[…] transcendental subjectivity in general is given in stages of
relative immediacy and mediacy, and exists [at all] only insofar as it
is given in such stages, stages of an intentional implication.1
Husserl felt that the structure of what he calls here “intentional implication” had
the capacity to illuminate the nature of all kinds of acts involving mediated
intuition, in all the “peculiarity of [their] subjective being and […] subjective
performance”.2 As we shall discover in this chapter, “intentional implication”
turns out to go to the very heart of Husserl’s mature understanding of such
ostensibly diverse acts as memory, expectation, and what Husserl calls
“phantasy” [Phantasie].3 In a different way, it also informs his understanding of
the structure of picture-consciousness.
In the first instance, the distinction between what Husserl calls “the
stages of relative immediacy and mediacy” is a distinction between presentation
1 EP II, 175, Trans. Bernet, Kern & Marbach (1995), p.154.
2 EP II, 128, Trans. Bernet, Kern & Marbach (1995), p.153.
3 Throughout this chapter, the term “phantasy” (so spelt) will be used in the Husserlian sense of
Phantasie.
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[Gegenwärtigung] and re-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung]. This canonical
distinction underpins all of Husserl’s mature thought, and is exemplified in his
understanding of the relation between perception and phantasy. Even in his early
thought, he knew that, in the context of phenomenological investigation, it was a
fundamental mistake to think that perception involves a mediating image. The
problem when it came to phantasy lay in upholding phantasy’s intuitional
character while accounting for the fact that the phantasy object is not
primordially present. Husserl was fully aware of Brentano’s position on this
matter, having attended his lectures in Vienna in 1884/5. Brentano thought that
phantasy was only approximately intuitional, and that, more specifically,
phantasy “presentations” turn out to be partly intuitional and partly conceptual.4
But it is evident that Husserl felt that the Brentanian view compromised
phantasy’s wholly intuitional character. The defect in Brentano’s account,
according to Husserl’s early view, was that Brentano focussed on phenomenal
content to the exclusion of analysing the interpreting apprehension. Husserl
initially tried to resolve the dilemma by pursuing the hypothesis that phantasy,
unlike perception, is given in an act-character of pictoriality.
In order to adequately adjudicate on this hypothesis it will be necessary
for us to begin this chapter with a discussion of Husserl’s understanding of
picture-consciousness, before proceeding to consider Husserl’s early account of
phantasy. We shall find, as Husserl did, that the imagistic account of phantasy
runs into various difficulties, difficulties which force Husserl to re-evaluate the
foundations of consciousness. We shall follow the transition in Husserl’s
thought to his mature position, according to which acts not only of phantasy, but
4 Mohanty (2008), p.307.
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of memory and expectation too, are understood to be, in a sense that we shall
explore, “reproductions” of (respectively) non-posited or posited acts of
perception.
In this sense we shall find emerging from Husserl’s thought a sharp
structural dichotomy in his understanding of re-presentation, also sometimes
referred to as intuitional presentiation, between the distinct structures of
reproductive re-presentation and the perceptual re-presentation found in picture-
consciousness. I wish to argue, however, that in the context of more complex
acts of reproductive re-presentation, a structure remarkably close to picture-
consciousness is in fact liable to arise. The pre-condition for the entire chapter,
then, is that we develop a coherent account of picture-consciousness, and it is to
this question that we now turn.
We might observe first of all that there is something effortless about
viewing a picture. Indeed, we appreciate pictures even before we learn to read.
Can such a familiar experience really be worth many lines of explicatory
reflection? What could be more straightforward? I see a picture. It represents
something else. But to dismiss picture-consciousness as a banal commonplace is
to presume that what comes easily to the human subject must have a simple
underlying phenomenological structure. This presumption is mistaken. Even
after just a few minutes of introspection, one finds that the phenomenological
structure of picture-consciousness reveals itself to be remarkably intricate.
On my desk before me lies a postcard. It is a print of Rembrandt’s
Homer. The painting depicts, to characterise it with extreme brevity, an enrobed
elderly man. The subject of the painting is ostensibly Homer, yet this seems
more like a stipulation than a phenomenological datum, for we do not know
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whether the depicted man particularly resembles the way Homer looked. Yet the
painting’s title cannot be taken on those grounds to be gratuitous. Homer himself
is part of the meaning of the painting. The competent viewer’s consciousness
cannot fail at some point to be directed precisely towards Homer, the historical
individual. The painting refers to Homer primarily through its title, but it
arguably also alludes to him in supplementary ways, through certain features of
the painting’s content. One might, for example, try to make the case that the
golden band across the man’s forehead somehow signifies Homeric poetical
inspiration.
Yet if we leave aside titular and hermeneutic considerations, and
concentrate expressly upon the phenomenology of picture-consciousness, then
we are obliged to adopt a less complicated account of the “picture-subject”
[Bildsujet]. The picture-subject is now simply the man who is represented here,
whether he ever existed or not. Let us say, then, for the purposes of the
following discussion that the picture-subject is he who is represented here as the
enrobed elderly man. If, in the interests of conciseness, I refer in what follows to
the picture-subject as “Homer”, this proper name will always be qualified with
quotation marks.
Strictly speaking, of course, I do not see the picture-subject. Before me is
a postcard, not a man. Let us note in passing that the postcard, being a print of
Rembrandt’s Homer, is a photograph of a painting, that is, a picture of a picture.
This fact, however, will not affect our discussion, for this factual nesting of
images is in this case not phenomenologically salient. The postcard remains for
me a straightforward “picture-thing” [Bildding] in its own right, a picture of an
enrobed elderly man. It is a physical spatio-temporal object, capable, for
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example, of being torn and of curling and fading in sunlight. The
phenomenological question before us is precisely how the man’s appearance
comes to be represented to me by way of the primordial presentation of the
picture-thing, the postcard.
In spite of what I have just said, it would be mistaken to think that the
very idea of perceiving the picture-subject is not somehow at work in picture-
consciousness. A sense of what it would be like to perceive the man is contained
in the experience of the presentation of the picture. As Eduard Marbach puts it,
the picture-subject is seen as it were. And in Marbach’s formal terminology,
perception of the depicted picture-subject as such is patently implied in picture-
consciousness. This is to say that to perceive the man as he is represented would
be a fulfilment of the meaning intention of the picture. It will turn out that the
underlying reason for this is that the presentation of the picture-thing gives rise
in consciousness to the constitution of a semblance, a so-called “picture-object”
or “image-object” [Bildobjekt].5 An elaboration of this notion of image-object is
now required if we are to adequately complete our account of the essential
structure of picture-consciousness.
Thus far it has been relatively straightforward to delineate two distinct
objectivities given to picture-consciousness. On the one hand there is the
picture-thing, the physical entity which belongs to the empirical world. The
picture-thing is, more explicitly, a picture-bearing-thing, the rectangular piece of
coloured card lying on my desk. It is embedded in my spatio-temporal
environment, and in that sense just one object among others. On the other hand,
5 In general I shall favour the use of the term “image-object” rather than “picture-object” for two
reasons. Firstly, “picture-object” seems rather too close to “picture-thing”, potentially giving rise
to confusion. Secondly, I think “image-object” helps to convey the notion of resemblance more
effectively than “picture-object”.
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it has become clear that this piece of card refers to something beyond itself. The
card is about something, and the content of this aboutness is not something that I
can arbitrarily specify. Instead, the aboutness is proper to the card. In a
stipulative sense, it refers to Homer the historical individual. But more to the
point for our present concerns, it refers intuitionally to a particular individual,
the enrobed elderly man. This man himself is the picture-subject. One’s
apprehension of this man is prior to one’s judgement regarding whether or not
he exists.
On the basis of what has been said so far, we have grounds for endorsing
the claim that the notion of resemblance is in some way constitutive of picture-
consciousness. The picture-subject, one feels bound to say, is given intuitionally
in some suitably broad sense of the term, though not in the manner of
perception. The picture-subject, as Marbach puts it, is “given in the mode of
non-actuality”. The enrobed man is not now here in person in my perceptual
field. The most natural way of explaining the observations (1) that the picture-
subject is given in an inauthentic (non-primordial) intuition and (2) that the
apprehension of the picture-subject seems to be founded in the perception of the
picture-thing is to appeal to the idea of resemblance.
Yet we must ask whether we really mean here a resemblance between
picture-thing and picture-subject. In certain respects, it is true that moments of
resemblance do exist between the respective phenomenal contents of picture-
thing and picture-subject. The part of “Homer’s” beard that appears grey can be
correlated with a grey region on the postcard. But even with something as
ostensibly simple as colour, there seems to be a problem with the extent to
which the case can be made for a necessary resemblance between picture-thing
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and picture-subject. Part of “Homer’s” clothing appears to give off a golden
shimmer. On careful examination, however, the corresponding area on the
postcard is in fact pale yellow interspersed with regions of brown. It is
“Homer’s” garment which shimmers golden, not the postcard. We are now
forced to recognise that picture-consciousness cannot be adequately accounted
for in terms of just two intentional objects, the picture-thing and the picture-
subject. Something giving off a golden shimmer is presentified. It is not the
postcard, which is yellow and brown in the corresponding region. And it is not
the man’s garment, as the golden shimmer appears here and now; the garment is
not here and now. There must be a third intentional object. The Husserlian
answer is that one sees an image-object. The image-object is a semblance. One
sees a semblance of a golden shimmer. One sees a semblance of a grey beard.
One sees a semblance of an enrobed elderly man.
The relation between picture-thing and picture-subject, then, is not
merely one of signification. Signification does not necessarily entail
resemblance, a fact demonstrated by the majority of words in the English
language. But an adequate account of picture-consciousness, as we have just
seen, does entail the notion of resemblance. More specifically, picture-
consciousness - when fully explicated - entails an awareness of a resemblance.
The appearance of the picture-subject is bound up with, indeed governed by,
precisely the picture-thing. But the foregoing considerations suggest that the
presence of moments of resemblance between the respective phenomenal
contents of picture-thing and picture-subject is not constitutive of picture-
consciousness. There may be factual resemblance between picture-thing and
picture-subject, but according to the Husserlian account, it is the apprehension
Chapter 3 - Husserl and the Imagination
Page 65 of 302
(pre-reflective or otherwise) of a resemblance between image-object and picture-
subject which is constitutive of picture-consciousness.
It will prove important for us to note at this point that there is a relation
of founding between picture-thing and image-object. More precisely, if one is
unable to perceive the picture-thing, then one is necessarily unable to view the
image-object. Perception of the picture-thing pervades awareness of the image-
object. Picture-consciousness itself is founded upon and permeated by the
primordial perception of the picture-thing. For reasons that will become clear
later in this chapter, it is also important that we note at this point that if one is
able to see the image-object, then one is then able in principle to switch one’s
attention back towards the picture-thing, and indeed back and forth as one
pleases.
Let us suppose now that I wish to check something about the appearance
of the picture-subject. Suppose, for example, that I cannot remember “Homer’s”
facial expression. I turn to the picture. Now the phenomenological fact of the
matter is that my volitional act of checking “Homer’s” expression does not
consist in looking up an appropriate region of the surface of the postcard. This is
not to deny that perceptual activity in relation to the picture-thing is factually
taking place. My subjective concern, however, consists in viewing the image-
object, not the picture-thing. I need to consult the semblance in order to find out
“Homer’s” facial expression. The semblance of “Homer” looks worried and
frail. And so I know that “Homer” looks worried and frail. My point here is that
the image-object has what we might call quasi-epistemic value. The image-
object cannot be said to refer to an image of the picture-subject, if our account is
to avoid an infinite regress. The image-object refers precisely to the picture-
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subject. “Homer” is intentionally given to consciousness, but in a non-
primordial fashion.
In order to illuminate further the constitution of the image-object, I wish
to differentiate between two distinct attitudes that may be adopted during the
viewing of a picture. My intention in doing this is to illuminate the way in which
a switching between the two attitudes corresponds to a switching in attention
between the image-object and picture-subject. Firstly, there is what Husserl
understands to be a kind of aesthetic attitude, in which concern centres upon the
way in which objects appear. Aesthetic experience finds value exclusively in
appearances, and, like the post-epochē transcendental attitude, is not essentially
concerned with any putative reality underlying phenomena. When viewing a
picture in the aesthetic attitude, the image-object is apprehended qua image-
object, precisely as a semblance of what is depicted. But to apprehend a
semblance qua semblance is to have one’s attention simultaneously directed
towards what is represented. In this sense, awareness of the picture-subject
always penetrates awareness of the image-object. There is a double-object
consisting of both the image-object and the picture-subject.
As I indicated earlier, in picture-consciousness I am not free to imagine
any image-object that I wish. The constitution of the image-object in
consciousness is constrained by what is given in the phenomenal content of the
picture-thing. Yet the image-object is still a construct of an act of the
imagination: it is an ideal, or purely intentional object. The semblance is what I
make of the picture, not a spatio-temporal entity that I perceive. The semblance
is not substantive, in the sense that its constitution is necessarily conditioned by
the constitution of something else, namely the picture-thing. The semblance then
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is a pure objectivity, constituted in consciousness in an heteronomous act of the
imagination.
It is, however, possible to adopt a different, non-aesthetic attitude during
picture-consciousness: one may shift the emphasis of one’s attention onto the
picture-subject. If a customs official views my passport photograph in order to
check my identity, then he is concerned primarily with whether the photograph
is of me, not with the manner with which I appear in the photograph. However,
as I intend to elaborate, while it may seem possible to attend solely to the
picture-subject in a lived experience of picture-consciousness, a reflective
explication of such a lived experience must inevitably lead back to an awareness
of the image-object as such and therewith some form of, or approximation to, an
aesthetic attitude. Let us suppose that I contemplate Rembrandt’s Homer, but
deliberately focus my attention upon the picture-subject, precisely the enrobed
elderly man, the perception of whom is implied in the picture. I do not think I
see a real man. I am not fooled. But it is as if I see the enrobed elderly man – yet
only as if. In this case my attention is in the first instance directed towards the
picture-subject. This is not to say that an image-object has not been constituted,
but rather that my attention has penetrated the image-object and grasped the
painting’s subject. When I reflect upon the way in which “Homer” appears, I
become explicitly aware of the image-object that was constituted yet buried in
my lived experience. The image-object penetrated the picture-subject all along,
just as my attention at first penetrated the image-object.
Husserl remarks that the image-object “truly does not exist”.6 An
assertion of this kind is certainly warranted, indeed arguably quite helpful
6 Husserl (2005c), §10, p.23.
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inasmuch as it registers at a stroke two important facts. Firstly, the image-object
is not real in the sense that it does not belong to the domain of spatio-temporal
reality. Secondly, the image-object also does not possess the quality of what is
perhaps best called ideal existence. The number π may be said to have ideal 
existence because it possesses the character of being pre-given, of seeming to
have been awaiting discovery. The number π is taken to be mind-independent: 
the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter exists regardless of whether
people exist. But the image-object is not self-sufficient in this way. Without the
picture-thing it is nothing. The image-object is, as Marbach puts it, “permeated”
by the perception of the picture-thing.
To say that the image-object is “truly nothing”7, as Husserl does, seems
less helpful than saying it “truly does not exist”. To say that something is
nothing seems to imply that it is not amenable to predication, which the image-
object is. It is of the essence of the image-object that its predicates be couched in
terms of appearance, for the image-object is the picture-subject as it appears in
the picture-thing. And “Homer” as he appears in Rembrandt’s Homer appears to
have a grey beard, appears to be wearing various garments, one of which
appears to give off a golden shimmer, and so on. We might perhaps best put
matters like this: the image-object is intersubjectively verifiable, and is ontically
heteronomous in relation to the picture-thing.8
It is now possible to see why Husserl ultimately conceives of picture-
consciousness as “imaging in the sense of perceptual phantasy understood as
immediate imagination”.9 The paradoxical phrases “perceptual phantasy” and
7 Husserl (2005c), §10, p.23.
8 On occasion Husserl uses the term “irreal” to describe entities that are constituted by
consciousness but which do not exist. E.g. Husserl (2005c), p.84.
9 Husserl (2005c), Text 18b.515, p.616.
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“immediate imagination” speak of the remarkable tensions implicit in the
essential intentional structure of picture-consciousness. The imagination
involved is “immediate” in the sense of not seeming to require any creative
constituting effort on the part of the subject. The content of the phantasy is
governed by the constitution of the picture-thing, and in this sense the phantasy
is “perceptual”. This layered intentional structure of picture-consciousness,
though intricate, is not ultimately mysterious, which is not to deny the noetic
truth of Marbach’s remark that “there is something unreal about pictures”.10 The
phenomenological force of this latter remark lies in the fact that picture-
consciousness cannot be adequately understood as simply a special kind of
direct perception. The apprehension of pictoriality is not, for example, analogous
to the apprehension of rectangularity. Rectangularity is a perceptually grasped
property, but picture-consciousness, though founded upon and permeated by
perception of the picture-thing, necessarily involves in addition some entirely
new intuitional faculties. The picture-subject, which may or may not be posited,
is represented in the image-object, which itself strictly does not exist but is
constituted in the realm of irreality. The constitution of both image-object and
picture-subject show that picture-consciousness, far from being an advanced yet
fundamentally perceptual act is in fact a sui generis mode of intuition of which
direct perception is merely one, albeit founding, component.
In reaching the finding in this chapter so far that picture-consciousness
cannot be adequately explained in terms of a theory of perception, the topic of
the imagination has naturally and necessarily been broached, but without until
this point a great deal of elaboration upon what exactly imagining consists in.
10 Marbach (1993), p.138.
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The advantage of investigating the nature of picture-consciousness before
turning to the question of what Husserl would call “pure phantasy” is that it
should enable us to adjudicate with some clarity upon Husserl’s early position
that pure phantasy itself has the structure of picture-consciousness. This idea,
that to imagine something is to picture it in one’s own mind, is in certain
respects a seductive one, and Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts show that he
required no small amount of phenomenological reflection in order to extricate
himself eventually from its grip. Let us turn initially to Husserl’s early position
before addressing the reasons that led Husserl ultimately to reject it.
With respect to the relation between picture-consciousness and the
imagination, questions of terminology now become particularly pressing. In
German, as in English, the notion of the imagination is often bound up, through
general association or etymological resonance, with the notion of an image
[Bild]. Most obviously, the etymological link is visible in the noun Einbildung
(imagination) and the verb sich einbilden (to imagine). Husserl’s preference for
the term Phantasie, in reaching back etymologically to the Greek phantazein
(‘make visible’) via the Latin phantasia (‘appearance’), helps to preclude
problematic and unintended connotations with pictoriality. In English, however,
the term “fantasy” (so spelt) often carries with it connotations that are not
pertinent to the present discussion. Talk of “fantasy” sometimes has overtones
connected with desire. The question of desire may well emerge more strongly in
later chapters of my thesis (I am thinking here in particular of the chapter on
Starobinski, and the chapter on literature’s capacity for moral suggestion) but it
is not directly relevant to the Husserlian concerns which are the focus of this
chapter. “Fantasy” is also often used in relation to an event or occurrence
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considered to be either impossible or improbable. In a literary context, it refers
to a genre of fiction involving such things as unrealistic settings, and magical
adventures. As I indicated earlier, throughout I shall often make use of the term
“phantasy” [Phantasie] and do so in the Husserlian sense, both to avoid
implying pictoriality where no such implication is intended and to avoid the
unintended connotations often invoked by the word in its more common spelling
of “fantasy”.
The most general feature of phantasy that Husserl grasps from the outset
(and in this basic respect he remains consistent throughout his treatment of the
imagination) is its intuitional character. As he suggests in LI II, in both
perception and phantasy the object is given in what he calls “intuitive
presentation” [Vorstellung].11 In phantasy presentation, it is not a sign or symbol
that is given to consciousness. Instead, an object appears, but not “in person”
[leibhaft]. As Husserl puts it, “it is as though it were there, but only as though”.12
The “as though”, then, is double-edged. In one respect it points to a structural
analogy with perception. Indeed, as Husserl observes in Hua XXIII,
[…] to every possible perceptual presentation there belongs a
possible phantasy presentation that refers to the same object and,
in a certain sense, even refers to it in precisely the same way.13
As in perception, phantasy involves both act-matter and act-character. And
again, as in perception, the act-matter is perspectival: it amounts to a view of the
object, not the object itself. Yet in a different respect, the “as though” registers
precisely a differentiation from perception. The object is not “there”, “here”, or
11 Husserl (2005b), p.235.
12 Husserl (2005c), p.18.
13 Husserl (2005c), p.17.
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“now” in my perceptual field. It is not unnatural to conclude that consciousness
is therefore being confronted with an image of the object.
Husserl’s position regarding the pictoriality of phantasy is consistent
across LI II and the early texts of Hua XXIII. In Text No.1 from 1904-5, Husserl
invites the reader to consider the example of imagining a landscape that one has
previously viewed.14 Then we find in this case that there is a similarity, or
likeness, in phenomenal content between the perception and the phantasy.
Indeed, Husserl goes on to assert that, quite generally, “[a]nyone who phantasies
has an image experience”.15 One takes the phantasy presentation to be “a re-
presentation, a pictorialisation”.16 Again, in LI II, the claim is no different: “[In
the imagination] the same object appears in a likeness”17; “[…] imaginative
contents comprise only analogising contents”.18
The central phenomenological question at stake here is, however,
whether the constitution of the likeness is immanent to the act itself, or whether
it occurs only in a subsequent act of reflection. On this matter, Husserl’s early
work is unequivocal: he refers precisely to the character of the act itself: “[…]
the character of the imagination lies in analogical picturing”19. The Husserlian
rationality at work here then is not inferential. The apprehension of the imagined
object as being re-presented in an image is not held to be an inferential
accomplishment. Instead, Husserl is arguing that the phantasy act itself has the
very tincture of pictoriality. As J.B. Brough translates it,
14 Husserl (2005c), p.17.
15 Husserl (2005c), p.27.
16 Husserl (2005c), p.27.
17 Husserl (2005b), p.222.
18 Husserl (2005b), p.237.
19 Husserl (2005b), p.235.
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[…] image consciousness has a tinction that confers on it […] the
characteristic of representation according to resemblance. […] And
this is not a conceptual knowing either, nor does it imply that I
undertake an act of distinguishing and relating, setting the
appearing object in relation to an object thought of. On the
contrary, the image is immediately felt to be an image.20
It is, of course, somewhat inadequate merely to insist that phantasy is
endowed with an act-character of pictoriality, even if one were to find this to be
the case as a matter of descriptive fact. Husserl proceeds to attempt to justify this
claim by describing the intentional structure of phantasy, arguing that phantasy
and picture-consciousness share what he calls a “community of essence”.21
We are entitled to ask ourselves first of all, however, whether on
introspective reflection, Husserl’s claim about the imagistic character of
phantasy actually rings true. One way of challenging the claim is to pursue the
question of whether there are any necessary limits on how realistic a phantasy
may seem to be. It is conceivable that I might be able to imagine extremely
vividly, and regardless of whether it exists or not, a certain landscape. I might
assert without hyperbole that it is as though I were there, as though I were
breathing the very country air, as though I were seeing the very trees. If I make
such assertions in good faith and without hyperbole, then one must conclude
simply that I have a very vivid imagination. It is erroneous to think that if a
phantasy seems sufficiently real then it will be taken by the subject to be real. I
do not mistake the appearance of the imagined landscape for an immediate
perceptual presentation no matter how vividly it may appear. There are other
20 Husserl (2005c), pp.27-8.
21 Husserl (2005c), pp.22.
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reasons quite distinct from the quality of fullness22 of the imagining which
ensure that I never waiver from my apprehension of its phantasy character. It
might be that I am aware that I am volitionally imagining something, and aware
for that reason that the lived quality of my intentional act is other than that of
direct perception. Pre-reflective awareness of one’s own imaginative volition
would then permeate the act-character of phantasy.
We must consider whether the imagining subject always has this kind of
self-awareness, awareness that one is volitionally imagining. Is awareness of
one’s own volition always strictly present to the imagining consciousness? The
case of a spontaneous day-dream seems to suggest that this is not the case. I
might have a spontaneous day-dream of the same landscape that I imagined
deliberately earlier on in our discussion. Now in this case the character of
phantasy is still given to consciousness. I do not believe that I am suddenly in
the countryside no matter how vivid the day-dream may be. The difficulty here
then lies in explaining the act-character of phantasy without appealing either to a
deficiency in the phantasy’s fullness, or to awareness of the presence of
conscious imaginative volition. The most convincing answer must be that I am
aware of a conflict between the phenomenal content of the immediate
presentation of my surroundings, and that of the day-dream. They seem to
overlap each other, and cannot be attended to simultaneously. If my awareness
of my surroundings were to somehow recede, for example if I were to fall
asleep, then my believing myself to be in the countryside would become a real
22 Husserl discusses the concept of the “fullness” of a presentation in LI II pp.233-238. Fullness
in this context is characterised by three dimensions that he calls “extent” (completeness of
scope), “liveliness” (fidelity), and “reality-level […], the greater or less number of its strictly
presentative contents” (which I take to mean richness of detail, vividness, or what we might
perhaps call “resolution”). (Husserl (2005b), p.238).
Chapter 3 - Husserl and the Imagination
Page 75 of 302
possibility. The act-character of imagining would dissolve into one of
perceiving.
We now have particularly strong grounds for rejecting the idea that the
act-character of imagining necessarily depends upon some kind of deficiency in
the fullness of the content. There are perfectly good reasons why an extremely
vivid phantasy may be grasped as such, namely awareness of one’s own
imaginative volition, and the conflict with one’s awareness of one’s
surroundings. All of this now puts pressure on Husserl’s early position that
phantasy has the act-character of pictoriality. The structure of picture-
consciousness, as we saw earlier, relies upon an essential discrepancy and
differentiation between the appearance of the image-object and that of the
implied perceptual presentation of the picture-subject. In Hua XXIII, Husserl
attempts to deal with the question of what he calls “thoroughly vital phantasy”23
by arguing that it does not retain its freshness for long. As he puts it, “[…] what
appears turns into an image object of itself, as it were”.24 Husserl’s suggestion
here is that the structure of picture-consciousness ineluctably asserts itself in
phantasy. The intentional object is re-presented in an image-object. Image-object
and intentional object are interwoven, and inter-penetrate one another. The
image-object is irreal, constituted in consciousness and founded upon really-
immanent phantasms.
It is not incoherent to claim, rightly or wrongly, that vivid imaginings
eventually break down into something else that has the structure of picture-
consciousness. But there is something evasive about Husserl’s move here, for it
remains for him to explain the vivid imaginings themselves, whose possibility
23 Husserl (2005c), p.33.
24 Husserl (2005c), p.34.
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and existence he does not deny. It is a notable lacuna in Husserl’s early position
that the essential structure of vivid imaginings remains unexplicated, beyond his
saying that they differ in structure from what he thinks they become.
Let us remind ourselves that the Husserlian account of picture-
consciousness that we considered earlier involves three interwoven objectivities:
picture-thing, image-object, and picture-subject. The interwoven character of
these three objects in itself provides us with grounds for suspicion regarding
Husserl’s simultaneous contention that although phantasy possesses the essential
structure of picture-consciousness, it only involves two of the three objects,
namely the image-object and the picture-subject. In fact, Husserl has good
reasons for excluding the picture-thing from the structure of phantasy. Firstly,
Husserl is certainly averse, indeed methodologically opposed, to being drawn
into psychologistic speculations regarding mental images held to be susceptible
in principle to empirical investigation. It is to the empirical world, as we noted
earlier, that picture-things belong. There can therefore be no picture-thing
immanent to consciousness. Secondly, when I imagine a landscape, the
landscape does not appear to be framed or contained within a separate physical
object. No picture-thing is given to consciousness, and this differentiates
imagining a landscape from walking into an art gallery and viewing a painting of
it. We must therefore also discard the idea that a picture-thing is somehow
constituted by consciousness during phantasy.
The naïve view, the view which is often implicitly under the sway of
psychologism, is that the image given to consciousness is a really-inherent inner
picture. But we noted earlier that the image-object is not immanent to
consciousness but constituted in a spontaneous act. Now if the structure of
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phantasy does not include a picture-thing, we must ask what Husserl considers
to found the constitution of the image-object. His answer is that the image-object
is constituted on the basis of phantasms. By “phantasm” Husserl means the
imaginary correlate of sensation, indeed an intentional modification of sensation.
Phantasm is the presentative content of phantasy, and interpreted in phantasy.
We noted earlier, however, that one of the distinctive features of picture-
consciousness proper is that it permits the subject to switch attention back and
forth between picture-thing and image-object. This volitional alteration in
intentional object corresponds to a switching in conscious activity between
direct perception and a “dwelling within” picture-consciousness. We should not
take, however, the phenomenological and indeed ontological differentiation
between picture-thing and image-object to imply constitutional independence
between the two objects. The constitution of both objects is founded upon the
same sensuous phenomenal content. Beyond this, however, the constitution of
the image-object depends upon the perception of the picture-thing. As Eduard
Marbach puts it, perception of the picture-thing is in fact an “intentional
moment” of the constitution of the image-object.25 This is to say that for the
subject engaged in picture-consciousness, the possibility in principle of turning
one’s attention to the picture-thing is an essential part of the structure of picture-
consciousness itself. This finding has important consequences for the discussion
concerning Husserl’s early understanding of phantasy. If the hypothesis that
phantasy has the structure of picture-consciousness is true, then imagining, say,
a landscape, implies the necessary possibility of turning one’s attention towards
a picture-thing bearing the landscape’s image. The picture-thing itself must
25 Marbach (1993), p.179.
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therefore be capable in principle of being constituted in phantasy. It would seem
that we are then obliged to permit the possibility in principle of turning one’s
attention towards a new picture-thing bearing the first picture-thing’s image. But
then we would be faced with an infinite regress. The hypothesis that phantasy
has the structure of picture-consciousness is showing itself to be deeply
problematic.
Let us briefly reflect and recapitulate upon Husserl’s early writings on
phantasy and picture-consciousness. We must observe that they actually entail a
rather odd combination of commitments. On the one hand, the picture-thing is
interwoven into the structure of picture-consciousness, the structure allegedly
possessed by phantasy. But on the other hand, Husserl finds very strong, indeed
compelling, grounds for excluding any essential role for a picture-thing in
phantasy. Something, as we have found, has to give. It certainly seems
implausible, on detailed investigation, to speak of picture-consciousness without
implicit reference to a picture-thing. Even when one “dwells within” picture-
consciousness in the sense of being deeply absorbed in a picture, for example
during aesthetic contemplation, there is still awareness of a conflict between
image-object and picture-subject, a conflict which is attributable precisely to the
constitution of the image-object being founded upon the same phenomenal
content that founds the constitution of the picture-thing. The image-object is
permeated by the perception of the picture-thing. The picture-thing cannot be
subtracted from picture-consciousness without losing picture-consciousness
itself.
One wonders, of course, just what happened to what I paraphrased as the
salient “tincture of pictoriality” when Husserl eventually changed his account of
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the noetic character of phantasy. In Husserl’s defence at this point, there is
admittedly some phenomenological merit to the imagistic explanation. There is a
neatness to it inasmuch as it coherently explains both the intuitional character of
phantasy, and why we do not mistake phantasy for perception. Yet we have
noted that the imagistic explanation also has certain seductive undertones that
require exposure. For one thing, as I pointed out earlier, there is in common
parlance a deep-seated conceptual entanglement between phantasy and pictures,
attributable at least in part to the etymological linkage, present in both German
and English, between imagining and imaging. In addition to this, however, we
have also noted that the imagistic account is suspiciously closely aligned with
the direction of neuroscientific and psychologistic discourses, discourses from
which Husserl rightly sought to distance himself and his phenomenological
project. It may be that an underlying worry about lapsing into psychologism in
some sense “necessitated” Husserl’s remarkable initial certainty about the
“tincture of pictoriality”. Husserl may equally have felt philosophically obliged
to adopt, at least provisionally, the imagistic explanation for want of better or
more plausible explanations. Towards the end of this chapter, however, I intend
to indicate the direction of a quite different underlying explanation for Husserl’s
adopting his initial position. This is that the structure of reflection upon past acts
of imagining turns out to be remarkably close to that of picture-consciousness.
This is a finding which, I intend to argue, emerges from Husserl’s mature
understanding of phantasy, and it is to this more promising account that we now
turn.
Husserl’s early understanding of intentionality, notably that set out in
Logical Investigations, is informed by what is sometimes referred to as a
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representation theory of the structure of consciousness. According to this view,
conscious acts are underpinned by an essentially bi-partite structure of really-
inherent content together with an interpreting apprehension. Portions of the
stream of really-inherent content are taken by the reflecting phenomenologist to
represent features of the act’s intentional object. Sensation, which in Husserl’s
early writings remains conceptually undifferentiated from sensuous content, thus
provides the basis for acts of perceptual apprehension. Husserl’s early account
of phantasy is also moulded to fit the representation model, with phantasy
entailing a phenomenal content of phantasms (the phantasy-correlate of
sensations) which are interpreted in an “objectivating apprehension”.26
As I indicated earlier in this chapter, Husserl initially thought the
apprehension of phantasmal content yields an appearing image-object, a view
toward which he must have gravitated because of its coherence with his early
hypothesis that phantasy conforms to the same structure as picture-
consciousness. Husserl does not proffer the representation theory, or “schematic
view” as J.B. Brough calls it, as a descriptive account of what is normally
experienced in cases of direct perception and clear phantasy. When I perceive a
landscape, I do not first see immanent sense-data and then proceed from there to
an interpreting apprehension. As a matter of descriptive fact, my intentional
object is not immanent but transcendent. My attention in this case is not
introspective but, on the contrary, directed precisely outwards, towards what is
other. We must ask, then, wherein lies the merit of the representation theory?
What contribution does it make to Husserl’s enquiries?
26 Husserl (2005c), p.24.
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It seems to me that the best way of answering this question involves the
idea of grasping the representation model as an important yet flawed prototype
for Husserl’s mature understanding of intentionality. Husserl retains certain
aspects of the representation model, namely the idea that the structure of
consciousness is stratified and permits of explication, and that the stratification
does not proliferate indefinitely but instead terminates at an absolute
foundational stratum. Yet Husserl’s understanding of the foundational layer
changes over time, and the way in which it changes helps to explain Husserl’s
shift away from the imagistic account of phantasy.
One of the problems with the representation model is that it turns out to
be unable to foster an adequate account of the relation between perception and
phantasy. It is reasonable to suppose that perception and phantasy must have
similarities in their intentional structure, on the grounds that both acts are
intuitional: when I imagine a landscape, it is in some phenomenologically
substantive sense like perceiving a landscape. Part of the problem, however, is
that it remains unexplained just how the subject distinguishes between sensation
and phantasm. If perception and phantasy both comply with the representation
model then phantasms themselves must belong to the stream of really-inherent
content. In this sense, phantasms are present to consciousness, in the here and
now. Phantasy itself, after all, is not a phantasised experience, on pain of infinite
regress. Phantasy itself is an occurrent lived experience, with its own occurrent
phenomenal content. But then the objects of phantasy constitution, being
grounded in phenomenal content deemed to be present in the here and now,
must be judged, like perceptual objects, also to be present. This cannot be the
case. Even if I have a spontaneous day-dream about being in the countryside
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looking at a landscape, I do not take the landscape to be present. The structure of
phantasy must have a degree of complexity greater than that afforded by the
representation model.
Husserl progresses beyond the schematic/representation model by
penetrating the structure of experience to a more primordial level, namely that of
the experience of experience, that is, the experience of conscious acts. This is
the stratum of lived experience that Husserl also calls internal consciousness.
Internal consciousness may be said to be non-thetic and non-objectivating in the
sense that it does not involve any sense-making apprehension of what it
experiences. It is prior to the interpreting apprehension of which Husserl speaks
in the context of the representation model. The stratum of internal consciousness
is the foundation of consciousness: there is no “observer” within Transcendental
Subjectivity watching internal consciousness as it occurs, and there is therefore
no infinite regress of the experience of experience, beyond the layer of internal
consciousness.27
Husserl’s understanding of internal consciousness is intimately bound up
with his concept of impression. Husserlian impression has two deeply
interconnected aspects, aspects which reach to the very heart of Husserlian
transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, impression is bound up with
temporality, and Husserl on occasion uses the term to refer to the “now” phase
of time-consciousness. Impression in this sense can only be properly understood
as but one member of an interdependent triad of constitutional moments, the
other two being what he calls “protention” and “retention”. For Husserl, the flow
of time-consciousness is not phenomenally distinct from the internal
27 For this reason it seems to me to be misleading when phenomenologists speak of the
experience or awareness of a lived experience rather than simply of having a lived experience.
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consciousness we have just discussed. As J.B. Brough points out, in Hua X
Husserl regards internal consciousness as the “absolute time-constituting flow of
consciousness”.28 Again in Hua XXIII Husserl remarks that the “perceiving”
activity of internal consciousness is “nothing other than the time-constituting
consciousness with its phases of flowing retentions and protentions”.29
Secondly, however, Husserl also uses the term “impression” to refer
more explicitly to specifically sensory impression. Sensory impression upon
internal consciousness is what is meant in Husserl’s mature position by the term
“sensation”. Sensation itself, then, is now understood to be a form of
consciousness, and therefore differentiated from sense-data or sensuous content,
a distinction that the representation model lacked the sophistication to support.
Husserl replaces the representation model with a fresh paradigm according to
which consciousness “consists of consciousness through and through” and
sensation is “already consciousness”.30 Sensation is an impressional
consciousness occurring at the foundational stratum of internal consciousness.
The question now arises as to whether an adequate phenomenological
account of perceptual intentionality needs to appeal to the notion of sense-data at
all. One of the most prominent commentators to argue that sense-data as such
should properly be excluded from the phenomenological account is Aron
Gurwitsch. Gurwitsch certainly endorses the direction of the transition in
Husserl’s thought as Husserl moves away from the schematic model to the
noesis-noema distinction of his mature position. However, Gurwitsch, unlike
Husserl, is motivated by a Gestaltist critique of the idea that intentionality is
structured according to the strict dualism of neutral sensuous content supervened
28 Hua X, §34, p.73. Cited in Brough’s introduction to Hua XXIII, p.LXII.
29 Husserl (2005c), Text 14 (1911-12), p.370.
30 Husserl (2005c), p.323.
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upon by a separate interpreting apprehension. On Gurwitsch’s account, a
perceptual object’s “sensuous aspect” or “sensible appearance” is ultimately
held to belong to the noematic side of intentionality. To be sure, it is indeed a
feature of the Husserlian account of the noema that the noema is composed of
both sensible and non-sensible (conceptual) manifolds. But Gurwitsch ultimately
departs from the Husserlian view in at least two important respects. On the
noematic side, Gurwitsch develops his own distinctive and original conception
of noema, according to which the relation of an object’s presentative
appearances to the thing itself is held to be one of parts to whole. And on the
noetic side, Gurwitsch ultimately proposes to discard entirely the theory of
neutral sense-data.31
My purpose in mentioning Gurwitsch is primarily to illustrate the point
that the question of sense-data marks a significant fault-line in Husserl
scholarship. I do not propose at this stage to undertake a detailed exposition and
evaluation of Gurwitsch’s position beyond what I have already said, on the
grounds that this would lead us too far away from the principal concerns of this
chapter. For one thing, a full examination of Gurwitsch’s understanding of
perceptual intentionality would be likely to draw us into the details of the
discussion surrounding how exactly Husserl’s concept of noema should be
interpreted. It is important nonetheless that we note that Husserl’s position on
sense-data (or “hyletic data” as he calls it) is a locus of significant controversy.
In what follows I shall argue that there is a case for retaining (as Husserl does)
some notion of sense-data, but I shall also seek to show how Husserl’s
understanding of this notion changes over time.
31 For an informative commentary on Gurwitsch’s position see Drummond (1990), especially
chapters 4 and 6. John Drummond himself is also in favour of discarding the theory of neutral
sense-data, but does not endorse Gurwitsch’s understanding of the noema.
Chapter 3 - Husserl and the Imagination
Page 85 of 302
As I indicated earlier on, I regard it as a relatively uncontroversial point
that, as a matter of descriptive fact, our everyday conscious life is not about
sensations but about ostensibly transcendent entities in the world. Yet it seems to
me that commentators such as Gurwitsch and Drummond don’t give adequate
consideration to the idea that there are certain circumstances which make it
possible, even relatively easy, for the subject to attend to his or her own
sensations precisely qua sensation. One obvious example is that of being in pain.
It seems disingenuous to say that someone with severe toothache is aware of a
tooth, or a nerve. It is more descriptively accurate to say that this person is
having a pain sensation, and moreover is able to attend to this pain sensation.
This is demonstrated by the fact that it is possible to characterise the pain as
“sharp”, “dull”, and so on. “Sharp” and “dull” in this context are predicates
attributed to the pain, not to the tooth or the nerve. Another example is that of
sitting in sunlight with one’s eyes closed. In this case one becomes aware of
redness in one’s visual field. There is no determinate intentional object beyond
the redness, and we might say for this reason that the objectivating motivation of
consciousness is being frustrated. The question is, how is this redness best
understood phenomenologically? According to his early position, Husserl
understands this redness to be really-inherent sense-data available to
consciousness in a kind of raw presence. But with the discovery of internal
consciousness, the story in Husserl’s mature position becomes more
complicated, and must register the fact that one’s awareness of this redness is
essentially conditioned by the flow of time-consciousness. Awareness of hyletic
data is now understood to be already an outcome of the hyletic-retentional-
protentional process. The moment of hyletic impression is certainly immanent to
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the process, but the process itself is foundational and phenomenally atomic.
There is in this sense always already a “meaning beyond” what is strictly the
hyletic data. Sitting in the sunlight with my eyes closed, then, my awareness of
redness in my visual field is best characterised not as consciousness of a discrete
intentional object that we might call “red hyletic data”, but instead as an
awareness of a flow of sensations of redness. The hyletic data is grasped as
immanent to the lived experience of the sensation, but only on reflection. It
would seem that strictly descriptively speaking, hyletic data as such turns out to
be an abstracted moment of the atomic hyletic-retentional-protentional process,
rather than something directly experienced.
If consciousness must always involve a “meaning-beyond” what is
really-inherent to consciousness itself, and intentionality always directed toward
what is in some sense constituted rather than what is given, then should we not
argue, with Gurwitsch and Drummond, that the notion of hyletic data has no
proper place in a truly phenomenological account of intentionality, and that
Husserl’s commitment to hyletic data is really a mistaken remnant of
psychologistic analysis, and needs to be exposed and rejected as such? And if, as
Drummond suggests, the Husserlian noesis is to be understood to comprise only
those moments of the act which “bear in themselves the specific trait of
intentionality”32 and by virtue of which the act may be said to be intentional,
then does this not mean that hyletic data, which Husserl accepts are intentionally
neutral and indifferent, cannot be held to belong to the noesis?
The difficulty with taking the radical step of excluding the hyletic data
from the noesis is that it seems regressive in the sense of effectively effacing the
32 Husserl (1998), p.203, cited in Drummond (1990), p.56.
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qualitative difference between the experiences of perception and sensation.
During sensation, one is aware of something which is different from a perceptual
object in that the object of sensation is given apodictically to consciousness. If
one cannot appeal in some way to the notion of hyletic data then it becomes
remarkably difficult to account for the descriptive facts about such non-
perceptual intentional experiences as we considered earlier (namely, being in
pain, or sitting in sunlight with one’s eyes closed). Husserl, in his mature
position, however, is able to adequately account for such purely sensory
experiences: one is aware of an impressional flow of hyletic data by virtue of the
hyletic-retentional-protentional process which is foundational to consciousness.
During normal perception, the impressional flow of hyletic data as such is
transparent to consciousness. But the phenomenological significance of
attending expressly to one’s sensations is that it renders the impressional flow
salient, and discloses hyletic data as being really-inherent to the noesis. On these
grounds Husserl is, I believe, justified to remark in Ideas I §36 that
One easily sees […] that not every really inherent moment in the
concrete unity of an intentive mental process itself has the
fundamental characteristic, intentionality, thus the property of being
“consciousness of something.” That concerns, for example, all data
of sensation which play so great a role in perceptual intuitions of
physical things.33
On this view, it would certainly be confusing to claim that sensation is founded
by a separate stratum, a layer of hyletic data. The relation between hyletic data
and sensation cannot be one of founding, because hyletic data is really-inherent
33 Husserl (1998), p.75.
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to sensation. Hyletic data cannot be said to found something which is already
supposed to contain it.
This discussion about sensation now enables us to understand what
Husserl means by the term “phantasm”. The Husserlian understanding of
phantasm depends upon his account of sensation. But the relation between
phantasm and sensation is not only one of analytical dependence. There is a
phenomenological dependence which can be expressed by saying that phantasm
is a reproductive modification of sensation. What does this mean? It means that
every phantasm bears within it a relation to a particular sensation, and that this
relation is one of non-primordial reproduction. Phantasms reproduce sensations
in a non-primordial fashion.
It seems appropriate at this juncture to underscore the importance of the
distinction between the notions of actuality and authenticity, a distinction which
I feel Marbach (1993) does not always observe particularly closely.34 An object
is given authentically if it appears primordially such as in an act of direct
perception. But appearing authentically is not the same thing as appearing
actually. An object is said to appear actually if it is posited. A phantasy object
may be given both actually and inauthentically, for example if I were to sit at
home and imagine the university library. We noted earlier that sensations are
positing because they occur at the level of impressional internal consciousness.
This is to say they are grasped immediately as actual because they involve
impressions upon internal consciousness in the here and now. But phantasms,
34 On many occasions Marbach (1993) refers to acts of intuitional presentiation as involving
perceiving an object “in the mode of non-actuality”. (e.g. pp.60, 72, 73, 79, 126, 148, 179.) But
this seems to me somewhat misleading. In these cases the implied act of perception itself may or
may not be posited, depending, for example, on whether we are considering an act of memory or
an act of phantasy. The act’s intentional object is given inauthentically but may or may not be
posited.
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unlike sensations, are constituted rather than primordial and consequently are
not given in the manner of authenticity. As Husserl puts it “phantasm, the
sensuous content of phantasy, gives itself as not present”.35
As I indicated earlier, phantasy is sometimes said to intentionally imply a
perception. We are now in a position to explicate in more detail the sense of this
claim. Husserl remarks in Hua XXIII that the distinction between perception and
phantasy rests upon the distinction between sensation and phantasm.36 The
account of phantasm as the reproductive modification of sensation enables us to
understand the nature of the phenomenal content of phantasy. So one sense of
the claim that acts of phantasy are reproductions of acts of perception is that
phantasy involves the reproduction of the sensations which ground a particular
perception.
Yet this is really a structural point about the relation between phantasy
and perception rather than a descriptive one. Phantasy is to perception what
phantasms are to sensations: reproductions. But it seems to be at odds with the
descriptive facts to suggest that during an act of phantasy, the primary act being
undertaken by the subject is a reproduction of sensations. Of course, it certainly
seems possible to volitionally reproduce a sensation or a flow of sensations
(“sensation” understood here in accordance with Husserl’s mature position as
consciousness through and through, not merely sense-data). I might, for
example, to develop the case we considered earlier, imagine sitting in sunlight
with my eyes closed. In this case I am readily able to attend to the red phantasms
as such, because the spontaneous motivation toward objectivation is, as I put it
earlier on, being “frustrated”. But in standard cases of phantasy, in which one
35 Husserl (2005c), p.87.
36 Husserl (2005c), p.87.
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has a distinct intentional object, one does not reproduce sensations in order to
reproduce a perception. Imagining is more immediate than that: one normally
imagines something, as it were, “without further ado”. The question, then, is
what exactly is the object of reproduction? The appropriate descriptive answer
must be that the object of reproduction in fact is the implied perceptual act itself.
But I believe it would be incorrect here to suggest that it is an objectified act that
is reproduced, on the grounds that phantasy itself remains intuitional in
character. Instead, the object of reproduction must be the implied perceptual act
as lived experience. In this case, we must conclude that reproduction always
operates at the level of noesis. Noeses are both the objects and the outcomes of
reproductions.
The term “reproduction” is helpful in this context insofar as it conveys
an essential sense of indirection - that there is, so to speak, a fold in the
intentional structure of acts of phantasy. On the other hand, the term
“reproduction” is not without its drawbacks. For one thing, it might be taken to
mean that the implied perception is replicated with the utmost fullness,
something which is rarely, if ever, the case. Imagining is characterised by
variability in fidelity, vividness, and completeness of scope. There are often
discontinuities in the angles from which the object seems to appear. The object
may appear clearly at one moment and vaguely the next. Husserl remarks that
the objects of reproduced acts seem to “hover before us” [vorschweben].37 This
“hovering before” one is connected with a kind of overlapping between what is
given in the realm of phantasy and one’s actual perceptual field. But what is
imagined “hovers” because, of the two fields, the phantasy field is the less
37 Husserl (2005c), p.405.
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steadfast, even in cases of what might be called clear phantasy. Only the implied
perception itself, precisely as the fulfilment of the imagining, can be said to
attain the ideal of fullness.
A further terminological difficulty lies in the fact that, under normal
circumstances, talk of a “reproduction” implies a positing of something prior,
that is, of precisely the reproduction’s object. In the case of phantasy, there is
undoubtedly something odd about claiming to re-produce an act of perception
which is precisely non-posited or neutralised from the outset. In this sense, there
is certainly a case for describing phantasy as a simulation of an act rather than a
reproduction of one. The advantage of retaining the term reproduction, however,
is that it makes explicit the structural homology between phantasy, memory, and
expectation, which is surely one of the central discoveries of Husserl’s entire
treatment of the imagination. Memory and expectation both posit the acts that
they reproduce, while phantasy can perhaps most accurately be categorised as a
non-positing reproduction of an act of perception. The act of perception is non-
posited, while the perceptual object in question may or may not be posited, the
concept of phantasy admitting of both cases.
Husserl’s understanding of the homology between phantasy and memory
implies that phantasy has the same essential structure as a neutralised memory.
But we must distinguish this view from the claim that phantasy precisely is a
neutralised memory. As J.B. Brough points out, although Husserl initially did
regard phantasy precisely as a neutralised memory, he changed his position at
some point during the 1920’s, instead holding that acts of phantasy do not
essentially entail a prior act to be neutralised, and that phantasy is non-positional
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“from the beginning”.38 Yet in this respect we are entitled to ask, if only in
passing, just how it is possible in the first place to imagine something that one
has never experienced. It is not implausible to think that there may in fact be
some kind of relation between acts of phantasy and memory, but one which is
more complex than phantasy simply being a neutralised memory. One would
expect, for example, that someone who has never seen a picture of a unicorn
(and, for obvious reasons, never seen a unicorn) should nonetheless still in
principle be able to imagine a unicorn, provided they have had prior experience,
through pictures or otherwise, of such things as horses and horns. This would
seem to point to the idea that the phantasy noesis can, at least on some
occasions, be understood as some kind of composite (and this would require
further elaboration) of one or more reproduced noeses drawn from memories.39
What may be observed more confidently, however, is that in Husserl’s
thought there emerges an important reciprocal relation between the concepts of
impression and reproduction. On the one hand, all impressions – actual and
possible – upon internal consciousness are held to be capable in principle of
being reproduced.40 All actual impressions permit of being reproduced after the
fact in the act of memory. And all possible impressions are susceptible in
principle to the non-positing reproduction occurring in phantasy. Pure phantasy,
according to Husserl, is the consciousness in which pure possibilities are
given.41 On the other hand, reproductions, like all experiences, also make their
38 Husserl (2005c), pp.XXXVIII-XXXIX.
39 The possibility that I am raising here is that moments of a phantasy experience may on
reflection carry a buried act-quality of remembrance. But there is a danger here of allowing
psychologistic reasoning to influence the direction of phenomenological speculation. And it is
not immediately clear that this hypothesis necessarily conforms to the descriptive facts. I do not
propose to pursue this matter further at this stage, beyond saying that it appears to require further
phenomenological investigation.
40 Husserl (2005c), pp.369, 402.
41 Husserl (2005c), p.696; Husserl (2005b), p.259.
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own impression. An impression of remembering, of imagining, is simply made
by virtue of the noetic component of the act, the lived experience of the
reproduction itself.
Our discussion so far of the reproduction of acts has been implicitly
making use of an extremely important feature of phenomenological
introspection in general, the capacity to objectify conscious acts in reflection. It
has been possible to elucidate the essential structure of the reproduction of acts
through an objectifying reflection upon a primarily descriptive enquiry into the
nature of the experience of phantasy. Alternatively, if we look at our
investigation in a slightly different way, we might say that we have found it to
be in the nature of reproductions to be amenable to objectification by the
subject. Of course, one has a choice. One does not find oneself compelled, as
part of the act of phantasy, to objectify the act. One may, volitionally or
otherwise, simply “live in” the reproduction. In fact, there is nothing to prevent
us from repeatedly switching our attention back and forth between reproduction
as lived experience and reproduction as objectified act. I believe that it will
prove valuable for us, especially when it comes to the discussion of empathy to
explicitly note at this point this double aspect to the reproduction of acts. As
Husserl is right to observe and make explicit, “In every ‘reproduction’, I have a
double focus or attitude as a possibility” – to live the experience or to objectify
it.42
What strikes me as most interesting about the relation between these two
phenomenological perspectives is that while they need to be strictly
differentiated from each other, we must also require that they be ultimately
42 Husserl (2005c), p.672.
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reconciled. One’s lived experience of an act cannot coherently refute the act’s
essential structure. In this regard, the most salient question that arises would
seem to be this: given that the structure of reproduction as we have discussed it
thus far involves the intentional implication of a perception, how (if at all) does
this “fold” in the intentional structure show up in one’s lived experience of such
an act? It might at first seem surprising to note that there is in fact no noetic
fissure or transition in the performance of such an act. One is not somehow at
first aware of an original perception to which one then, and only then, applies a
certain modification into a mode of inauthenticity, a mode of not being
subjectively occurrent in the here and now. There is instead, if we attend
carefully to the lived experience of, say, an act of phantasy, a notable unity of
performance. One imagines objects, in the phrase that I used earlier, “without
further ado”, which is to say that the structural complexity of the act is
transparent to the performing consciousness.
Husserl’s explanation for this phenomenon actually illuminates the
structure itself. Phantasy bears a relation to another conscious act, namely a
perception, but does not itself contain this perception. Phantasy is not the
application of a modification but instead, as Husserl puts it in Hua XXIII,
precisely “modification through and through”.43 The wording of Husserl’s
account of this structure in Ideas I §99 suggests that he is not unaffected by a
sense of its strangeness:
[T]he reproductive modification simpliciter, the presentiation
simpliciter […] in its own essence, remarkably enough, is given as
43 Husserl (2005c), pp.323, 326.
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modification of something else. Presentiation refers back to
perception in its own peculiar phenomenological essence […].44
To the twin attitudes that we remarked upon above, namely those of
objectification and of dwelling within the reproduction, there correspond the
twin intentional objects of the reproduced act and the reproduced act’s
intentional object. If, for example, I sit at home and imagine the university
library, then my attention is directed towards precisely the library, and not
towards some image or semblance of it. Yet not only am I thinking about the
library (and not about an image of the library) but I am also quasi-perceiving the
library. This is to say that it is as if I were perceiving the library or that the
library is given intuitionally in the mode “as if”.
My awareness of the modification “as if” is traceable to the fact that
reproductions are not primordially impressional in the sense that they do not
entail occurrent sensations. Awareness of the difference in act-character between
perceiving and imagining then is surely attributable, if not wholly then at least in
part, to a pre-reflective awareness of the constitution of phantasms, the
constitution of reproductions of sensations. Reproductions, like all experiences,
make their impression as lived experiences, but they are not in the first instance
impressional, because their content is governed not by the sphere of otherness
but by subjectivity from the beginning.
We are now compelled therefore to differentiate between two distinct
kinds of impression. Firstly, we have primordial impressions of sensuous
content upon internal consciousness. And secondly, we have the impressions
made by the lived experience of reproductions. Husserl explicates this difference
44 Husserl (1998), p.244.
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in terms of two time consciousnesses: awareness of present time and awareness
of represented time.45
This idea of a double time-awareness leads us into a further reason why
phantasy is not mistaken for perception. According to Husserl, the perceptual
world is always to some extent present to consciousness during acts of mental
re-presentation.46 Now, in an earlier chapter I called into question whether this is
in fact always the case. But let us assume for the present purposes that we are
dealing with a case in which the subject has some awareness of his or her
surroundings. Then, according to Husserl, the relation between what is re-
presented and what is presented is one of “overlapping” [Verdeckung]. They
cannot be attended to simultaneously because they belong to different streams of
time-consciousness. This phenomenon of overlapping works to differentiate re-
presented appearances from the presentation of one’s surroundings. Marbach
argues that perceptual awareness of the world is actually constitutive of the
structure of reproductions of acts.47 However it seems to me that the presentation
of one’s surroundings only becomes critical in cases of involuntary phantasy. In
cases of deliberate phantasy, the apprehension of the “as if” modification of a
perception can be explained by the subject’s own awareness of the very activity
of imagining.
It is a straightforward yet highly significant corollary of our discussion of
reproductions that reproductions themselves are capable of being reproduced. As
the careful reader will have already observed, the reason for the reproducibility
of reproductions must be that reproductions themselves produce an impression
45 Hua X, No.45, cited in Marbach (1993), pp.84-5.
46 See, for example, Cartesian Meditations, §51; or Experience & Judgement, §42, cited in
Marbach (1993), p.84.
47 Marbach (1993), p.85.
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(an impression which we have noted must be non-primal) which, like all
impressions, permits of being reproduced. In Eduard Marbach’s terminology,
the reproduction of a reproduction can said to be an example of the iteration (or
“nesting” as we might also call it) of acts of intuitional presentiation. Examples
of iteration include such mental activities as phantasy within phantasy, memory
within memory, memory within phantasy, and so on, even including higher
orders of iteration.
Let us consider the following example. I am remembering imagining the
library. The double focus that we discussed earlier means that I remember not
only the act of imagining the library but also its lived experience. I remember
the library appearing in the manner “as if I were perceiving it”. We must now
consider the additional effect of the modification introduced by remembering the
imagining. The original imagining does not occur again, and is not itself
experienced again. But it is as if I were imagining the library again. Strictly
speaking this is precisely to say that it is as if it were as if I were perceiving the
library again. This recursive articulation of what it is like to remember
imagining something may seem convoluted but the convolution is, I believe,
genuine, and a consequence of the recursive structure of the iteration of
reproductions.
According to Marbach, the experience of remembering imagining
something possesses an immanent tendency towards self-simplification.48 On
Marbach’s account, if one dwells within the lived experience of remembering
imagining, say, the library, there is a tendency for one to simply end up
imagining the library. The modification introduced by remembering doing so
48 Marbach (1993), pp.153-4.
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seems to recede, if not wholly disappear. The suggestion here then is that a level
of intentional implication somehow becomes suppressed. Furthermore, Marbach
argues that remembering imagining something is not the only case in which such
a transformation might occur. In Marbach’s view, imagining imagining has a
tendency to become simply imagining, and remembering remembering has a
tendency to become simply remembering.
As I intend to elaborate in what follows, Marbach’s account of this kind
of contraction in the structure of nested reproductions is, in my opinion,
ultimately at odds with the descriptive facts. It seems to me that where such
transformations do occur, they are perhaps best viewed as consequences of some
kind of subjective frailty which it would be mistaken to regard as particularly
significant. However, I believe there is one important aspect of Marbach’s
account that needs to be noted and to some extent preserved. If I am presently
remembering imagining something then the presentation of my current
surroundings is liable to dominate, or at least interfere with, any reproduced
impression I may have of my original surroundings at the time of the imagining.
Naturally this assumption will hold true provided (1) the respective
presentations of my surroundings (present and remembered) are of similar
prominence, and (2) my attention is directed towards the imagined object as it
was imagined and not the remembered surroundings. Let us assume for the
present purposes that (1) and (2) happen to hold true. Then in this case Marbach
thinks that the effective suppression of the remembered surroundings by my
present surroundings gives rise to a kind of collapsed structure involving the
original imagining, yet grounded in the awareness of my present surroundings,
and that this collapsed structure itself is homologous to that of a simple
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imagining. The problem here is that Marbach overlooks the fact that something
about the activity of remembering is still at work: I am remembering the way the
imagined object looked, not imagining the object. It is mistaken, then, to think
that, for a competent subject, remembering imagining tends to undergo a
transformation into straightforward imagining.
In fact, something more interesting is surely going on. When I dwell in
the lived experience of remembering imagining the library, the remembered
object is not the library. I am not remembering the library, but the appearance of
the library when it was imagined. My intentional object is an image grasped as
an image, that is, as a semblance. I have a picture-subject, namely the library.
And I have in a sense a picture-thing, namely the imagining as an objectified act.
We arrive then at a most interesting finding: remembering imagining something
conforms to a structure homologous to that of picture-consciousness. And this
provides us with a possible explanation for Husserl’s reaching his initial account
of phantasy: in the course of his phenomenological reflections on this matter, he
may have been remembering previous acts of imagining.
Husserl remarks that remembering has the quality of “again” or “once
again”.49 But this “again” is not merely a quality that is passively observed by
consciousness, unless the act of remembering is involuntary. In acts of volitional
remembering, the quality “again” is a requirement towards whose fulfilment
consciousness actively works. Once one has specified what one is to remember,
the remembering is, to a greater or lesser extent (depending on the nature of the
specification), heteronomous and constrained. Now the act of remembering
imagining the library is wholly constrained by the way the library appeared
49 Husserl (2005c), pp.345-7.
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when I imagined it. This transcendence of the remembered object contributes
constitutively to our discovery that remembering imagining has the structure of
picture-consciousness. A picture in a gallery and the semblance it bears
transcend my viewing them in the same way that the imaginational appearance
of the library transcends my remembering imagining the library.
Now as I intend to elaborate in what follows, acts of imagining
remembering something are not heteronomous in quite the same way, and for
this reason are not, I would suggest, plainly given in the manner of pictoriality.
But why should we be interested in imagining remembering something in the
first place? Under what circumstances would an act of imagining remembering
something take place? One answer to this question lies in the encounter with a
literary text. Consider the scene early in Hamlet when Hamlet remembers his
mother appearing to be in love with her first husband, Hamlet’s father, the late
King who has now been murdered.50 An actor playing Hamlet, or indeed a
reader of the text of the play trying to understand Hamlet’s state of mind, might
try to imagine remembering such an experience under the same circumstances.
This might involve imagining being Hamlet remembering this experience, or
imagining being oneself in Hamlet’s circumstances remembering such an
experience. It would be prudent for us to suspend judgement in this chapter as to
whether even the former of these two possibilities might qualify as an act of
empathy. Our concern at present is strictly to clarify the nature of imagining
remembering. In a later chapter, however, I believe it will become apparent that
there is an important structural affinity between imagining remembering
50 Hamlet, Act I, Scene 2, lines 143-5.
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something and activities akin to empathy in the context of the encounter with a
literary work.
For this reason, my principal aim for the remainder of this chapter will
be to illuminate as far as possible the nature of imagining remembering
something. In particular, I wish to explain a certain paradox which emerges in
this context. The paradox concerns the relation between imagining remembering
and remembering. On the one hand, while consciously imagining remembering
x, one never succumbs, as a competent subject, to the delusion that one is
remembering x. The actor playing Hamlet, if he is a competent actor, retains his
grip on reality. He does not suddenly believe he is Hamlet or that he is
remembering his mother behaving in a certain way. Yet on the other hand, there
is, as I intend to argue, something about imagining remembering that has the act-
character of remembering. Let us examine this paradox in more detail.
There is no reason in principle why our descriptive analysis of imagining
remembering should not make use of the example of the actor imagining being
Hamlet remembering his mother behaving in a certain manner. I feel, however,
that the interests of clarity will be better served if we use a simpler example
which does not involve the additional complication of imagining being someone
else. Imagining being someone else is really superfluous to the essential
structure of imagining remembering, and an activity whose detailed examination
I propose to restrict to the chapters dealing expressly with questions of
intersubjectivity and empathy.
For our present purposes, the following example will serve perfectly
well. Let us suppose that the following events all take place within a single
continuous phantasy while I am sitting in my study at home. I leave my home
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and travel to the university campus where I stand and view the library. I then
leave the campus and return home where I sit down in my study and remember
my viewing the library. Then the phantasy ends.
Let us attend now to the act of remembering which takes place inside the
phantasy, that is, my remembering perceiving the library. In accordance with our
earlier discussion of the reproduction of acts, this act of remembering permits of
a double focus. I have an objectifying awareness of it which includes within it an
awareness that I am imagining remembering the library. Yet I grasp not only
what the act accomplishes, its quiddity, but also its haecceity, its thisness, by
dwelling within it as a lived experience. Now if I attend to my dwelling within
this imagined remembering, I discover that it has precisely the character that
Husserl referred to as “once again”. And this is attributable to the fact that I am
genuinely remembering something, namely the antecedent imagined act of
perceiving the library. But how can I reconcile this act-character of
remembering with the fact that at no point do I believe that I am remembering
perceiving the library? The answer must be that dwelling within a reproduced
act is never wholly immersive. To a greater or lesser extent, the double focus is
always in force. The twin perspectives are not merely options between which I
may switch the emphasis of my attention, but in fact parallel perspectives
neither of which ever fully obliterates the other. I am both inside and outside the
remembering. Inside, we may say without exaggeration that the library “appears
again”. But outside the remembering within the phantasy it is merely as though
the library were appearing again, as though I were remembering the library.
Our discussion of the Husserlian account of the various forms of
intuitional presentiation has in a sense come full-circle. We began with an
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examination of the structure of picture-consciousness and proceeded from there
to a discussion of phantasy. We then traced the reasons behind the transition in
Husserl’s understanding of intuitional presentiation and discovered how the
mature account permits of the iteration of such acts. I then argued that the
essential structure of picture-consciousness turns out to be capable of re-
appearing in the context of such iterations, and that this clarifies and improves
Husserl’s initial intuition that phantasy is connected in some important way with
picture-consciousness.
Let us reflect in more detail upon the important milestones of this
journey. It is an indication of the seductive power of the imagistic account of
phantasy that Husserl initially pursued this hypothesis in spite of being aware of
the dangers of etymological and psychologistic biases. The careful development
of a detailed account of picture-consciousness has proved invaluable in pin-
pointing some of the fault-lines in Husserl’s early position. Perhaps the central
problem relates to how or where the so-called picture-thing is supposed to fit
into phantasy. For perfectly understandable reasons, Husserl tries to abolish any
notion of the picture-thing and make do with the image-object and picture-
subject. This avoids the pitfalls of being drawn into psychologistic accounts
involving mental images supposedly amenable to scientific investigation.
Equally, it also avoids the threat of infinite regress inherent in talk of imagining
a picture-thing. Unfortunately picture-consciousness proper turns out to
inherently involve the subject’s ability to shift attention between picture-thing
and image-object. The image-object is ontically heteronomous upon the picture-
thing and infused with the same phenomenal content. In running up against this
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problem, Husserl is forced to confront the counter-intuitive idea that imagining
may not after all necessarily involve an image as such at all.
The evolution of Husserl’s understanding of phantasy is bound up with
his changing understanding of what sensations actually are, and this in turn is
bound up with the development of his crucial notion of internal consciousness.
In rethinking the foundations of consciousness, Husserl moves away from the
primitive representation model of Logical Investigations which turns out to lack
the resources to properly account for phantasy. In re-conceiving of sensation as
itself a form of consciousness through and through, and of phantasms as
reproductions of sensations, Husserl finds a new way of accounting for the
intuitional character of phantasy, and takes an important step in clarifying the
relation between perception and phantasy, something that remained somewhat
obscure when phantasy was conceived in terms of pictoriality.
According to the new model, a wide range of acts of intuitional
presentiation, most prominently phantasy, memory, and expectation, come to be
understood as reproductions of primordial impressions made upon internal
consciousness. These so-called “reproductions” do not somehow contain their
corresponding original impressions but rather bear a relation of implication or
modification towards them. Reproductions have a unity of performance such that
they are given to consciousness as modifications through and through. The unity
of the impression made by a reproduction renders it amenable to itself being the
object of a subsequent reproduction. For this reason, Husserl’s mature
understanding of the imagination opens onto a potentially vast, and indeed in
principle infinite, array of different types of conscious acts all conforming to the
general structure of nested reproductions of impressions.
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In this chapter I have looked at two of the most obvious and arguably
important (as I hope will become clearer in subsequent chapters) cases of nested
reproductions, namely imagining remembering and remembering imagining.
These latter investigations have helped to illuminate some highly important
features of reproductions in an iterated context. One of these is that the double
focus to which Husserl refers is actually a parallel focus which permits of
variations in emphasis between the objectified act and the dwelling within it. I
have argued that the experience of dwelling within a reproduced experience can
never be wholly immersive. I have also argued that a structure of experience
homologous to picture-consciousness is capable of arising during iterated
reproductions. In the case we examined, namely remembering imagining
something, we found objectivities corresponding to the three intentional objects
constitutive of picture-consciousness. I have tentatively suggested in this chapter
that the fact of this homology may even have contributed to Husserl’s starting
intuition (ultimately found to be erroneous) that phantasy itself is given in the
act-character of pictoriality.
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Chapter 4 - Edith Stein and the Problem of Empathy
As we saw in chapter 2 (Husserl and Intersubjectivity), one of the
essential features of Husserl’s account of basic or “inauthentic” empathy is the
taking place of an act of “pairing” [Paarung] in relation to the bodily
appearances of self and Other. This pairing, which involves an overlaying of
sense between distinct phenomenal data, was found to be a condition for the
possibility of imaginative transposal into the Other’s situation, and for the
apprehension of this Other as another conscious living individual. If we now
turn our attention, as Edith Stein does in her doctoral thesis Zum Problem der
Einfühlung,1 to the question of “authentic” empathy, conceived as the
apperception and comprehension of another’s mental life, then it is not
unreasonable, I would suggest, to speculate that something close to this kind of
Husserlian passive synthesis might well be taking place precisely as the
condition for the possibility of the adequate grasping of the Other’s lived
experiences.
In fact, Stein herself appears to make no explicit reference to Husserl’s
concept of Paarung. Yet one of my intentions in this chapter is to elaborate upon
the way in which Stein does in fact intimate a broadly analogous pairing or
overlaying of sense of entities given to consciousness as a condition of
possibility for the accomplishment of authentic empathy in its fullest sense.
Without this particular kind of pairing, I wish to suggest, Stein is implying that
one is left with something inauthentic, an empty intending of foreign experience
bereft of a fulfilling understanding of its lived character.
1 Edith Stein’s doctorate was undertaken under the supervision of Edmund Husserl and awarded
in 1916 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. Its English translation, On the Problem of
Empathy (Stein (1989)), is hereafter abbreviated to OPE.
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The occasional aptness and prima facie plausibility of demotic
statements akin to “I totally understand how you feel” might lead us at first to
suppose that if there is a pairing taking place in the context of authentic
empathy, then the overlaying of sense must naturally relate to the respective
lived experiences of self and Other. But for the cogent Husserlian reasons
touched upon in chapter 2, the transcendental phenomenologist in general, and
Edith Stein in particular, is obliged to relinquish Romantic pretensions to
primordial access to the experiences of the Other. In a sense, this might be
viewed as precisely the fundamental “problem” to which Stein refers in the title
of her thesis. As we shall see, according to Stein’s account, during authentic
empathy the Other’s primordial experience as such is not itself a primordial
phenomenal datum at all, but remains veiled, at times attended to as the content
of an objectifying apprehension, but always at one remove from what is
originally given to the empathising consciousness. In the place of a claim to
phenomenal unity with the Other, the idea is pervasive in Stein’s thesis that
empathy should properly be regarded as a particular kind of “seeing”, not merely
for the epistemic connotations of this word, but to the extent that one intuits
something which is alien, and not something which belongs to one’s sphere of
ownness. She remarks, for example, that by a person’s “walk, posture, and his
every movement, we also ‘see’ ‘how he feels’”;2 that “I can see a person’s
sadness by his gait and posture”;3 and that in the Other’s expressions “we have
[…] the spirit ‘becoming visible’ in the living body”.4 The advantage of Stein’s
“seeing” metaphor is that it conveys entirely fittingly, and in a way that Husserl
himself would undoubtedly endorse, the sense in which empathy turns out to be
2 OPE, pp.68-9.
3 OPE, p.78.
4 OPE, p.92. Emphases mine.
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quasi-perceptual. But its disadvantage, I want to suggest, is that it glosses the
stratified complexity of Stein’s own understanding of empathy’s essential
structure, and risks implying its collapse into something intuitionally
presentational. One of my principal contentions in this chapter will be that a
serious reading of the Steinian account must take it to be at least deeply
suggestive of the idea that the respective lived experiences of self and Other
should be understood to be phenomenally connected by a relation of
resemblance. Surprisingly (in my opinion), the concept of a semblance, like that
of a pairing, is not one to which Stein explicitly appeals in her explication of the
empathic understanding of the Other’s experience. But it is, I intend to argue, a
concept which is not only strongly implied in her descriptive account of
empathy, but one whose proper place within the phenomenology of empathy is
corroborated by the findings reached during the detailed investigation into the
Husserlian understanding of the imagination that we undertook in chapter 3. The
constitution of a semblance, I intend to argue, is central to the accomplishment
of authentic empathy, and pairing (the particular form of which, albeit
implicitly, Stein illuminates) a condition of its possibility.
Empathy, as I have just indicated, is for Stein fundamentally intuitional.
This commitment to empathy’s intuitional character leads Stein to reject the idea
that empathy is an inferential accomplishment, as well as the idea that empathy
is either an ascription of a primordial experience to somebody else (a view she
attributes to Adam Smith) or an assumption about the Other’s experience (a
view she attributes to Meinong).5 Stein by no means asserts that acts of
inference, ascription, and assumption might not serve us well, especially in cases
5 OPE, p.14.
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in which empathy (as she conceives it) seems difficult to attain. Yet one of
Stein’s primary concerns in her book’s second chapter ‘The Essence of Acts of
Empathy’ is to develop a sufficiently precise initial conception of the empathic
act to enable further fruitful phenomenological investigation to take place. Many
conscious acts, intellectual or otherwise, may prove to be useful in the encounter
with the Other, but only the intuitional comprehension of a foreign
consciousness counts as a fulfilment of authentic empathy for Stein. This initial
conception provides the basis for Stein’s opening delineation of her precise field
of phenomenological investigation.
Empathy thus conceived has the epistemological advantage of
structurally avoiding what we might call projective deception, a risk logically
inherent in the act of ascribing to someone else a mental state with which one is
already familiar. Clearly, if ascription were the name of the empathic game, then
one might plausibly be inclined, precisely on epistemological grounds, to ascribe
to the Other a mental state with which one is familiar, rather than one with
which one is unfamiliar. But therein lies the danger of projective deception that
Stein explicitly recognises and seeks to avert. As Stein puts it,
If we take the self as the standard, we lock ourselves into the
prison of our individuality. Others become riddles for us, or still
worse, we remodel them into our image […].6
Yet Stein also remarks, in the same context as the passage just quoted, that
“[o]nly he who experiences himself as a person, as a meaningful whole, can
understand other persons”.7 Thus, in spite of her admonition against
6 OPE, p.116.
7 OPE, p.116. As we shall see, Stein’s understanding of the empathic act is influenced by
specialised discourses and debates surrounding the theory of the humanities or cultural sciences
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imprisonment within the self, she also rejects the idea that introspection has no
contribution to make to the accomplishment of empathy.
We find emerging here the way in which Stein intimates the deeply
paradoxical nature of the problematic of empathy. In fact, there seem to be two
distinct paradoxes at work. Firstly, we have a paradox to do with how empathy
is to be conceptualised. On the one hand, empathy is supposed to grant the
subject access (in some sense yet to be elaborated) to the Other’s experience.
But on the other hand, the empathiser is precisely not the subject of the
empathised experience. This distinctive feature of the primordially experiencing
subject in question being essentially alien differentiates empathy from other acts
of intuitional presentiation such as memory, expectation, and “phantasy” in the
Husserlian sense. Yet secondly, there seems to be a paradox arising from a
tension between the intentional structure of the performance of empathy and the
conditions for its possibility. On the one hand, the intuited intentional object is
the Other’s experience, and the ascription of one’s own primordial experiences
to the Other is held to be impermissible on pain of projective deception. But on
the other hand, Stein also holds, as we recently noted, that “[o]nly he who
experiences himself as a person, as a meaningful whole, can understand other
persons”.8 This is to say that no small degree of self-awareness is a condition for
the possibility of the accomplishment of empathy. Both of these paradoxes
require proper explanation if we are to avoid (as phenomenologists must) the
[Geisteswissenschaften]. She finds it noteworthy, for example, that Ranke expressed a desire to
somehow “‘erase’ his self in order to see things ‘as they were’.” But there can be little doubt that
Stein herself rejects any notion of self-erasure or self-nihilation as essentially
unphenomenological. Instead, although critical of Dilthey’s psychologism, Stein indicates that
she is sympathetic to his view that “[t]he interpretive faculty operating in the cultural sciences is
the whole person”. The connection with Dilthey is an aspect of Stein’s thought that we shall
discuss in more detail later in this chapter.
8 OPE, p.116.
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philosophically unpalatable outcome that empathy should be taken to be at some
level impenetrable or ultimately mysterious. Stein criticises Theodore Lipps
(1851-1914) for gesturing toward an “inexplicable adjustment of our spirit”,9
instead of providing a detailed account of the constitution of foreign experience
within consciousness. Unlike science and other disciplines, philosophy, as Stein
observes, has no “domain into which it can push unsolved questions”, and
instead “must give the final answer, gain final clarity”.10 Let us begin by
examining in more detail Stein’s phenomenological attempt to elucidate and
ultimately resolve these paradoxes.
Given Stein’s explicit warnings about projective fallacy,11 how are we to
explain her implicit position that the most effective empathisers turn out to be
remarkably self-aware individuals? I want to suggest that an important part of
the answer to this question lies in Stein’s view that empathy, for the Husserlian
phenomenologist, involves apprehending not only the Other’s lived experience
as such, but also the latter’s essential phenomenological structure, and that a
sharing between self and Other of essential phenomenological structures of
experience makes empathy possible. The assumption that the structures of
conscious acts (including, of course, the structure of empathy itself) are
universal across all human subjects is an implicit part of the entire Husserlian
phenomenological project, a project within which Stein consciously situates
herself. Indeed, even when Stein considers pathological conscious experience,
she interprets it in terms of the absence of externally intelligible motivations, not
9 OPE, p.37.
10 OPE, p.38.
11 OPE, pp.87, 116.
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in terms of deviation from the essential structures of conscious acts
themselves.12
This presumption of the universality of the structures of human
experience provides us with an important explanation and justification for
Stein’s ostensibly introspective interest in the structure of emotion. What seems
at first to be a purely subjective enquiry into the phenomenology of affectivity
turns out to be an essential contribution to her governing interest in the
experience of the Other. While Stein always insists upon the intuitional
character of the experience of foreign experience, she is also, I would suggest,
implying that empathy is partly attributive after all, not at the noetic level of
lived experience, but at the reflective level of the essential structures of
experience in general, and of emotion in particular. A constraint upon one’s
knowledge of the Other is held to be the extent of one’s introspectively
corroborating knowledge of the essential structures of one’s own experience.
In fact, for reasons that will become clearer as this chapter proceeds, it is
Stein’s understanding specifically of the emotions that turns out to be pivotal to
what is most distinctive about her entire account of empathy. Let us therefore
consider more closely Stein’s account of the emotions, their place in conscious
life, and their relation to other mental phenomena and activities. It is worth
noting at the outset that it seems doubtful whether emotions should properly be
regarded as conscious acts. Intentional acts like perceiving, imagining,
remembering, and so on, are susceptible to volitional initiation by subjectivity.
But it is not in the nature of the emotions to be subject to volitional initiation.
While acts such as perception may properly be said to be performed, we do not
12 OPE, p.97.
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in the normal course of events perform emotions. Emotions come upon us, and
seem to well up, we might say, from the depths of our being. Emotions act upon
and affect subjectivity. In this sense, then, the emotional “direction of action” is
precisely the reverse of that occurring in what we standardly regard as conscious
intentional acts.
Emotions in the first instance, then, are not really acts at all, but involve
a subjective passivity in their simply being a part of our lived experience, of the
world or of ourselves. In fact, actively attending to an emotion has a tendency to
interrupt or dissipate its action. For this reason, if an emotion should have an
intentional object, it is rarely about itself. If I am full of joy, then under normal
circumstances it is not the joy that I am attending to, but something else,
something over which I am joyful. Equally, it is possible that I may be full of joy
without knowing why. Emotions which do not seem to have a readily
identifiable intentional object may be classed as moods. Moods are not, on the
face of things at least, about something, but instead colour one’s entire
experience, not only of the world but of one’s own conscious life.13
Two of the most important properties of the emotions that Stein
identifies are what she calls depth and intensity. I remarked earlier that
emotional lived experience is given as somehow welling up from the depths of
one’s being. But how is this “depth” to be understood, and what makes one
feeling deeper than another? Stein’s answer to this question is formulated in
terms of the person’s hierarchy of felt values:
13 OPE, p.100.
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Anger over the loss of a piece of jewellery comes from a more
superficial level or does not penetrate as deeply as losing the
same object as the souvenir of a loved one.14
On the Problem of Empathy is not a detailed axiological treatise, but it is clear
nonetheless that Stein’s implicit axiological view is not dissimilar to that of Max
Scheler, at least in broad terms.15 Perhaps most importantly, Stein believes that
if one attends carefully to the givenness of a lived emotion, then one finds it to
be correlated with one’s own personal value hierarchy. Emotions, in this sense,
provide access to values, or, to put it another way, values motivate emotions.
This is the most important sense in which Stein believes that all emotions,
including moods, are in fact intentional: we might say that emotional experience
opens onto the experience of values. Or as Stein herself puts it,
[A]s physical nature is constituted in perceptual acts, so a new
object realm is constituted in feeling. This is the world of values.16
It seems right to say that while feelings correlated with peripheral values
are inherently punctual, feelings governed by more central values take on a
durative and therefore quasi-normative character, in the sense that they make
claims upon the future. In this context, it is important to make a conceptual
distinction between the value-correlated “depth” or “centrality” of a feeling and
what Stein calls its “intensity”. The intensity of a feeling is the degree to which
it actually takes over the individual’s conscious life and influences the will. The
intensity of a feeling is not wholly governed by the person’s value hierarchy,
and Stein illustrates this point well with the observation that “the least mishap in
14 OPE, p.101.
15 In fact, in relation to the hierarchy of values, Stein straightforwardly refers the reader to
Scheler’s principal work on this topic, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale
Wertethik (1913-16). See OPE, p.101, Note 127.
16 OPE, p.92.
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our environment tends to excite us much more strongly than a catastrophe in
another part of the world without our mistaking which event is more
significant.”17 The implication of this point is that Stein believes a feeling’s
intensity is determined not only by its correlated values (though it seems to me
these must surely influence the intensity to some degree) but by a sense of
urgency in one’s immediate living environment.
When Stein refers to the “intensity” of an emotion, she is really drawing
attention to what is given to consciousness as a kind of build-up of excitation in
one’s subjective processes. Feeling, as Stein observes, is “[a]s it were […]
loaded with an energy”.18 The qualification “as it were” registers the fact that
Stein does not appear to be using the term “energy” in a scientific sense, for the
domain under scrutiny is not that of the natural sciences but that of
transcendental subjectivity, the domain of what Stein calls “spirit” [Geist].19 On
the other hand, there are occasions when Stein also uses the term “intensity” in
the context of discussing the psycho-physical individual.20 This overlapping
usage of the term “intensity” between the domains of science and consciousness
seems to imply that Stein has in mind a correlation of psychic intensity at the
psycho-physical level with intensity at the level of the conscious life of
subjectivity. In fact, as I believe it will soon become clear, Stein’s account of
empathy on the basis of bodily expression is implicitly committed to the idea of
such a correlation, for it relies upon an overlaying of a causal view at the level of
the psycho-physical individual with a motivational one at the level of conscious
experience. On this view, when Stein speaks of “energy” within the domain of
17 OPE, p.105.
18 OPE, p.51.
19 The terms “spirit” and “spiritual” in this chapter are used specifically in this Steinian sense.
20 OPE, pp.40, 105.
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subjective processes, it should not be interpreted merely as a metaphorical
flourish. It is something more than that because, for one thing, natural
limitations upon energy levels at the psycho-physical level are held to have
implications for the individual’s conscious life. In addition to this, a further
important property of energy, as science understands it, turns out to propagate
into subjective experience. When a spring is compressed or twisted it acquires
potential energy, energy which not only is stored within the spring, but which
the spring has a natural tendency to release when permitted to return to its
normal shape. The emotions, according to Stein, exhibit an analogous property:
[A]s I live through the feeling, I feel it terminate in an expression[,]
or release expression out of itself. Feeling in its pure essence is
not something complete in itself. As it were, it is loaded with an
energy which must be unloaded. […] By nature [feeling] must
always motivate something, must always be “expressed.”21
The above excerpt provides us with one of Stein’s clearest intimations of the
idea of a kind of phenomenal contiguity between feeling and expression. It is
even a little surprising that Stein herself does not use the word “contiguity” at
any point in her book. Yet there can be little doubt, I would suggest, that
contiguity (divested of its Humean connotations), is precisely the concept she
has in mind here.22 Feelings are not essentially static entities, but instead are
pregnant with a kind of movement, an essential movement toward expression.
The movement toward expression is part of what feelings are. The frequent
21 OPE, pp.51-2.
22 I do not believe that Hume’s use of the term “contiguity” in relation to causal connections
should deter us from employing the same term in this context. In mathematical analysis, for
example, the notion of contiguity has nothing to do with causation: a set of points S is said to be
contiguous if and only if any two points in S may be joined by a line contained by S. For our
purposes, the conception of contiguity that I am interested in developing is a “dual-aspect” one:
that a single occurrent feeling-state may be understood to have both an inward and an outward
aspect. While the inward aspect corresponds to its lived experience, its bodily expression is to be
regarded as the outward aspect – the outward face of the very same state of mind.
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occurrences of the word “must” in the sentences just quoted shows us that Stein
explicates this contiguity in terms of an exigency. But the exigency Stein has in
mind here is not that of psycho-physical causality, but an exigency which is
itself felt by the subject. It is the exigency of motivation, part of the lawfulness
of conscious life. In one sense, the fact of this exigency means that the subject is
prevailed upon, affected by, the immanent movement of feelings toward
expression. But this lawfulness is not given to consciousness in the first instance
as an alien force permitting of apprehension. The subject lives within the
motivation and is inside its movement. Indeed, it is precisely the experience of
living within the motivation that makes it meaningful. So motivation in this
context is given to consciousness as a meaningful proceeding from feeling to
expression.
When Stein uses the term “meaningful” in this context, she does not
intend to imply that the lived experience of the motivation of feelings toward
expression is necessarily either amenable to linguistic articulation or
conceptually intelligible to the subject. This is consonant with the fact that
complex emotion often becomes the object of artistic attention precisely by
virtue of its seeming both deeply meaningful and yet, if not ineffable, at least
resistant in its primordial experience to adequate articulation. And we also need
to sharply distinguish the meaningfulness in question from familiarity. Feelings
and their tendencies, of course, may not be at all familiar to the person having
them. Instead, the meaningfulness that Stein has in mind here is precisely to do
with dwelling within an emotion and its motivations. The motivation is
meaningful to the subject because it is, so to speak, a pathway which itself
belongs wholly within the territory of subjectivity, the sphere of ownness.
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Stein remarks that one of the important properties of the living body
[Leib] is that it is “the field of expression of the experiences of its ‘I’”.23 What
this claim leaves unsaid, however, is that Stein does not in fact believe that all
expressions are bodily. There may be occasions when the expression of feeling
is realised in an act of the imagination. The example of this that Stein herself
provides is that of the case in which awareness of social conventions forestalls
outward bodily expression of one’s actual feelings. In such cases, “[t]he creation
of another world where I can do what is forbidden to me here is itself a form of
expression.”24 So the living body is not the only field of expression available to
the transcendental ego. And Stein is not arguing either that there is something
about the essential structure of expression that somehow privileges bodily over
ideational expression. Her point here is really factual rather than eidetic, that, as
a matter of human fact, subjectivity has a natural tendency toward outward
bodily expression, and that ideational expression tends to occur where
supervening cultural factors require the suppression of primal motivations.
Stein’s considered view, then, regarding the significance of the living body in
the context of an investigation into empathy, is that the living body is not the
only field of expression of the experiences of the transcendental ego but the
primal one. And the primal nature of bodily expression makes acts of empathy
founded upon such expression an appropriate starting point for the
phenomenological investigation into the experience of foreign experience.
In the case of empathy founded upon bodily expression, the
appresentation of foreign experience is an instance of the more general
phenomenon of what Stein calls “co-givenness”, in which what is co-given
23 OPE, p.57.
24 OPE, p.52.
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appears, strangely enough, “in that very peculiar way where what is not
perceived can be there itself together with what is perceived”.25 The Other’s
faculty of sensation, for example, is co-given with their bodily presentation, as is
the transcendental ‘I’. Yet what distinguishes the experience of bodily
expression from these other cases of co-givenness is the apprehension of a
particular kind of intuitional unity connecting what is appresented with what is
primordially given. As Stein observes, “[f]ear is at one with the cry of fear just
as sadness is [at one] with the countenance”.26 At the root of this phenomenal
unity is the apprehension of a proceeding of what is primordially given from
what is co-given. It seems to be a natural implication of Stein’s position that this
unity of proceeding must be understood as the empathic correlate of the
subjective contiguity of expression that we discussed earlier. Yet it would seem
the grasping of this unity is held to be intuitional rather than attributive, at least
partly because the outward bodily expression on which the act of empathy in
question is founded is (authentically) perceived. All the same, it is hard to see
the ground for the constitution of such a unity if there were not some prior or
background attribution of the structure of contiguity of expression that one
experiences in oneself. The attributive dimension to empathy at the structural
level is something that Stein leaves largely implicit, yet it can hardly be ignored
if Stein’s account of empathy’s intuitional character is to be properly grounded
and explicated.
Let us note that the co-givenness of the Other’s feeling with their bodily
expression that occurs during an act of empathy is not signitive in nature.
Signitive givenness is characterised by a phenomenal disjunction between the
25 OPE, p.57.
26 OPE, p.78.
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given sign [Zeichen] and what it signifies, such as when, to cite Stein’s own
example, a flag announces that the king is in the castle. The relatedness between
sign and signified is essentially arbitrary and governed by convention. At the
same time, Stein also differentiates the contiguity experienced during empathy
from the kind of connectedness found in what she classifies as an “indication”
[Anzeichen], which she believes is exemplified in the relation of smoke to fire.
Clearly, from what has just been said about signs, the relation between smoke
and fire cannot strictly speaking be said to be signitive, because the smoke and
fire are physically and causally connected entities, and their relatedness is
therefore not arbitrary or a matter of convention. But equally there is a
difference between the synthesis of smoke with fire, and the connectedness of a
person’s sad countenance with their feeling of sadness. The difference is that the
phenomenal transition from smoke to fire, or similarly, I would suggest, from
medical symptom to diagnosis, takes place at the thematic level. In this sense,
indications are grasped in active rather than passive synthesis.
If the nature of the empathic phenomenal relation between an
expression’s appearance and that which is expressed is neither signitive nor
indicative, according to Stein’s understanding of these terms, then how is it to be
denoted? From what has already been said, there is, in my opinion, a case for
describing it as “contiguous” or “conjunctive”, but Stein elects to call it a
“symbolic” connection [Symbolzusammenhang], primarily, it would seem, to
remain terminologically continuous with the work of Lipps, who made a similar
distinction between signs and symbols. The disadvantage of Stein’s choice of
terminology here is that it obscures the phenomenological conception of
contiguity that she works so hard to elucidate, both in her introspective account
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of the experience of one’s own emotions, and in her empathic account of the
experience of the Other’s.
Stein, as I have just indicated, was not the first to become intrigued by
the discovery of certain instances of co-givenness involving the structure of the
constitution of a phenomenal unity which cannot be rendered intelligible by
appealing to notions of signification or indication. Stein endorses and tries to
illuminate the view she attributes to Johannes Volkelt (1848-1930) who
believed, as Stein puts it, that “[t]he experiences we comprehend in expressive
appearances are fused [verschmolzen] with the phenomena of expression”.27
Accordingly, Stein on occasion adopts the term fusion [Verschmelzung] to
characterise the phenomenal contiguity between feeling and its bodily
expression.28
Yet, as Stein herself suggests, the most decisive influence upon her
conception of what, it seems to me, we might reasonably call empathic
conjunctive co-givenness comes from her doctoral supervisor Edmund Husserl,
and in particular from his account of ‘Expression and Meaning’ provided in
volume II of Logical Investigations. Husserl himself briefly remarks upon the
intuitional character of empathy in the context of a discussion of expressions as
they function in communication. While hearing another person speaking,
Husserl observes, it is quite possible, for example, to “‘see’ their anger, their
pain etc.”.29 The kind of “seeing” that Husserl has in mind here provides the
hearer with an outer but not an inner grasp of the speaker’s experiences. The
inner grasp, of course, is one of the things that Stein herself seeks to account for.
27 OPE, p.127, Note 102. Emphasis mine.
28 See, for example, OPE, pp.49, 58.
29 Husserl (2005a), p.190.
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And Husserl also speaks of “the experienced unity of sign and thing signified”30
involved in expression. As Stein makes clear, it is this Husserlian notion of an
“experienced unity” which forms an important basis for her account of the
“symbolic” connection in empathy founded upon bodily expression, and which
also, Stein surmises, may well have prompted Lipps to differentiate between
sign and symbol in his account of empathy.
The account of conjunctive co-givenness that we have discussed thus far
has helped to illuminate the phenomenal nature of the particular phase of the
empathic encounter that Stein refers to as emergence.31 It is during emergence
that one acquires an outer grasp of the Other’s experience, apprehended as an
intentional object. One “sees” the Other’s feelings in a mode of intuition that
Stein calls “the non-primordial parallel to perception”.32 Yet empathy for Stein
is not only a form of non-primordial intuition but also a form of understanding,
and the empathic understanding that Stein has in mind goes beyond an empty
objectifying awareness of the Other’s experience, and beyond, too, an awareness
simply of the kind of experience that the Other is having. Rather, Stein argues
that it is part of the essential structure of acts of authentic empathy that they
involve acquiring some apprehension of the nature of the Other’s lived
experience precisely as a lived experience. This is to say that a full realisation of
authentic empathy, as Stein understands it, entails the acquisition of an
acquaintance with what it is to be the Other having the experience in question,
an acquaintance upon which empathic knowledge may in due course be
founded.
30 Husserl (2005a), p.193.
31 OPE, p.10.
32 OPE, p.10.
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The acquisition of this inner grasp of foreign experience lies beyond the
phase of emergence, and takes place in a subsequent phase that Stein calls the
“fulfilling explication”.33 During the fulfilling explication, there is a shift from
objectifying intuition into pre-reflective lived experience, a lived experience in
which, to put it loosely, we might say that one “dwells within the Other’s
experience”. But what sense can it make to say that one dwells within the
Other’s experience? As we noted in chapter 2, Husserl explicitly rules out, on
the basis of his investigation into the encounter with the Other, an identity or
confluence of primordial experience between self and Other, on the grounds that
a disjunction of subjective processes turns out to be constitutive of the Other
being other.34 Naturally, Stein is fully aware of this Husserlian finding, and it is
clear that she does not dispute it. Her fundamental agreement with Husserl on
this matter is demonstrated, for example, in her remark that “[the Other’s] joy is
neither given to us as primordial joy over the event nor as primordial joy over
his joy. Rather it is given as this non-primordial act of empathy […].”35
Empathy, in its relation to the Other’s primordial experience, is non-primordial
throughout all of its phases, even including the lived experience of the fulfilling
explication.
Part of the value of Stein’s assertion about the non-primordiality of
empathy is that it intimates some important conceptual distinctions between
empathy, as Stein conceives it, and other forms of intersubjective emotional
experience. One of these is the distinction between empathy and sympathy. For
Stein, sympathy seems to entail (1) an alignment of primordial experience
between self and Other, and (2) an apprehension by the subject of this
33 OPE, p.10.
34 Husserl (1999), §50, p.109.
35 OPE, p.14.
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alignment. For example, I sympathise with the Other’s joy only if (1) I am joyful
over that over which the Other is joyful, and (2) I am aware, pre-reflectively or
otherwise, that (1) is the case. Strictly speaking, in sympathising with the
Other’s joy I do not share the Other’s joy, if this sharing is supposed to amount
to an identity of primordial experience, something ruled out by Stein for the
reason recently mentioned. In fact, the concept of sympathy needs to be able to
accommodate certain kinds of variation between the respective lived experiences
of self and Other. For one thing, there may be differences in the intensity of the
feeling, in the sense of “intensity” that we discussed earlier. Additionally, there
may be differences in the complexity of feeling. For example, I may share some
of the Other’s reasons for feeling joyful over a certain event, but not others. In
this case, I only sympathise with the Other’s joy insofar as we are joyful over
the same event and for the same reasons. We must take it to be constitutive of
sympathy that there should be similarity not only in the kind of feeling being
experienced, and in what the feeling is about, but also a similarity in what is
motivating the feeling. This is to say that sympathy requires that the respective
primordial experiences of self and Other be aligned across three distinct
dimensions: kind, intentionality, and motivation.
Elaborating in this way upon the concept and structure of sympathy helps
to clarify certain features of the relation between sympathy and empathy.
Perhaps most importantly, it is now possible to observe the way in which
empathy is prior to sympathy as a condition for its possibility, and is
contemporaneous with sympathy in the performance of the act. It is not possible
to sympathise with the Other if one does not hold in one’s mind an apprehension
of the nature and content of the experience with which one is in sympathy. Yet
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the fact of this embeddedness of empathy within sympathy now raises in turn a
further important question about empathy. We must ask what happens to the
empathic fulfilling explication during the experience of sympathy. Does it
somehow vie for attention with the subject’s own primordial feelings? It seems
to me that we cannot discount this possibility. In this case we face once again a
scenario in which the phenomenon of overlapping comes into play. In chapter 3
we reflected upon the way in which imaginational lived experience seems to
overlap with the primordial perceptual presentation of one’s surroundings, and
in particular on the way in which overlapping seems to be characterised by a
mutual exclusivity of the “competing” experiences involved. It is not possible,
Husserl argues, to attend simultaneously to what is given in phantasy and to
what is given in one’s perceptual field. It is indeed plausible to think that a
similar kind of mutual exclusivity can arise during sympathy. In this case, for
example, one either “dwells within the Other’s joy” (to the extent permitted by
the empathic fulfilling explication) or one lives wholly within one’s own. Yet
one is free to switch from one lived experience to the other, and back and forth
as one pleases. I can be joyful over your examination result, or I can “dwell
within your joy”, all within the ambit of a single sympathetic encounter, yet as
discrete aspects of it.
There is, however, a different possibility, one which involves the
empathic act moving out of the lived experience of the fulfilling explication, and
back into the mode of objectifying intuition. A reversion to an objectification of
the Other’s experience, an objectification which now benefits from both an inner
and an outer grasp of it, is something that Stein regards as a maturation of
empathy, indeed a kind of epistemic telos toward which the experience of
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foreign experience has a tendency to move. In this third and final phase of
empathy, one attains not only an external apperception of the Other’s
experience, but retains a noetic comprehension of what it is (for the Other) to be
having such a primordial experience.
In chapter 3 we developed an account of the structure of acts of
reproductive re-presentation which stressed the importance of the Husserlian
observation that such acts involve a double focus in which the subject may
attend to a re-presented impression either as the content of an objectified act or
by dwelling within it as a lived experience. I argued that this double focus in fact
turns out to be a parallel focus permitting of variations in emphasis between its
two aspects, between which the performing subject is in principle free to switch
attention back and forth as he or she pleases. It is difficult to think of a reason
for supposing that something similar is not the case during empathy. Provided
that I have already acquired for the first time the fulfilling explication, it would
seem that there is nothing to stop me from choosing either to continue to dwell
within it or alternatively to switch out of it and instead objectify the Other’s
experience. And from the objectifying apprehension I may revert to the fulfilling
explication and alternate between the two foci for as long as the Other’s
primordial experience continues to take place. Given this descriptive evidence, it
is perhaps slightly surprising that Stein herself does not engage substantively
with this idea of a double focus within the context of her investigation. As my
exposition of her account has indicated, Stein configures the aspects of the
empathic experience into a sequence of levels (their sequential character being
intimated by her labelling them numerically and by her implying that in the
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optimal case one “go[es] through” them all)36 rather than an accumulation of
persistent perspectives which remain in the end co-present or at least co-
available to the subject. The sequential characterisation is justified to the extent
that the fulfilling explication, as Stein conceives it, cannot be performed unless
the subject already believes, at some level, there to be a foreign primordial
experience presently being had, and to the extent that this foreign primordial
experience cannot be simultaneously objectified and adequately comprehended
without the existential epistemic light of the fulfilling explication. What Stein
fails to make explicit, however, is whether, or the degree to which, the different
levels interpenetrate one another. Does one completely exit the fulfilling
explication when one finally objectifies the Other’s experience, or do the two
levels continue in parallel? The problem with supposing the final objectification
to be a discrete phase, self-sufficient in itself and independent of the fulfilling
explication, is that it makes it difficult to justify the claim that the empathising
subject is presently in a state of intuitional comprehension of the Other’s
primordial and presently occurring experience. It would be questionable to claim
that one simply retains in memory the fulfilling explication, as this would appear
to compromise empathy’s quasi-perceptual character, according to which
something presently occurring is presently being “seen”. If Stein’s position is to
be broadly sustained, then, we are now obliged to uphold the principle of the
double focus, which Stein does not explicitly articulate or analyse. In this case, a
Steinian position would have to argue that one’s claim to comprehend the
Other’s lived experience is justified either by virtue of being able to switch back
into the fulfilling explication whenever one wished, or by claiming that the
36 OPE, p.10.
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fulfilling explication and the objectification are contemporaneous and
interpenetrate one another within the empathiser’s stream of subjective
processes.
We must assume that Stein’s choice of the phrase “fulfilling explication”
is intended to suggest the idea that the Other’s primordial experience is
somehow (indeed, in a sense that we shall shortly seek to specify) fulfilled and
given to consciousness during the act of empathy. Yet we noted earlier that the
fulfilling explication phase cannot be understood to be the Other’s primordial
experience, on the grounds that I, as empathiser, am the one experiencing it. I
am in fact having a lived experience which precisely is not the Other’s
primordial experience, yet which bears an important relation to the Other’s
primordial experience, a relation moreover, which carries epistemic weight.
What exactly is this relation? One of the slightly surprising features of Stein’s
account is that she does not actually provide a very explicit answer to this
question. Stein’s account of the essential structure of empathy is expounded
early in her thesis, and in my opinion could do with being revisited toward the
end, to take into account the phenomenological findings of chapters III and IV
(entitled ‘The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Individual’ and ‘Empathy as
the Understanding of Spiritual Persons’ respectively). Some kind of conclusion
at the end of the book regarding the essential structure of acts of empathy would
seem to be appropriate, not only in terms of reflecting the methodological
priority of descriptive phenomenological work over eidetic findings, but also
because the position Stein sets out in chapter II, ‘The Essence of Acts of
Empathy’, requires further elaboration if the implications of Stein’s overall
understanding of empathy are to be fully understood.
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I wish to pursue the idea that there is in fact a fully coherent
understanding of empathy implicit within Stein’s account, but that Stein herself
does not appear to fully appreciate, or at least fully articulate, certain important
structural implications which remain latent within her position. As I have
already indicated, I believe the part of her thesis that could particularly benefit
from clarification is her understanding of the fulfilling explication, the lived
dimension of the empathic experience in which one “dwells within” a foreign
experience, to the extent that it is intelligible and phenomenologically possible
to speak of doing so. I believe the key to clarifying Stein’s account lies in certain
important insights that we developed in chapter 3 to do with the essential
structure of reproductive re-presentations within an iterated context, findings
which both Husserl and Stein may not themselves have fully recognised.
A possible source of difficulty in properly understanding Stein’s account
lies in the different senses in which she uses the word “primordial”. On the one
hand, Stein wishes to stress the Husserlian idea that one does not have
primordial access to the Other’s primordial experience, a fundamental
phenomenological stance which informs her problematisation of the views of
both Lipps and Scheler. This view informs Stein’s drawing of a sharp distinction
between the “inner perception” of one’s own mental life and the empathic
intuition of the Other’s, and explains why she makes assertions such as
If I experience a feeling as that of another, I have it given twice:
once primordially as my own and once non-primordially in empathy
as originally foreign.37
37 OPE, p.34.
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And this is why she underscores the distinction between sympathetic primordial
feelings of one’s own and the feelings of the Other with which one is in
sympathy. Primordial feelings of one’s own in a sympathetic context are to be
separated from the act of empathy, on pain of projective deception.
Yet on the other hand, it is also clear that Stein believes it to be
constitutive of empathy that one should have primordial access to something, a
primordial experience which illuminates the lived character of the Other’s
experience. So empathy is not regarded by Stein as “primordial” simply for the
relatively trivial reason that it is, as she puts it, “primordial as present experience
though non-primordial in content”38, but because empathy in its fullest
manifestation is not merely an empty objectifying intending, but incorporates an
essentially lived component, the component of the fulfilling explication.
And while I am living in the other’s joy, I do not feel primordial joy.
It does not issue live from my “I.” Neither does it have the character
of once having lived like remembered joy. But still much less is it
merely fantasised without actual life. This other subject is
primordial although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non-
primordial experience I feel, as it were, led by a primordial one not
experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my non-
primordial experience.39
Stein is suggesting here that the lived experience of dwelling within the
Other’s feelings somehow intimates beyond itself a different lived experience,
namely that of the Other. In this sense, the fulfilling explication is intentional: it
is a lived experience which is about another lived experience. The reason behind
Stein’s observation that the Other’s joy is not given to the empathiser as “merely
fantasised without actual life” must lie in the fact that it is (in the way that we
38 OPE, p.10.
39 OPE, p.11.
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considered earlier) constituted heteronomously on the basis of the Other’s bodily
expression. The Other’s primordial experience is given as pre-given, as being
prior to the empathic act, and furthermore governing the content of the fulfilling
explication: “[…] I feel, as it were, led by a primordial [experience] not
experienced by me but still there”. With these words Stein clearly draws
attention to the peculiar form of heteronomy constitutive of the act-character of
the fulfilling explication. It is to be distinguished from the heteronomy found in
acts of memory or expectation on the grounds of its being more radical by an
order of structural magnitude, for not only is the empathised primordial
experience subjectively transcendent to the empathic act but it is also
apprehended as belonging to a foreign subjectivity, and I am aware of it
“manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience”. From this standpoint we
may now observe that in registering descriptively the givenness of the foreign
experience as such as an element of the fulfilling explication, it seems that Stein
is in fact implicitly endorsing a notion of parallel focus of the kind that we
discussed in chapter 3: one is both having a lived experience of one’s own and
constituting the Other’s as an intentional object.
Had Stein continued in the train of thought set out in the passage recently
quoted, even for just a few more lines, it seems to me almost inconceivable that
she should not have, at the very least, speculatively raised the idea that the
phenomenal relation between the fulfilling explication and the Other’s
primordial experience is one of resemblance. The precise extent to which Stein
herself contemplated this possibility is going to have to remain a matter for
conjecture. Yet a combination of features of Stein’s account makes the case for
investigating the question of the quasi-pictoriality of empathy quite compelling.
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Firstly, empathy is held to be an intuitional act, but one which is not mistaken,
by the careful phenomenologist, for having primordial access to the Other’s
primordial experience. This in itself does not point conclusively to picture-
consciousness, but it certainly raises it as a possibility. And it is worth recalling
in this context that it would seem that Husserl initially pursued the imagistic
theory of phantasy at least partly because phantasy is intuitional in character
while at the same time not being mistaken for perception. That Stein should not
in a similar fashion pursue an imagistic explication of empathy, even if only
with a possible view to discarding it, is therefore somewhat surprising.
Secondly, the content of the fulfilling explication is implicitly construed by
Stein as being heteronomous in the sense that it is held to “speak”, as it were, of
an object which is not primordially present to consciousness. This corresponds
to the way in which an image-object “speaks” of a picture-subject which is not
primordially present.
Let us attempt to complete Stein’s project and investigate the question of
the “pictoriality” of empathy, that is, to verify the hypothesis that the essential
structure of the empathic act is, in substantive respects, homologous to the
structure of picture-consciousness. This will involve, in particular, showing that
equivalents of the three distinct pictorial objectivities identified in chapter 3 turn
out to be present within empathy, and fulfilling similar roles. We shall seek to
locate, firstly, a governing intentional object implied within the experience (a
picture-subject), secondly, an object grasped as a semblance (a semblance qua
semblance or image-object), and thirdly, a containing object of some kind (a
picture-thing).
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In the cases of the image-object and the picture-subject, this task does
not appear so difficult, for they have already emerged in the course of the
preceding discussions. There can be no doubt that the governing intentional
object in question is the Other’s primordial lived experience. And the image-
object with respect to this “picture-subject” must, as I have already suggested,
be taken to be the fulfilling explication.40 In this respect, Stein has already done
much of the work for us in registering and explaining the importance of these
objectivities. Her only omission was to forget or overlook the important idea that
the fulfilling explication as a lived experience should be understood precisely as
a semblance of the foreign primordial experience, but it will, I believe, shortly
become clear that this is the only convincing way of reconciling its epistemic
value with its essentially non-primordial character.
A difficulty remains, however, with the delineation of a container object.
We are not at liberty to disregard the importance of locating a “picture-thing”
within the structure of empathy, for one of the important conclusions of chapter
3 was that the ability to switch the direction of one’s attention between image-
object and picture-thing turns out to be constitutive of picture-consciousness
itself. As we saw in that chapter, the fact that this does not take place during an
act of pure phantasy contributed to the refutation of Husserl’s early hypothesis
about the pictoriality of such acts.
Let us consider the possibility that to the picture-thing corresponds the
phase of empathy that Stein calls “comprehensive objectification”. At this level
of empathy, the foreign primordial experience is not only objectified but
40 The structural correspondence between the image-object of picture-consciousness and the
empathic fulfilling explication is exemplified in the fact that during the observation of a painting
in an art gallery, the image-object may be dwelt within as a lived experience when one is
absorbed in aesthetic contemplation of the work.
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understood. But what is the basis for this understanding? The basis for the
understanding is the insight provided during the lived experience of the fulfilling
explication. So if Stein’s “comprehensive objectification” purports to
comprehend the Other’s experience, then it must somehow involve the content
of the fulfilling explication. In this connection, I want to suggest that there is a
sense in which the comprehensive objectification may be said to open onto the
fulfilling explication, which in turn opens onto the Other’s primordial
experience as an objectified intentional object. This view does indeed appear to
be supported by the view I put forward earlier regarding the parallel focus.
According to the parallel focus view, both the objectified foreign experience and
the fulfilling explication are simultaneously available to consciousness and
permit of being attended to with varying degrees of emphasis. An elaboration of
Stein’s account is therefore required if the view that empathy conforms to the
structure of picture-consciousness is to be sustained. The level of the
comprehensive objectification must be understood not merely as temporally
conditioned by the fulfilling explication, but in fact as incorporating it as well,
and permitting of a return to it through a shift in the emphasis of the focus of
one’s attention. In this case the conditions for an homologous relation to picture-
consciousness may be said to be satisfied. Our picture-thing is the
comprehensive objectification; our image-object is the fulfilling explication; and
our picture-subject is the foreign primordial experience.
The finding that is now emerging is that the co-givenness of the foreign
lived affective experience is to be explicated as the heteronomous constitution of
a felt image-object on the basis of the Other’s perceptually given bodily
expression. But in this imaginational heteronomy, I am not imagining having the
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Other’s experience for myself: I am imagining being the other person having the
experience in question. Even more precisely, I believe that in the final and fully
explicated analysis, we must say that there are in fact two distinct acts going on
in the fulfilling explication. I am imagining being the other person, and then
within this act of imagining, I am imagining having the experience in question.
It would seem that empathy is performatively stratified in this way because
having the experience in question is in truth merely a factual, and not an
essential, part of being the other person. The kinds of experience of particular
interest to us in this chapter, such as feeling joyful, sad, or angry, are being
considered as contingent experiences: joy over an examination result; sadness
over a bereavement; anger over a stolen item of jewellery. For this reason,
imagining having the foreign experience is not an essential part of imagining
being the Other. In this sense, it would seem there is an essential fissure in the
performance of the fulfilling explication. We are dealing at root, I would
suggest, with an iteration of acts of the imagination.
On at least two occasions, Stein implicitly registers the idea that the
fulfilling explication must involve a cumulation of distinct acts of the
imagination. In the context of discussing the difference between empathy and
inner perception (a difference she attributes to the lived character of the
fulfilling explication) Stein refers to the fulfilling explication as “[t]he level [of
empathy] where I am at the foreign ‘I’ and explain its experience by living it
after the other […].”41 Then later on while referring specifically to empathy
based upon bodily expression, Stein appears to summarise the fulfilling
explication by stating that “I project myself into the foreign living body, carry
41 OPE, p.34.
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out the experience already co-given to me as empty with its countenance, and
experience the experience ending in this expression.”42 In these passages, Stein
sets out a temporal series of aspects of the performance of the fulfilling
explication. But there can be little doubt that, beyond this sequencing, Stein
must also be implicitly committed to a nesting of the acts she delineates. One
cannot empathically carry out the foreign experience if one does not remain
transposed into the foreign subjectivity. In fact, it is the imaginative transposal
into the other person which is responsible for the very alterity of the fulfilling
explication, and without which the fulfilling explication could not be said to be
experienced as a semblance of what is radically other, the Other’s primordial
experience, as experienced by the Other. So the explication of nested acts within
the fulfilling explication underpins the claim that the Other’s experience is given
in the manner of a semblance, a finding which in turn informs the discovery that
empathy conforms to an essential structure homologous to that of picture-
consciousness.
It is not surprising, therefore, that as her book proceeds Stein becomes
increasingly interested in the phenomenology of understanding the foreign
personality, as distinct from understanding its contingently occurring
experiences. Veridically intuiting the structure and content of the foreign
personality is precisely the pre-condition for the imaginative transposal of
consciousness, which in turn conditions the carrying out of individual foreign
experiences. It is appropriate therefore that we now turn our attention to Stein’s
42 OPE, p.82.
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account of the intuition of the foreign personality, or, as she calls it, the
“spiritual subject”.43
When Stein speaks of the Other’s “personality” or “character”, she is
referring to an objectivity which is not in the first instance adequately given to
consciousness in an act of empathising with the Other’s present experience, but
instead one which emerges gradually as a consequence of an ongoing
aggregation of such empathic acts.
I not only comprehend an actual feeling in the friendly glance, but
friendliness as an habitual attribute. An outburst of anger reveals a
“vehement temperament” to me. In him who penetrates an intricate
association I comprehend sagacity, etc. Possibly these attributes
are constituted for me in a whole series of corroborating and
correcting empathic acts.44
Of course, we are confronted now with a circularity. Understanding the
Other’s personality is a condition of imagining being the Other. But now we find
that grasping the foreign personality is an outcome of an aggregation of
empathic acts. So empathic acts at the respective levels of the person and of
experience, are mutually conditioning. This is not so much a contradiction as a
refinement of how empathy is to be conceived. The accomplishment of empathy
is not just a binary question of success or failure (though success or failure,
articulated loosely in terms of “getting someone right” or not, remain genuine
possibilities) but a matter of degree and convergence. The better one is
acquainted with a person, the more fully one is able to empathise. And the more
one empathises with the Other’s present experience, the more one converges
upon the underlying personality. In this way, the intuition and understanding of
43 OPE, p.96.
44 OPE, p.86.
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the Other’s personality is to be regarded not only as a form of empathy, but
arguably as a kind of culmination of empathic activities. It is, then, an empathic
act of a different order from the acts of empathy that we have considered thus far
in this chapter. It is to be understood as a second-order apperception which
differs in essential structure from the prior apperceptual acts upon which it is
founded.
This “personality”, like the experiences which speak of its structure and
content, is an entity which belongs to the domain of the spirit, as opposed to the
domain of psycho-physical reality. For this reason, strictly speaking, the
constitution of the Other’s personality does not entail, on pain of an ontological
category mistake, its introjection into the Other’s physical body. The Other’s
personality is co-given with the appearance of the Other in essentially the same
way in which the Other’s transcendental ego is co-given. Indeed, the
transcendental ego and the personality are both to be understood to be parts of
the concrete entity that Husserl calls the monad, as defined in chapter 2.
Stein’s conception of the personality is bound up with notions of stability
and intelligibility. In Stein’s view, to refer to someone’s personality is to imply
that there is something consistent about this person, and that the personality has
become salient and intelligible precisely because of this consistency. Such
consistency need not be absolute, but the apprehension of a degree of
consistency is constitutive of the apperception of the personality. One is only
able to remark that a person acts out of character if a sufficient number of
previous encounters have appresented a relatively stable and unified underlying
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personality. Failing that, the person can only be held to be unintelligible, an
eventuality that Stein configures as “pathological”.45
The question of “acting out of character” is not one that Stein pursues in
any great detail, but is one that I have introduced into this discussion as a way of
illustrating one way in which an individual’s underlying character can
sometimes seem to become phenomenologically salient. I do not suggest that
Stein somehow believes that in non-pathological cases, people with whom one is
well-acquainted are incapable of surprising one by their demeanour or actions.
Yet the very idea of somebody “acting out of character”, though one that I
believe is helpful in this context by virtue of its picking out an aspect familiar to
most of us of the experience of others, is also, I believe, one which is, strictly
speaking, ultimately at odds with Stein’s understanding of the fundamental
nature of conscious life. By this I mean that for Stein, in non-pathological cases,
the experience of what we might loosely term the Other’s “acting out of
character” is instead to be understood as a disclosure of hitherto unexperienced
aspects of their personality. To the extent that the Other can be said to have a
coherent personality at all, their mental life is held by Stein to be not only
roughly consistent over time, but essentially lawful. This is the basis for Stein’s
assertion that
having […] gotten a picture of the foreign “character” […] this itself
serves me as a point of departure for the verification of further
empathic acts. If someone tells me about a dishonest act by a
person I have recognised as honest, I will not believe him. […] A
truly good man cannot be vindictive; a sympathetic person, not
cruel […].46
45 OPE, p.97.
46 OPE, p.86
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So the empathic judgement, to take Stein’s example, that someone is an honest
person, does not correspond to a claim about probability, or a claim that the
Other exhibits honest behaviour “in general”, but to the constitution of a
particular attribute of the personality in question, an attribute which is
understood to hold a governing influence upon the person’s conscious life. In
making this point, Stein underscores her understanding of empathy as intuitional
through and through, not only at the level of individual experiences, but at the
level of the constitution of the personality itself. And the apperceived lawfulness
of conscious life confers upon the disciplines of axiology and ethics a kind of
rigour coordinate with that of the a priori sciences, and enables them, as Stein
puts it, to “take their place beside logic”.47
For both Husserl and Stein, this “lawfulness” of spiritual life is
encapsulated in the concept of motivation.48 Earlier on, we touched briefly on
the notion of motivation in the discussion about the expression of feeling. In that
context, the motivation in question was understood to be an actually subjectively
occurring meaningful proceeding from an incipient feeling to its completing
expression. More generally, the term “motivation” often refers just in this way to
a factual movement or transition within the noetic side of intentionality from one
lived experience to another. Motivations belong to the subject, to the sphere of
ownness, and not to the natural or psycho-physical world. Yet for both Husserl
and Stein, the term “motivation” also carries an eidetic sense, in that it
sometimes refers not to a concrete movement within consciousness, but
specifically to the lawfulness of such a movement. Concrete motivations
conform to the lawfulness of conscious life, and this lawfulness is sometimes
47 OPE, p.97.
48 For almost identical statements in this respect, see Husserl (2002), p.231, and OPE, p.96.
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simply referred to as the person’s “motivations”. Motivations, in this eidetic
sense, can be understood as latent tendencies belonging to the individual,
tendencies which themselves transcend the occasions on which they are fulfilled.
An individual may possess a tendency to be friendly, as a distinct part of his
personality, even when he happens to be alone, and furthermore not thinking of
others.
Part of the significance, then, of the eidetic sense of “motivation” is that
it makes it possible to speak of such things as a person’s various dispositions,
preferences, habitualities, associations, instincts, and (of particular interest to
Stein) values. Some kinds of motivation may be said to be “active”, in the sense
that they take place at the thematic level. Perhaps the most obvious case of
active motivation is that of motivation under the norms of reason. For example,
a perception may motivate a judgement on the basis of empirical evidence. A
combination of judgements may motivate, in a syllogistic fashion, a new
judgement on the basis of logical grounding. I may undertake a certain action
deliberately because I hold a certain belief about the world, or because I have a
certain goal. Doxastic or teleological motivations of this kind may also be said
to be active and taking place under the norms of reason if they occur at the
thematic level. Yet active motivations are really only a part of the story of the
lawfulness of conscious life, for many motivations are, in Husserl’s terminology,
essentially passive, and occur pre-reflectively. Husserl understands passive
motivations to pervade and govern the lived character of conscious life. To take
an experience that we considered in an earlier chapter, viewing the front of a
building can now be seen to motivate the appresentation of its averted sides. It
may also motivate a memory of a similar building; I may associate the building,
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if it is the library, with the experience of studying; or it may motivate a valuing
of the building on aesthetic or architectural grounds. All such kinds of
motivation – appresentative, recollective, associative, value-based – are typically
spontaneous and passive, or have a passive component, and form the intricate
web of motivations constitutive of the noetic fabric of our quotidian conscious
lives.49
The apperception and understanding of the Other’s motivations provides
the foundation for a further level of eidetic intuition which moves beyond the
specificity of the individual, and provides insight into the essential structure of
the human personality. For Stein, this important property of the empathic
experience does not simply provide a corroboration for what could otherwise be
intuited from introspection, or the activity that she calls “inner perception” of the
self. Inner perception and empathy work together, reciprocally verifying and
corroborating intuitions about the essential structure of the personality. Beyond
this reciprocity, however, Stein ultimately privileges empathy as the primary
ground for such knowledge. To empathy Stein accords an equivalent or parallel
role for the human sciences and phenomenological enquiry into the mind as
perception holds for the natural sciences:
As natural things have an essential underlying structure […] so
there is also an essential structure of the spirit and of ideal types.
Historical personalities are empirical realizations of these types. If
empathy is the perceptual consciousness in which foreign persons
come to givenness for us, then it is also the exemplary basis for
obtaining this ideal type, just as natural perception is the basis for
the eidetic knowledge of nature.50
49 For the Husserlian account of the concept of motivation, see Husserl (2002), §56.
50 OPE, pp.95-6.
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This epistemic privileging of empathy over inner perception is attributable to the
idea that an introspective view of the personality is structurally vulnerable to
certain blind-spots by virtue of the subject remaining caught up in their own web
of motivations. Indeed, on at least two occasions, Stein refers to situations in
which individuals might be mistaken about their own motivations behind certain
actions.51 The fact that the noematic side of empathic intentionality lies outside
the sphere of ownness favours empathy’s status as the spiritual analogue of
perception. Accordingly, Stein seeks to configure empathy as the more reliable
mode of intuition, and as a kind of corrective for the deceptions of subjective
self-perception. As Stein puts it,
It is possible for another to “judge me more accurately” than I judge
myself and give me clarity about myself. For example, he notices
that I look around me for approval as I show kindness, while I
myself think I am acting out of pure generosity.52
Stein by no means claims that empathy is always veridical, any more than she
makes the same claim for perception. Deception and mistakenness always
remain possibilities. But the epistemic answer always lies in the verification,
clarification, or correction that may be furnished by supplementary acts of
empathy.
Actions only invite understanding on the basis of the premise of the
lawfulness of spiritual life. Not all actions and gestures are spontaneously
expressive like the ones we considered earlier. Someone else’s non-spontaneous
actions, if observed in person, may also on occasion speak of a directedness
toward some purpose which illuminates the individual’s character. And the more
51 OPE, pp.33, 89.
52 OPE, p.89.
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someone is observed, the fuller the picture that emerges of his or her personality.
Stein explicates this appresentation of the personality in terms of a chain of
motivations. Deliberate actions are motivated by a will, will by a feeling, and
feelings, as we noted earlier, by values. The appresentation of values motivates
in turn the empathiser’s expectations regarding possible future feelings,
volitions, and actions. Accordingly, as Stein memorably puts it, “a single action
and also a single bodily expression, such as a look or a laugh, can give me a
glimpse into the kernel of the person”.53
For Stein, then, the chain of motivations leads back to values. And for
Stein it is values that provide the structuring principle for the personality. This is
not to say that the personality is composed of values. Values are given as
transcending the personality, yet they may be said to govern its motivations and
the way those motivations are structured. The sense of this “governance” is
really a correlation between the individual’s hierarchy of felt values and the
realm of the personality. As I indicated earlier, for Stein the personality is to be
conceived as a component of the ‘I’ (i.e. the monad) which is the bearer of all
experiences, including feelings. The correlation of such feelings with values is
what makes ethical deliberation and judgement possible.
The principal structuring influence of values upon the personality is
therefore one of stratification. Our deepest feelings are correlated with our
highest values. Yet for Stein there is something more to the topology of the
personality than a straightforward layering. She observes that feelings, to a
greater or lesser extent, have a tendency to spread or radiate from their original
location within the ‘I’. In this connection she notes that certain of our feelings
53 OPE, p.109.
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(our deepest) originate from the “centre” and are capable of radiating from there
and permeating the entire personality. The personality, then, is both layered and
somehow centred, the centre being the locus of one’s deepest feelings. If such
spatial notions of depth, layering, and centredness are to speak meaningfully of
what is given in the empathic intuition and the inner perception of the person,
then what kind of a topology can they imply? One thinks of concentric rings of
different sizes somehow stacked upon one another. Perhaps the most
straightforward geometrical interpretation of her position is that the personality
is structured approximately like an inverted cone, with deep feelings originating
near the centre, at the tip of the cone where they are capable of permeating the
whole, while shallow feelings originate near what she calls the “periphery”, at
the cone’s base. Unfortunately, further phenomenological investigation into the
shapes and forms constitutive of the domain of the personality is an avenue that
Stein does not pursue.
One of the important features of Stein’s account, which she has in
common with Scheler, is that while values are given as transcending the
personality, different individuals can have different value hierarchies. This raises
in turn the question of whether it is possible to make general claims about the
content of the value hierarchy. If we all have our own value hierarchy, or
“personal moral tenor” as Scheler might put it, then does this mean simply that
we are all sui generis moral agents? Stein’s answer is to try to impose some
order upon the apparent proliferation of possible moral tenors, by suggesting
that distinct personal types exist, although she does not elaborate to any great
extent on what the nature of these types might be, beyond occasionally
providing an example. She does, however, speculate that a doctrine of personal
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types might provide the “ontological foundation” for the cultural sciences that
Dilthey intended.54
Stein’s relation to Dilthey, which she touches upon only towards the end
of her book, illuminates an important feature of her account that we have not yet
considered. This relates not to the essential structure of the act of empathy, nor
primarily to her descriptive account of its performance, but instead to the
conditions for its possibility. Prior to her discussion in terms of Dilthey, the
intelligibility of the foreign subject is explicated principally in terms of the
lawfulness of the Other’s consious life. As we have seen, this view leads Stein in
the direction of a pathologisation of cases in which the experience of the Other
seems to stubbornly resist full comprehension. But Stein’s transcendental
understanding of the intelligibility of the Other ultimately moves, under the
influence of Dilthey, beyond considerations of the Other’s motivations by
shifting attention back onto constraints imposed by a priori features of the
empathising mind. As Stein points out, it was Dilthey who proposed that the
intelligibility of the foreign individual is necessarily delimited by one’s own,
and that the human person precisely is the interpretive faculty operating in the
cultural sciences. This quasi-Kantian view is one that Stein broadly sustains, and
seeks to transpose into the context of transcendental phenomenology. At stake
here for Stein is not the possibility of the empathising objectification of the
foreign experience, but the extent to which the fulfilling explication can take
place. As she puts it,
[…] I cannot fulfil what conflicts with my own experiential structure.
But I can still have it given in the manner of empty presentation. I
54 OPE, p.108.
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can be sceptical myself and still understand that another sacrifices
all his earthly goods to his faith.55
According to Stein’s example, religiously motivated behaviour is not
unintelligible to the atheist. The atheist can acquire an objectifying apprehension
of the Other’s experience and the values motivating it. But it is not possible to
feel a value that one does not “possess”, that is, a value that is not included in
one’s own value hierarchy. For this reason, the performance of the fulfilling
explication phase of empathy is necessarily precluded in such cases. It follows
from Stein’s position that the extent of the delimitation of foreign experience
during empathy is determined by differences between the respective personal
types of the empathiser and the Other. But the notion of personal type is really
derivative in terms of its explanatory power. Personal type is a function of
values, and it is the overlap of felt values that truly governs the extent to which a
fulfilling explication might occur.
It is not possible, in Stein’s opinion, for an individual to change his or
her personal type. In this sense, there is something immutable about the personal
value hierarchy. One does not somehow “pick up” values that were not deeply
and essentially one’s own in the first place. Values alien to the individual remain
so, and values that one does possess cannot be somehow lost or erased. As Stein
puts it, “[t]he levels of the person do not ‘develop’ or ‘deteriorate’”, and this
regardless of upbringing and contingent life experience.56
Nonetheless, empathy for Stein is ultimately bound up with a particular
conception of subjective transformation. One’s own values strictly do not
change but they are capable of being “exposed” or “unfolded”, precisely in their
55 OPE, p.115.
56 OPE, pp.110-1.
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being experienced in the empathic encounter with others. Stein indicates that she
believes that a complete unfolding of the personality is entirely possible, and not
merely possible in principle. Yet equally, the essentially contingent nature of
such encounters means that an individual’s personal unfolding may very well
remain partial:
He who never meets a person worthy of love or hate can never
experience the depths in which love and hate are rooted. To him
who has never seen a work of art nor gone beyond the walls of the
city may perhaps forever be closed the enjoyment of nature and art
together with his susceptibility for this enjoyment. Such an
‘incomplete’ person is similar to an unfinished sketch.57
The unfolding of a value, then, takes place in the context of a lived experience of
it in what is other. Hence the extent of one’s personal flourishing, unlike the
content of the levels of the person, is a function of the vicissitudes of one’s own
life experience.
It is interesting to note that in this passage, Stein does not construe such
life experience solely in terms of the people one meets, but also in terms of
one’s experience of art and of nature. The implication of this momentary
broadening of perspective from the principal concern of her work is that
empathy, as Stein conceives it, is not to be regarded as the sole context for the
unfolding of the personality. The extent to which the intentional structure of the
encounter with an artwork, and in particular with a work of literature, can be
said to be analogous to that of encountering another person is a question to
which we shall turn in a later chapter.
57 OPE, p.111.
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Let us take a few moments now to reflect upon where our investigation
into Edith Stein’s account of the problem of empathy has taken us. Stein’s
engagement with the thought of Dilthey towards the end of her book represents
in my opinion a significant epistemological transition in the way she understands
empathic knowledge. From the outset of her work, Stein aligns her methodology
with that of Husserlian phenomenology, and aligns the epistemic status of
empathic intuition with that of the Husserlian understanding of intuition in
general, and of perception in particular. Accordingly, empathic knowledge is
held to be possible in principle, the condition of such knowledge being
continuous and harmonious confirmation attained as an eventual outcome of a
multiplicity of corroborating and correcting empathic acts. Beyond this, our
detailed explication of the stratified essential structure of the component acts
involved in empathy has revealed for us the way in which the epistemic quest
for ever more complete and precise apperception of the Other’s present
experience is ultimately coterminous with a convergence upon a comprehensive
understanding of the Other’s underlying motivations. Yet with the introduction
into the discussion of ideas associated with Dilthey, the epistemological picture
becomes more complicated, and in an important respect quasi-Kantian. The
extent of empathic knowledge becomes inescapably constricted by immutable
features of the subject’s own value hierarchy. And this in turn seems to raise the
epistemologically chastening prospect that the empathic understanding of certain
individuals may turn out to be, for certain would-be empathisers, a priori
impossible. Empathy, then, is to be differentiated from other forms of intuitional
presentiation, not only for the reason that Stein herself remarks upon, namely
that the subject of the re-presented experience is another, but also for the
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transcendental reason that empathy’s very possibility is conditioned by the
particularity of the empathising personality, and, more precisely, the latter’s
contingent correlation with the personality of the Other.
Stein’s entire treatment of values turns out to be an indispensable
component of her thesis. It not only illuminates the essential structure of the
personality but also explains, without resorting to pathologisation, why some
people might be difficult or even impossible to understand. If I have a criticism
of this aspect of Stein’s work, however, it is that, in certain important respects, it
has the character of a rigid importation of ideas from Scheler and Dilthey, rather
than an axiological enquiry conducted, as it were, under her own
phenomenological steam. Stein appears to unreservedly endorse Scheler’s
axiology, his account of the personal value hierarchy, and the subjective
transcendence of values. This importation of Schelerian ideas seems to replace a
detailed phenomenological investigation of her own into the givenness of values.
Such an enquiry would admittedly be a formidable project in its own right, yet it
might serve to illuminate, or call into question, certain doctrines that Stein
appears to take for granted. Why, for example, should the content of the
personal value hierarchy be held to be essentially unchanging? The
phenomenological grounding is not clear for Stein’s claim that new values
cannot be acquired or old values discarded. There is also a tension in Stein’s
relation to Scheler in that she adopts his axiology while disputing his account of
intersubjectivity, and it would therefore seem to be incumbent upon Stein to
clarify the separability of these two aspects of Scheler’s thought. In relation to
Dilthey, Stein appears to adopt his doctrine of personal types. Yet she does not
elaborate upon the phenomenological basis for the constitution of such types. In
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relation to both Scheler and Dilthey, then, it would seem that Stein leaves
undone the detail of certain phenomenological investigations, investigations
necessary to fully and seamlessly assimilate into her own Husserlian project the
aspects of their thought that she wishes to endorse.
For Stein, part of the tremendous significance of empathy is that it is
capable of disclosing not only the nature of someone else’s present experience,
but features of the essential structure of the human person, features which could
not be properly intuited and verified on the basis of introspection alone. Yet if
Stein appears to grant empathy some kind of epistemic upper hand over
introspection, such a privileging is mild, and cannot by any means be taken to
imply the dispensability of introspection. The two modes of intuition are held to
have an essentially reciprocal relationship of mutual corroboration and
correction. Self-awareness, no matter how attentive and profound, cannot by
itself solve the riddle of the Other. But it can provide important evidence
relating to the essential structures of experience at the personal level, such as the
correlation of feelings with values, the nature of the chain of motivations
running from values to actions, and the idea that the personality seems to have a
core as well as a stratified structure. What Stein seems to leave unsaid is that the
fact that introspection is capable of disclosing and corroborating such findings
implies that empathy, notwithstanding its intuitional character, properly has an
ascriptive dimension at the level of the structures of experience, and, of
particular interest to the concerns of this chapter, the structure of emotion. But I
think it must be precisely this ascriptive property that Stein has in mind when
she remarks that “[o]nly he who experiences himself as a person, as a
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meaningful whole, can understand other persons.”58 Understanding empathy’s
ascriptive dimension as applying at the level of the structures of experience
explains the paradox that the most effective empathisers should turn out to be
remarkably self-aware individuals who nonetheless avoid the epistemic dangers
of projective deception, and succeed in intuiting and understanding an
experience which is essentially not theirs.
The kind of understanding of the foreign experience that interests Stein is
not in the first instance conceptual, but instead takes the form of a lived
experience which I have characterised as a kind of “dwelling within” the Other’s
conscious life. One of the important philosophical problems that Stein seeks to
address is the explication and rendering intelligible of the ostensibly paradoxical
claim that in the performance of empathy one is having an experience which
precisely is not one’s own. As we noted, the principal constraint imposed by
transcendental phenomenology upon obtaining an answer to this question lies in
the Husserlian view that a disjunction of subjective processes turns out to be
constitutive of the Other being other. Stein’s proposed solution to this problem
involves two extremely important phenomenological insights. Firstly, she
implies that the lived experience of the fulfilling explication carries an essential
character of non-primordial heteronomy in relation to the foreign primordial
experience, and that the latter is only objectified, and not itself lived by the
empathising subject. Secondly, she implies that a condition for the possibility of
such a fulfilling explication is a distinct and phenomenologically prior act of
transposal into the motivations of the foreign personality, a transposal which
itself is conditioned by the extent to which a “pairing” or “overlaying of sense”
58 OPE, p.116.
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may take place between one or more elements in the respective value hierarchies
of self and Other. Without this prior act of personal-level transposal, the
performance of the range of empathic activities described by Stein is curtailed,
and cannot proceed beyond the emergent level of an empty objectification of
essential features of the Other’s experience. What Stein fails to properly
recognise and make explicit, however, is that this nested structure of
heteronomous acts of the imagination has an important implication for the way
in which the foreign experience is itself experienced, namely that the fulfilling
explication is given in the manner of a semblance, and that empathy essentially
conforms to an intentional structure homologous to that of picture-
consciousness. In this chapter, it has only been possible to substantiate this
conclusion on the basis of findings which emerged in the course of our
investigation, undertaken in chapter 3, into the development of Husserl’s
understanding of the imagination. Even so, it is surprising that Stein seems to
have held back from at least raising the possibility that the Other’s primordial
experience could be given to the empathising consciousness in the manner of a
semblance, although it is reasonable to assume that a contributory factor behind
this omission lies in Husserl’s sharp differentiation between the structure of
reproductive representation, of which Stein took empathy to be a sui generis
example, and that of the kind of perceptual representation found in picture-
consciousness.
The notions of pairing and transposal are two of the features of the
Husserlian account of basic or “inauthentic” empathy that turn out to propagate
into the Steinian account of “authentic” empathy as discussed in this chapter. A
third is the possibility of subjective transformation. In the Fifth Meditation, as
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we noted in chapter 2, Husserl argues that inauthentic empathy is epistemically
transformative for the subject, in that it transforms one’s verifiable
understanding not only of others, but of one’s relation to others and to the world.
For Stein, the transformativity of authentic empathy consists primarily in an
unfolding of values which lie dormant within the individual. As Stein puts it,
“through empathy with […] persons of our type, what is ‘sleeping’ in us is
developed”.59 Secondarily, empathy also provides opportunities to have an
empty intending of values different from one’s own. In consequence of both
kinds of encounter, one finds oneself better positioned to value oneself,
favourably or otherwise, in relation to others. There can be no doubt, then, that
Stein regards the empathic encounter with others, in all its possible forms, to be
at the very heart of the processes of the unfolding of the person. Yet as we noted
earlier, she also alludes in passing to other avenues of human flourishing,
including the encounter with art. In some of the following chapters, I intend to
engage with the question of the transformativity of the encounter with a work of
literature, and to consider the possible connections of such subjective
transformation to questions of intersubjectivity.
59 OPE, p.116.
Chapter 5 - Starobinski’s Conception of the Implied Author
Page 155 of 302
Chapter 5 - Starobinski’s Conception of the Implied Author
The Swiss literary critic and theorist Jean Starobinski, frequently
identified with the so-called “Geneva School”, is understandably fascinated by
his fellow Genevan, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Starobinski’s most prominent
writings on Rousseau include an extended work of literary criticism entitled
Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le Péril de la Réflexion (1961) and an acclaimed
book-length study, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transparence et l’Obstacle
(1971). The respective (and notably polymathic) interests of the two men
coincide perhaps most strongly around questions of otherness, and the
intersubjective significance of literature.
Starobinski’s engagement with Rousseau naturally has its essential
historical and philosophical dimensions. Beyond these, however, the powerful
gaze to which Starobinski subjects Rousseau is also infused with a self-reflexive
subtext of literary theoretical questions. Rousseau functions ultimately not only
as the object of study, but also as a case study in literary criticism, from which it
is hoped that wider theoretical conclusions may be drawn. Criticism, as
Starobinski suggests in his essay The Critical Relation, is ultimately obliged to
look beyond the textual object and its concomitant world, towards a
“generalisation of its discoveries”, towards “a theory (in the sense of theoria,
intellectual contemplation) of literature”.1
Meta-critical and theoretical questions are therefore seldom absent from
the horizon of Starobinski’s thought. What are the ends of criticism? In what
sense can the text of Rousseau’s work be said to be revelatory of Rousseau
himself? What function can the term “author” responsibly take on in literary
1 The Living Eye (LE), p.114.
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theoretical discourse? In these senses, in the broad sweep of Rousseau’s thought,
and in particular in Rousseau’s own reflections upon the nature of literature, the
ends it might serve, and his envisaged directions for its potential transformation,
Starobinski finds a fruitful way into some central theoretical and meta-critical
questions relating to the very possibility of literary self-disclosure, the role of the
critical imagination, and the nature of interpretation. In this chapter, my
particular interest lies in the nature and origin of Starobinski’s conception of the
implied author.
Let us turn our attention initially to Rousseau, restricting our focus
primarily to those aspects of his thought that can be said to inform and motivate
Starobinski’s general theoretical position. One of Starobinski’s most fertile lines
of engagement with Rousseau, centring on a dialectic of transparency and
obstruction, has important roots in Rousseau’s conception of truth. The question
of truth is arguably Rousseau’s most deep-seated bone of contention with what
we might now call, for the sake of historical precision, the increasingly
“enlightened” intellectual climate in which he found himself. For Rousseau (as
for Keats as we saw earlier), the significance of truth must be framed within a
discourse of the passions: “Love of truth … is the noblest [passion] that can
enter the heart of man.”2 Truth does not amount to a property of timeless
propositions, but instead is essentially temporal, lived, existential. To know
others is to know their truth, and it is the love of truth that motivates Rousseau’s
desire to see beyond the linguistic meaning of other people’s utterances, and
look instead into their “hearts”, their pre-reflective being.
2 Rousseau (1959), ‘Ébauches des Confessions’, Book I, p.1164, Trans. R.J. Morrissey, cited in
Starobinski (1988), p.xiv.
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Rousseau privileges pre-reflective acts over deliberated ones, and aligns
reflection with man’s supposed fallenness from a kind of Edenic or Arcadian
grace. As Starobinski points out, in Rousseau’s Dialogues “sensuous souls” are
depicted communicating through instantaneous signs rather than with
“plodding” (“consequitive”, as Keats would put it) discourse.3 In this sense,
Rousseau understands reflection as introducing a rupture into the primordial
connectedness (an “alliance of sympathy”4, as Starobinski puts it) of all humans,
other creatures, and the whole of the natural world.
Love of truth, then, as the noblest passion, motivates Rousseau’s
valorisation of the existential truth of one’s own lived being. In Dialogues,
Rousseau develops an account of self-love as being, in one sense, a kind of
contented and undivided self-presence and self-involvement. Yet such self-love
cannot properly be construed as solipsistic, as Rousseau works to pre-empt the
very topology of a self comprising an inside and an outside. In its untroubled
idyllic state, the self is immersed in a stream of affection, and remains
unconcerned with whether this affection flows from self or Other. In Rousseau’s
view, this primordial self-love merges seamlessly into sympathy with others.
Thus sympathy, for Rousseau, is no mere aspiration: there is such a
thing, even if it lies dormant in the hearts of most “civilised” men. Sympathy,
pre-reflective and antecedent to reason, remains a power for those, like
Rousseau, in whom the “voice of nature” survives. Rousseau’s position is that in
perfect sympathy, one attains, however fleetingly, a primordial unity with the
Other. Rousseau, like Keats, is not primarily preoccupied here with metaphysics.
Indeed, it seems to me that Rousseau’s emphasis upon the primitive importance
3 LE, p.55.
4 LE, p.59.
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of Nature lends support to the interpretation that the sense of his conception of
this interpersonal unity is phenomenological rather than metaphysical. This is to
say that, without wishing to over-interpret him, Rousseau seems to imply that in
sympathy the subject is not concerned with the strictly metaphysical question of
whether the otherness of the Other is an illusion. The otherness of the Other
simply becomes phenomenologically transparent, in what is for Rousseau an
ultimately mysterious act of consciousness (for Rousseau provides no detailed
explication of primordial sympathy of the kind produced by Scheler). The
sympathetic effacement of otherness is a manifestation of the transparency of
experience for which Rousseau longs, and which he understands to be a return to
the innocence of natural intersubjectivity.
While Rousseau’s ideas of truth and truthfulness illuminate the
axiological dimension to his desire for transparency, his motivations can also be
understood from a more explicitly sociological perspective. Rousseau is
perplexed and repelled by the superficial conversations that he comes across in
Geneva’s salons. For Rousseau, the perversity of such ostensible social
engagement consists in its insincerity, in its occlusion of true feelings. And at
the same time, Rousseau’s own openness to others is obstructed by his social
awkwardness and anxiety. Timid and easily embarrassed, he turns to writing as a
passage to authentic self-disclosure.
The striking, indeed revolutionary, feature of Rousseau’s literary
ambitions, and his ambitions for literature itself, is the way in which he sweeps
aside the notion of literary language as a common property or tool for the
production of meaning which is in some substantive sense distinct from the
author’s own subjectivity. Instead, the work is understood to somehow
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(Rousseau’s failure to adequately explicate this is ultimately significant) embody
the author’s very being. As Starobinski puts it, Rousseau “was the first to
experience the dangerous compact between ego and language, the ‘new alliance’
in which man makes himself the word.”5 It is this theoretical paradigm shift,
entailing an authorial re-appropriation and re-assimilation of language, which
leads Starobinski to claim that Rousseau “truly invented a new attitude, which
became that of modern literature.”6
Given such extraordinary stature accorded to Rousseau, specifically as a
literary thinker, the paradox of Starobinski’s engagement with Rousseau lies in
the consistent emphasis Starobinski places upon the significant inadequacies, to
which we shall shortly turn, in Rousseau’s theoretical understanding of
literature. This is indeed, I would suggest, the crucial dialectic informing
Starobinski’s relation to Rousseau. Starobinski’s insight into Rousseau’s
aspirations for literature is that, while they seem to provide prima facie grounds
for dismissing Rousseau as (in the worst kind of sense) a sentimental Romantic,
the very fault-lines in Rousseau’s implicit manifesto for literature themselves
intimate and open up radically new and important literary theoretical and meta-
critical questions. Let us look more closely at what seems to go wrong in
Rousseau’s account.
Rousseau’s literary project is bound up with a quest for self-knowledge.
Self-knowledge would seem to be a logical pre-requisite for faithful self-
portraiture, which is the explicitly stated aim of his Confessions. Yet for
Rousseau, self-knowledge is not only logically prior to such unflinching
autobiographical literary production, for as we shall see, self-knowledge itself is
5 Starobinski (1988), p.xxiv.
6 Starobinski (1988), p.xxiv.
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attained precisely in and through such literary endeavour. The attainment of new
forms of self-knowledge comes to be understood to be part of the subjective
significance of being an author.
In the interests of self-knowledge, Rousseau intends in writing his
Confessions to both re-live past experiences and work at other times as a
detached self-observer. As Starobinski puts it, Rousseau assigns himself a
double duty of “complete unity and total fission”.7 Rousseau’s view that self-
knowledge stems from both feeling and detachment echoes his ambivalent
stance towards reflection. To be sure, reflection in the first instance is held to
fracture the idyllic self-presence that we considered earlier. Yet on occasion
Rousseau also concedes that a sustained regression to the primitive pre-
reflective state is impossible. Instead, the unavoidable remedy lies in a
painstaking and progressive transformation of man through ongoing reason and
reflection. Reflection, for Rousseau, turns out to be both poison and cure.
Let us turn first to the question of detached self-contemplation.
Rousseau’s fascination with mechanical technology and scientific
instrumentation is connected with a valorisation of its capacity for impartial
empirical observation. It is understandable, therefore, that at one point Rousseau
should wish to liken his literary technique to that of working inside a camera
obscura, the elaborate optical device providing exactly the kind of dispassionate
images to which Rousseau aspires. Rousseau finds himself drawn to the ekstasis
of the obscura’s projection, for the impassive fidelity of mechanical optics, for
the epistemic promise and variable viewpoints of its rotating all-seeing eye.
7 LE, pp.63-4.
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Yet Rousseau appears to overlook the idea that any literary description,
unlike the potentially variable viewpoints of the projected images of the camera
obscura, remains locked in its perspective, and must necessarily, to a greater or
lesser degree, shape and construct its object. If one’s chosen object is oneself, as
it is for Rousseau, then the problem of detachment would seem to be further
compounded. It is not surprising that as his work proceeds, Rousseau becomes
less certain about his chances of success.8
Questions of detached self-contemplation aside, what is one to make of
what we might call Rousseau’s expressivism? Rousseau’s proposed
transparency of expression is motivated by what Starobinski calls a “soulful
imperative”,9 an impulse to disclose with perspicuity one’s deepest affective
states. Let us consider in more detail Rousseau’s idea of a literary work being in
some sense adequate to the author’s phenomenal being. Formulated thus,
without reference to a reader as such, it amounts to a view that Starobinski is
broadly prepared to sustain. Starobinski explicates it as a particular form of
artistic narcissism. It finds an analogy in the myth of Pygmalion, who desired his
own artwork (an ivory statue) to such a degree that Aphrodite decided to answer
his prayer and make it come to life. Narcissism of this kind involves a double
movement which obviates the need for the kind of straightforward self-reflection
provided by a mirror. One initially alienates oneself in the production of the
work, only to seek self-communion precisely through engagement with the
work. Far from disparaging such narcissism, Starobinski stresses its deeply
demanding and creative nature. Perhaps most importantly, the artistic desire
8 As Starobinski points out, there is a deeply sceptical passage in one of Rousseau’s letters in
which he writes “We do not see the souls of others, for they are hidden, nor do we see our own,
because we have no intellectual mirror. We are in every respect blind, but blind from birth.”
(Correspondance, Vol.3, p.354. Trans. LE, p.64).
9 LE, p.73.
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involved is bound up with the imagination. For Rousseau, the imagination is the
setting not only for a kind of curiously perfected yet introverted
intersubjectivity, but also for an idyllic self-love and self-presence. Pygmalion
adores himself in what he has made.
The suggestion here is that while relations with others may seem only to
disappoint in comparison with fantasy, an imagined communion with the “other”
of one’s own artwork offers the catharsis and satisfaction of a perfect
interaction. It is in this movement that affective adequation is apprehended by
the artist. The artwork compensates the artist for the disappointments of life, for
unrequited desire. In communing with his desire, Rousseau attains the kind of
primitive happiness he longs for, in which he is sufficient unto himself.
I suspect that what is right about this idea is that it captures the
movement of an entirely plausible account of authentic poetic creation.
According to this account, the poet in his or her most private moments is
possessed of a pure motivation not so much to communicate as simply to
express – to externalise, even expurgate - something that lies within. Naturally,
the poet has a good sense of when such expression has been accomplished, of
when the job is done. In this case, questions of communication, of being
understood, are in an important sense secondary, or even immaterial for the
artist. As Starobinski suggests, Rousseau was arguably among the first to
seriously give primacy to the expressive function of literary language. But the
difficulty with Rousseau’s conception of the transparency of expression lies in
its Janus-like quality of looking both back to the author’s interiority and forward
to the reader as such. Rousseau’s self-expression always seems to have not only
an accusative but a dative, an anonymous other to whom Rousseau imagines he
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is disclosing himself. This conception of transparency of the text for the reader
holds out the promise of a primordial sympathy between reader and author of the
kind considered earlier, and, in Rousseau’s case, thereby overcoming his sense
of social alienation. Thus Rousseau’s conception of literary expression
ultimately turns out to be a conflation of self-expression and self-disclosure.
As Starobinski does not fail to point out, this turns out to be deeply
problematic, both in literary theoretical terms, and in Rousseau’s personal
experience as a writer. The author may attain a kind of privileged self-
communion in the work, but what Rousseau seems to overlook is that for any
other reader of the work, the experience must necessarily be quite different. For
readers other than the author, the encounter with a literary work is, as
Starobinski puts it, “predicated upon loss of the object and its replacement (I do
not say representation) by words”.10 Literature is conditioned by the absence and
inaccessibility of the originating primordial experience. What Starobinski calls
“the purity of immediate sentiment”,11 far from being preserved for others, is
precisely what is lost, the very moment the ink leaves the writer’s pen. And
authors become obliged, too, to take existential responsibility for the meanings
they choose to see in their own work. But for Rousseau, the possibility of a
proliferation of possible meanings leads only to anxiety about hostile and
malicious interpretations. His later works, such as Confessions, betray a nervous
cycle of correction and clarification.
Rousseau’s apparent neurosis about the possibility of his writings being
misunderstood is suggestive that he may have developed for himself the
apprehension, unconscious or otherwise, that there was something inherently
10 LE, p.198.
11 Starobinski (1988), p.xxv.
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misguided about his aspirations for the transparency of literature.
Notwithstanding any doubts he may have had, however, Rousseau also preferred
on occasion to disparage his own writing abilities and perpetuate his literary
idealism. But Starobinski’s scrutiny of Rousseau’s project compels us now to
confront the underlying theoretical problem that Rousseau unwittingly brings to
light: if the very conception of literature as some kind of window onto the
human heart begins to unravel before Rousseau’s very eyes, to what extent does
it make sense at all to configure the encounter with a literary work in
intersubjective terms?
Starobinski is certainly alive to the seductions and pitfalls, epistemic and
moral, of pretensions of being able to divine a soul in the transient play of
appearances. According to Starobinski, the deepest intellectual concerns of
L’Oeil Vivant, published in 1961, were already germinating in his mind some
twenty years earlier amidst wartime anxiety surrounding the captivating power
of charismatic leaders. What seems to have chilled the young Starobinski was
the realisation that the charisma of such individuals “stemmed essentially from
their knowing how to make use of a certain kind of mask”.12 For Starobinski, the
perils of being seduced by appearances are bound up with a more general
problematic of the desirous gaze. And he takes seriously the implicit insights
and admonitions of classical myth. Poppaea’s lovers come to grief because of
their impetuous desire to see behind her veil. For the critic who desires to see
too much, the risks are also serious. To fail to retain some distance from the text
is to risk losing one’s bearings in a manner which parallels the way in which
Rousseau’s persistent desire to see into others’ hearts most often ends badly for
12 LE, p.v.
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him, in humiliation, confusion, or (in the end) paranoia. In attempting to see
what cannot be seen, one is prone to fill in the void with a narcissistic projection.
In Rousseau’s case, a sense of personal guilt, apparently instilled during his
puritanical upbringing, was not infrequently transformed into the presumption of
the silent censure of others, the mirage of the hostile gaze.
In this context, Starobinski accords some validity to Paul Valéry’s view
that, at least in the normal course of events, and despite polite protestations to
the contrary, we never do quite see with perspicuity into other people’s affective
lives. There is always an essential moment of ambiguity, a kind of truncation in
empathic precision. Valéry traces the undecidability of foreign affectivity to a
moment of signitive disguise that he considers to be constitutive of all human
relations. His conclusion is as memorable as it is dialectical: “Human relations
are based on ciphers. To decipher is to become confused.”13 For Starobinski,
part of the significance of this Valérean line of thought lies in the sense that,
even in the very act of revealing oneself, something is always held back,
obscured, or deferred.
Yet this hardly confounds the case for an intersubjective approach to
literature. To the extent that empathy does take place in human relations, should
we not at least take seriously the possibility of a literary analogue? Starobinski
stands by the view that to the extent that a literary work implies thought at all,
such thought cannot but be correlated with a consciousness employing the
available linguistic resources of the times. Starobinski’s dialectical solution to
the problem of literary intersubjectivity centres on his conception of a work’s
implied author. It is time now for us to consider this idea more closely.
13 Valéry (1932), pp.103-4, Trans. LE, p.231.
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In this chapter so far, it has become relatively clear that Starobinski’s
engagement with Rousseau has put Rousseau’s literary ideals, and his manifesto
for the transparency of literature, under quite serious pressure. Perhaps it is at
junctures such as this that the many advantages of the critical approaches of the
formalists, structuralists, and textualists become most apparent. In restricting
attention to objectively observable features of the work, and to the life of the text
itself, difficulties connected with the urge to see a hidden source or origin
beyond what is manifestly given are systematically avoided. Starobinski himself,
as it will turn out, is no anti-structuralist. Yet one of the dialectical subtleties of
Starobinski’s approach to the study of literature lies in the importance, indeed
necessity, that he attaches to traditional philological rigour in tracking down, to
the maximum scholarly extent possible, the nature of a given text’s originary
historico-linguistic context. To be sure, for Starobinski, cultural context and
supposed Zeitgeist are not in themselves wholly adequate explanations of the
literary work. The greatest authors not only subsist within their cultural
environment, but kick against it, innovating and invigorating the very womb
from which they are born. Yet this very individuality can only become fully
delineable and intelligible against its contemporary cultural backdrop.
Starobinski studies Rousseau in his socio-historical context precisely to
illuminate Rousseau’s radical differentiation and innovation. And Starobinski’s
point of departure from the formalists is that the text cannot ultimately be
properly distilled and withdrawn from the passage of history. For this reason, he
does not equivocate on the point that a diligent undertaking of the usual
philological groundwork – the determination of “precise definitions of words in
their historical context”, for example, and “establishing scrupulously accurate
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texts”14 in the first place – is quite simply a prerequisite for any subsequent
critical work, regardless of interpretive brilliance.
Even so, Starobinski’s methodological interest in literary origins should
not be interpreted as evidence of a literary theoretical commitment, at least in
terms of the most crucial and distinctive aspects of his theoretical position, to a
conception of “author” as necessarily absented and distantiated across the divide
of historical time. Starobinski’s theoretical understanding of literature ultimately
moves beyond the terms and ambit of a purely philological discourse.
Nonetheless, in Blindness and Insight, Paul de Man claims that in his treatment
of Rousseau, Starobinski is attempting to intuit truths about the historical
Rousseau, truths that lie beyond the ostensible meaning of what Rousseau
actually wrote. In the preface to The Living Eye, however, Starobinski, while
admitting that his critical perspective may require some supplementary
clarification, convincingly answers de Man’s charge by pointing out that
Rousseau himself urges his readers not to read him at face value. Starobinski
insists that his critical interest never alters its focus from the Rousseau as author
implicit across the entirety of Rousseau’s work. For Starobinski, the literary text
is not conceived as a mask behind which a pre-given author is a priori
condemned to concealment, but instead as precisely a privileged disclosure of a
particular and distinctive conscious interiority.
For Starobinski, the idea that a literary work should be correlated with an
individual consciousness is not an isolated critical theme, or mere
phenomenological detail, but instead goes to the very heart of his conception of
what literature turns out to be, at least in its greatest and most significant
14 LE, p.115.
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manifestations. To adumbrate such individuality, it is not sufficient for a work to
simply employ a given language, to operate it according to its grammatical and
syntactical requirements, and according to one’s referential intentions, that is, to
master it as one masters a bicycle to accomplish a specified journey, no matter
how original or pioneering that journey may be. The literary work is
distinguished from other instances of language usage by the fact that it changes
the language in some way, and makes it its own. Literature ruptures the
determinacy of language, in the sense that it is both conditioned by and
conditions its language. The autonomy of literature gives it the power to change
the course of history: it can alter the shapes of consciousness in a dialectical
action of compliance and subversion of its language. As Starobinski sees it, the
essential tension of literature is that it is both a “celebration” and a “profanation”
of language.15 It is, in particular, this aspect of profanation which enables the
correlation of a text with an individuated and distinctive consciousness, and
informs Starobinski’s fundamental intuition that literature is “intimately
associated with a personal way of being in the world”.16
The “profanation” of language of which Starobinski speaks can be
understood in multiple ways. In one sense, at work here is an image of trauma,
transgression, and violation. Writers, though existing within, or in relation to, a
prevalent culture, make their way out of the temple of the cultural Logos, of
linguistic and spoken conformity, towards a more marginal, semi-detached
vantage point. From belonging within, the writer withdraws into a kind of
parasitic ambivalence, if not overt hostility. Starobinski observes that the
outstanding works of modern literature tend to relate to the world by rejecting it
15 LE, p.116.
16 LE, p.215.
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in some way. The opposition to culture comes to be reflected in the violation of
its literary and linguistic norms. At some level (precisely which, the critic must
judge) the work remains internally consistent, yet stubbornly opposed to its
outside. It falls to the critic to uncover the signs of destructuring and deviation
manifestly or latently operating within the work.17
Yet Starobinski also recognises that literature’s profanation of language
is not always obviously traumatic. There is a softer way in which literature
announces its cultural differentiation and individuation, and it involves bending
and deforming language out of its customary shapes and contours. At this level,
the question of hostile transgression become less prominent, and language’s
profanation becomes, too, its celebration. The writer may have left the temple,
but may also turn outside to face it, to stand before it. While the style of a work
may break or vitiate its host language, it may equally bend it and place it under
the torsions of a personal rhetoric. Either way, the notion of literary style, for
Starobinski, has now become intimately, even inseparably, associated with
existential style. Such “style” can push expressive capacity and suppleness to its
limits. Style as such has now become something more substantive than a vague
reference to a work’s way with words. Style is now not only surface but
somehow contiguous with existential reality, not only artistic appearance but an
opening onto authorial being.
In this respect, Starobinski believes that, for all of Rousseau’s excesses,
there is still something to be learnt from Rousseau’s ambitions for style:
Rousseau understands style’s simultaneously subversive and authentic moments.
Rousseau comes to the view that the nature of style, or at least of the kind of
17 LE, p.120.
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style that his own autobiographical endeavours require, must be far more radical
than merely the superficial, expedient, or even cynical employment of rhetorical
technique and literary artifice. The allegiance of style lies not with accepted
fashions or mannerisms, with the prevalent cultural grooves of expression (no
matter how intricate or sophisticated they may have become) made familiar in
the daily traffic of social encounters, but with the impulses, motivations, and
directions of the individual’s conscious interiority. The production of an
authentic style amounts to the invention of a new language, the creation of a
personal dictionary. As Rousseau pledges in Confessions,
I will always have whatever style comes to me; I shall change it
without scruple according to my mood; I shall say each thing as I
feel it, as I see it, without straining for effect, without
embarrassment, and without worrying about the mixture of colours.
By surrendering to the impression received and to the sentiment of
the moment, I shall paint the state of my soul twice over, at the
moment the event occurred and at the moment I wrote it down.18
Even as Rousseau elaborates his philosophy of style, however, the cracks in his
position become more apparent. While his literary aim is clearly fixed or fixated
on self-immediacy and self-transparency, he finds himself driven to a signitive
metaphor to capture the operations of his authorial processes: an image of
painting. The difficulty here is that representation is somehow being conflated
with presentation. A painting of Rousseau does not render present Rousseau,
except in the most hyperbolic of views. If it did, one would perceive Rousseau,
not a painting of him. Depending upon the skills of the artist, Rousseau may be
said to be depicted, but in depiction, qua depiction, the transparency of
immediacy is ineluctably lost.
18 Rousseau (1959), Book I, pp.1153-4. Trans. LE, p.179.
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Starobinski intimates precisely this problem when summarising
Rousseau’s understanding of the function of style: “Style [for Rousseau] points
infallibly to the author’s inward truth.”19 It would seem that the aporia in
Rousseau’s thought has now been relayed into Starobinski’s paraphrase, in
which “painting” has become “pointing”, and that Starobinski’s very effort to
convey Rousseau’s view coherently results in the dubious idea of an infallible
pointing. But pointing, like painting, necessarily implies distance, and distance
surely precludes infallibility.
I alluded earlier to some of the alternative theoretical approaches to
literature which could be said to bypass the troubling question of
intersubjectivity. The siren call of scepticism would seem to offer the modern
critic a comfortable way out, a resigned, even quietly relieved, retreat into the
dispassionate impersonal analyses of structure, form, and text. The sceptical
escape route even seems attuned, on the face of it, to the very ethos of detached
critical discourse. To simply look carefully at a text, instead of curiously, even
desirously, into it, is to remain discretely isolated from the difficult
involvements of empathy and feeling, and, in short, the personal encounter.
The originality of Starobinski’s ultimate critical response to Rousseau
lies in the fact that he does not straightforwardly discard the spirit of Rousseau’s
intersubjective aspirations as some kind of hopeless artefact of a discredited
form of Romantic idealism. The Starobinskian insight into Rousseau is to
observe just how close Rousseau actually is to a coherent theoretical
understanding of the intersubjectivity of literature. Rousseau is fundamentally
right, in Starobinski’s view, to propose and pursue the idea that questions of
19 LE, pp.178-9. My emphasis.
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intersubjectivity go to the very heart of what it is to be a writer, and of what it is,
in turn, to encounter as a reader a work of literature. Rousseau’s difficulties,
however, at both a theoretical and a personal level, relate to an inadequate grasp
of the relation between appearance and reality in the context of encountering the
Other. Rousseau sets out in his literary work, and often too in the encounters
described in his Confessions, to somehow circumvent external appearances. He
desires to bare his own heart, and to see directly into other people’s. Yet his
literary dissatisfactions, and his social disconnections, jointly intimate an
underlying failure to address the difficulties of otherness.
The alternative view which informs Starobinski’s entire critical approach
first receives detailed philosophical elaboration only in the twentieth-century
phenomenological work of Husserl and Stein on the question of
intersubjectivity. As I indicated in a previous chapter, one of the most distinctive
features of the Husserl-Stein account is the positing of a fundamental
phenomenological contiguity between appearance and being. An object’s being
is ultimately inseparable from the primordial appearances which found its
intersubjective co-constitution. And outward bodily expressions are held to be
capable of disclosing through appresentation the nature of the person’s
conscious motivations. It is precisely through this phenomenological conception
of contiguity that Starobinski proposes to transcend the appearance/reality
dichotomy in the context of literature. The motivations implicit in literary
expression, and capable of textual explication under the rubric of style, are now
coherently understood to constitute the contents of an implicit authorial
consciousness.
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Further detailed study of Starobinski’s thought (opportunities for which
will be limited within the scope of the remainder of this thesis) would help to
bring out the ways in which he denies neither that objective textual analysis is
important to literary criticism, nor that the literary work always remains
essentially open to multiple readings, and that critics ultimately find themselves
to be existentially implicated and entangled in the forces at work in their own
interpretations. Yet perhaps the most theoretically decisive aspect of his thought,
the commitment which arguably governs his fundamental understanding of
criticism, is the view that the literary work itself, distinct from historical
background and philological enquiry, has the capacity to grant us an
intersubjectively privileged insight into the intentionality of the Other, that is,
that the work possesses and opens onto an inherent authorial consciousness.
This conception of the inherence of what is other leads Starobinski to
configure the interiority of the inherent author as a kind of latency within the
work. The Other’s experience, precisely in being that of an Other, is not, to the
reader’s eye and mind, primordially accessible and apprehensible in the manner
in which the textual surface and its manifest semantic value could be said to be.
The Other is present within the work, neither manifest at the surface nor secretly
hidden away, or hermetically sealed behind the symbols of the text. Instead, the
Other is accessible via the text, susceptible to what Starobinski calls “greater
penetration” into the work, towards its “second meaning”.20 We are dealing here
with neither an encryption nor a straightforward occlusion. The critic’s work is
not at root to be understood as a project of deciphering, accomplished with the
20 LE, p.11.
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hypothesising guile common to allegorical or psychoanalytical interpretations,
but rather a much more direct seeing into the work, an apperceptual penetration.
The textual Other is never disjoint from its textual appearance because its
principal presenting aspect is that of literary style, the expression of authorial
individuality in the profanation of language. For this reason, the search for what
is deepest in a work often returns to what is formally and semantically relatively
near to the surface of the text. Starobinski intimates this deeply
phenomenological idea of a transcending of the appearance/reality opposition in
the following way:
Frequently the search for what is most remote leads to what is
nearest at hand: to what was obvious at first glance, the forms and
rhythms that seemed merely to hold the promise of a secret
message. After a long detour we come back to the words
themselves, where meaning chooses to reside, and that gleaming
mysterious treasure we had felt compelled to seek in a “deeper
dimension”.21
Literary façade and underlying being are ultimately fused into coherence: there
can be no circumvention of the text. And in the literary as in the purely
phenomenological domain, Starobinski suggests, we find the ontological force
of the appearance/reality dichotomy to have been all but neutralised.
The trajectory of Starobinski’s thought has now taken us from a strictly
psychophysical conception of author to one belonging to pure consciousness.
The concept of author has been transposed from embeddedness within history
into the domain of the imagination. For this reason, Starobinski understands the
intersubjective latency of the text to be “the vaster life or transfigured death
21 LE, p.12.
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inherent in it.”22 The death to which Starobinski refers is that of the original
living intentions of the historical author, a necessary death, promised and
predicted in the undoing of Rousseau’s fated hopes for literary self-transparency.
Yet the “author’s lived intentions” as such find a sense in which they can
meaningfully survive, but only in a “transfigured” and non-primordial form,
buried yet readable within the permanence of a text.
22 LE, p.12.
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Chapter 6 - Literature’s Capacity for Moral Suggestion
I began my earlier chapter on Keats’s meta-poetical thought by
remarking upon the way in which Keats registers an ostensible polarity between
philosophical and poetical thought. We observed that Keats links poetry to a
kind of protean pleasure capable of surprising and confounding the theoretically
orientated “virtuous philosopher”. Moral philosophy is indeed fundamentally
concerned with general features of situations and actions, while literature very
often seems to display, at least on the surface, precisely the opposite orientation:
a preoccupation with singularity, with what seems to render experiences and
events unique and unrepeatable. On the account of Keats’s thought that I have
provided, one has to admit that it would be difficult to imagine Keats being
anything but instinctively sceptical about the possibility or validity of systematic
moral deliberation. In this sense, the pursuit of the idea that literature has, after
all, some contribution to make to moral philosophy would seem to be
adventitious to the direction of Keats’s poetical aspirations. Yet in that initial
chapter of my thesis it emerged that Keats also takes the proper concerns of
poetry to include what are, by any standards, some of the most serious and
central questions pertaining to the human condition: questions, for example, to
do with suffering, existential anxiety, and uncertainty. I argued that Keats
implies that grasping a poetical treatment of such subject matter is ultimately
connected with the question of empathy. From this perspective, it is not
unreasonable to speculate that if, as Keats suggests, poetry can be a source of
non-propositional insight into such matters, then such insight could turn out to
have an important influence, possibly indirect but nonetheless formative, upon
ethical understanding. More generally, and without wishing to pursue any
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further my exegesis of Keats’s theoretical position, I want to suggest in this
chapter that empathic emotional engagement with a work of literature can be
profoundly relevant in various ways to the processes of moral deliberation.
Naturally, and as we shall soon discover in more detail, the suggestion that the
modes of poetic contemplation are not merely at variance with those of
deductive moral enquiry, but are also deeply relevant in other ways and at other
levels to moral reflection, opens onto a set of interwoven moral epistemological
and literary theoretical questions. We need to try to clarify, in particular, exactly
why it makes sense to speak of quasi-empathic involvement in a literary work,
what the relation of such literary “empathy” might be to that of real-world
interpersonal encounters, why such empathic imaginational involvement in a
literary work should turn out to be relevant to moral philosophy, and whether
literature’s contribution to moral deliberation can be said on occasion to have
aesthetic value. In this chapter, I want to begin to unravel some of these
complexities.
The epistemic component of literary aesthetic moral cognitivism claims
that some literary works are capable of conveying moral knowledge. The
version of this position that I wish to consider in both this and the next chapter is
a relatively strong one, as it makes two distinct yet cognitively complementary
claims. Firstly, there is the claim that literature has a special capacity for moral
suggestion, and that the moral suggestions that a work of literature can make
may correspond not only to beliefs either that the reader already holds, or at least
whose content the reader is already familiar with, but, importantly, to views and
insights that the reader simply would not have come across were it not for
reading the literary work. Secondly, there is the claim that literature can be a
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source of moral justification for the very suggestions it seems to be making,
which is to say that there may be occasions on which the reader does not need to
turn to activities extrinsic to the encounter with a literary work in order to
rationally decide that what the work is suggesting is in fact morally justified. In
observing that these two types of claim (a claim regarding moral suggestion, and
a claim regarding moral justification) are involved in aesthetic moral
cognitivism, I do not presuppose that proponents of aesthetic moral cognitivism
are necessarily committed to the traditional tripartite account of knowledge, an
account which remains a matter of epistemological dispute, most notably in the
wake of Gettier-style counter-examples purporting to show that occasions can
arise in which true justified beliefs do not reasonably count as knowledge. For
the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient for us merely to endorse the view that
even if the traditional tripartite account of knowledge should turn out to require
some kind of enhancement, any such enhancement would not have to involve a
cancellation of the justification condition. Indeed, one of the main ways of
responding to Gettier-style counter-examples (by those who take Gettier’s
position to be sound) is to argue that the tripartite account needs to be
supplemented with a fourth condition, not that the justification condition needs
to be replaced. Without committing ourselves either way with respect to the
traditional tripartite account, we can, I would suggest, engage substantively with
what is epistemically at stake in aesthetic moral cognitivism by restricting the
scope of our investigations in this chapter and the next to the related questions of
moral suggestion and moral justification. In the course of our investigation, I
intend to draw attention in particular to two different kinds of object of moral
suggestion: putative intuitions pertaining to the domain of values, and putative
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phenomenological knowledge pertaining to the essential structures of what
might be called “virtuous” experience. In both cases, I will wish to pursue in
subsequent chapters the questions of rational moral justification, and of aesthetic
value.
I want to begin our discussion of literature’s capacity for moral
suggestion by considering the problem of suggestive relativism. Proponents of
what we might call literary aesthetic moral relativism will argue that great works
of literature can certainly stimulate us to think afresh about moral questions, but
that different readers will respond in different, and perhaps even opposing,
ways. On this view, it would seem that the contribution of the literary work to
the reader’s moral deliberation is not to convey some determinate moral lesson,
understood to be proper to the work itself, but instead solely to stimulate the
reader’s moral thinking, to put in play a set of ideas and questions that readers
themselves must work through, in their own different ways. Articulated thus, the
position of literary aesthetic moral relativism seems to lead us to view the
literary work not even as strictly a “suggestor” of moral opinion, but primarily
and essentially a “catalyst” of moral reflection.
Jenefer Robinson’s work Deeper Than Reason can provide us with some
assistance at this point in our discussion. I find Robinson’s thought to be
particularly relevant here because, while remaining alive to certain important
possible connections between literary experience and moral learning (I do not
say knowledge), she is also not prepared to repress the issue of literature’s moral
indeterminacy. On the one hand, she is interested precisely in the kind of literary
works pertinent to the present chapter, works that can rightly be described as
“morally serious”, in that they manifestly seek to confront and engage with
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serious moral questions.1 Yet on the other hand, Robinson recognises that
different readers could have different, “equally plausible”,2 interpretations of
such a work, and that her prime example, Edith Wharton’s novel The Reef,
which Robinson understands (not unreasonably) to be a “meditation on
morality”,3 does not, for all its meditating, turn out to answer moral questions
unambiguously.4
Robinson grounds the validity of a plurality of moral interpretations in
her acceptance of an inevitable factual plurality in different readers’ emotional
experiences of a given work. Robinson suggests that readers become
emotionally engaged with a novel to the extent that aspects of the plot and
characters appeal to the readers’ value commitments, interests, and emotional
and psychological needs.5 Robinson also endorses Wolfgang Iser’s view that in
addition to responding to characters and events that the narrative explicitly
describes, an important part of reading a novel involves engaging one’s
imagination in relation to things that the narrative omits. Accomplished novelists
shape and construct their fictional worlds in part by skilfully selecting which
perspectives to adopt, and which aspects of people or events to reveal. Yet these
aspects and perspectives appresent a complete imaginary world, a world which
“goes on”, so to speak, in between scenes, a world in which a brief glimpse of
someone’s expression can bespeak a rich and complex mental life. Robinson
implies that such “gaps” in a narrative contribute to a novel’s indeterminacy of
meaning, because the manner in which readers “fill in” such lacunae will be
conditioned to some extent by their own personalities and autonomous choices,
1 Robinson (2005), p.159.
2 Robinson (2005), p.185.
3 Robinson (2005), p.187.
4 Robinson (2005), p.178.
5 Robinson (2005), p.176.
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and not wholly by what is disclosed in the text.6 Robinson’s claim here, of
course, is not that a literary work’s meaning is wholly indeterminate, but that it
is not wholly determinate. She wants to suggest not that any reading is critically
permissible or appropriate, but that there is no reason in principle why
substantially different, and even conflicting, readings should not emerge, and
even that the structure of literary understanding itself is conducive to such
critical plurality arising. She attributes hermeneutic variations, as I have
indicated, to lacunae in the text, and ultimately to the impossibility of erasing the
reader’s critical subjectivity from the experience that a literary work seems to be
offering.
As Robinson rightly indicates, readings can reasonably be said to be
critically inappropriate when they become detached from any plausible
philological or textual grounding.7 There remains something be got right in a
work of literary criticism, I would suggest, because literary works (and certainly
great ones) do not merely present an inchoate constellation of ideas, but manifest
some kind of organising principle, effecting a treatment of an underlying
problem or theme. Yet in seeking to make general claims about the processes
involved in literary criticism, one always needs to tread carefully, and my blunt
assertion that engaging in literary criticism involves an attempt to apprehend
features of the work’s treatment of one or more themes may seem to risk in
some way vitiating the delicacy of what it is, or what it should be, to encounter a
literary work on its own terms, in all its otherness, uniqueness, and particularity.
It may help, therefore, if I qualify my claim straight away with the point that in
this context I do not employ the concept of “theme” as a way of transcending the
6 Robinson (2005), p.184, 192.
7 Robinson (2005), p.192.
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literary work, but on the supposition that the work itself may possess its own
implicit conception of what a theme can be, and of how a theme can be treated
and developed. My suggestion here, then, is that serious literary works typically
display an orientation toward exploration and enquiry into a certain discernible
subject matter; that an important part of our valuing certain works is to do with
what we take to be the importance of their subject; that we often explicate the
importance of great works under the traditional humanistic rubric of their being
“explorative of the human condition”; that questions pertaining to the human
condition certainly include questions of morality. It would be premature at this
stage in our discussion to jump to grand claims about the constitutive capacity of
great literature to provide very clear answers to such questions. Indeed, to do so
would be to overlook a somewhat less controversial yet highly significant
observation: that literary works can be remarkably adept at articulating and
illuminating moral problems qua problems. To clarify what is at stake in a moral
problem, not only intellectually but in terms of value commitments, would in
itself constitute an extremely important contribution to the processes of moral
reflection. In stating matters in this way I am deliberately lowering the bar
below the stringent requirement of acquiring the kind of moral knowledge that
enables one to answer moral philosophical questions to do with knowing how a
moral agent should act in certain situations, knowing more generally how to
decide how to act morally, or being able to answer meta-ethical questions, e.g.
questions such as whether moral values are objective, or whether all moral
dilemmas are resolvable. My intention in lowering the bar in this way is not to
imply that I am prejudging the discussion in a later chapter regarding the
question of literature’s occasional capacity to genuinely provide justification for
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certain moral beliefs, but to bring into focus where literature’s most obvious
strengths in contributing to moral reflection seem to lie. For all the interpretive
leeway implied by the reader-response aspects of literary criticism that we
recently considered, the crucial point that now cannot be ignored is that morally
serious works call out for understanding by the competent critic, in virtue of
their (I do not say the critic’s) intrinsic orientation toward the exploration of
moral themes, conflicts, and problems. In this chapter I want to show how an
investigation into the phenomenology of the critical reader’s attempt to
understand a literary work’s explorations of moral questions can illuminate the
nature of the different kinds of moral suggestion that literary works are capable
of making, and that the apprehension of such moral suggestions turns out to be
deeply integrated into the essential phenomenological structure of reading a
work of literature.
We need to pursue a little further the important idea just intimated that a
literary work’s deepest meanings, and the levels of meaning with which critics
are often most interested, are those bound up with the elaboration of a certain
theme, and that such thematic elaboration coheres around what we might call
“cogitative” (I do not yet say “cognitive”) explorations or streams of enquiry.
On the one hand, there is no need for us to presuppose that such literary
meditations should necessarily arrive at some kind of unequivocal conclusion.
Yet, on the other hand, the unity of the work, and our ultimate critical basis for
taking it to be a single accomplished work rather than a collection of disparate
textual pieces, depend to some extent upon different strands of contemplation
discernible within the text being connected and coordinated in certain crucial
ways. On unearthing such connections, critics can justifiably feel that they have
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made progress in unlocking the secrets of the literary work in question, and that
they are contributing substantively to the literary discourse surrounding that text.
I would suggest that the contemplative coherence of a work can be an important
contributor to our grounds for correlating its thematic elaborations with a single
meditating consciousness. In this case, we need to investigate the extent to
which a literary work’s capacity for moral suggestion is bound up with the
reader’s experience of an implied author.
In chapter 5 (‘Starobinski’s Conception of the Implied Author’) we
considered Starobinski’s understanding of the way in which the literary style
manifested in a work has the capacity to disclose aspects, to use Starobinski’s
own phrase, of an implied author’s “personal way of being in the world”.8 I
argued that Starobinski’s account is connected in important ways to the
phenomenological understanding of intersubjectivity, and in particular to the
positions of Husserl and Stein discussed in earlier chapters. In the chapter on
Starobinski, I sought to begin to develop the idea that the manner in which the
experience of textual features of a literary work grounds the apperception of an
implied authorial conscious interiority is not unrelated phenomenologically to
the manner in which the perceptual experience of an Other’s bodily appearance
and expression grounds the empathic constitution of a foreign subjectivity, and
its associated personality, motivations, and lived experiences. The notion of an
implied author is also one which Robinson discusses in relation to a reader’s
emotional and imaginational involvement in a literary work, although
Robinson’s understanding of emotional response is framed within a
physiological and psychological discourse, rather than a phenomenological one.
8 Starobinski (1989), p.215.
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Robinson understands the implied author to be a kind of “construction” built up
by the reader as he or she progresses through the work.9 Yet there are two
reasons why Robinson’s notion of construction here does not parallel very
closely the Husserlian concept of constitution. Firstly, she clearly indicates that
she regards the nature of such acts of construction as inferential rather than
intuitional or apperceptual.10 Secondly, Robinson’s evident enthusiasm for
reader-response theory works to draw her position away from the idea (which I
am interested in pursuing) of an implied author certain features of whom can be
understood to be amenable to intersubjective co-constitution by different
(philologically responsible and textually attentive) readers. Indeed, Robinson
suggests on at least three occasions that different readers of the same literary
work will be liable to construct different implied authors.11 For Robinson, the
respects in which the construction of the implied author is reader-relative are
important because they have a bearing on the reader’s emotional experience of
the work. Such emotional experiences, in Robinson’s view, can be a source of
learning about life in general, and human relationships and morality in
particular. The disadvantage, however, of Robinson’s stressing of the reader-
relativity of emotional experience is that it risks unnecessarily underestimating
the potential epistemic contribution of the work itself, and the idea that literature
can on occasion be a source of intersubjectively identifiable moral suggestion.
To take seriously the idea of an implied author is to commit oneself,
even if only implicitly, to the relevance of, and the need to elaborate upon, a
certain understanding of literary empathy, conceived as the apperception and
comprehension of such things as the implied author’s mental life, lived
9 Robinson (2005), pp.159, 181, 188.
10 Robinson (2005), p.181, Note 61.
11 Robinson (2005), pp.179, 186, 188.
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experiences, and personality. Indeed, in the course of this and subsequent
chapters, I intend to bring out ways in which the idea of literary empathy can
help to illuminate and orientate what thinkers such as Jenefer Robinson,
Catherine Wilson, Berys Gaut, and Tzachi Zamir have to say about the relation
of literature to moral knowledge. As my phrase “literary empathy”12 seems to
suggest, we need to use the term “empathy” in this context in a qualified
manner. Empathy proper, in both its “basic” and “authentic” forms, as Husserl
and Stein have shown us, is essentially a positing act, a perception of something
which exists or is taking place. In this sense, “empathy” seems, on the face of it,
to be, strictly speaking, inappropriate to literary theoretical discourse, a prima
facie observation which perhaps goes some way (but not all the way) toward
explaining why the term “empathy” is not infrequently simply absent from the
indices of theoretical works which nonetheless seek to engage in some way with
the relation between literature and morality, and which seem, furthermore, to
take seriously the idea of an implied author, or an implied artist. One of my
central contentions in this chapter, however, will be that, from a
phenomenological perspective, precisely (I say again, precisely) the concept of
empathy developed by Husserl and Stein turns out to be profoundly relevant to
literary theoretical discourse, by virtue of the reproductive representation of an
Other’s experience being deeply embedded within the very phenomenological
structures of literary experience and understanding.
In chapter 4 we reflected upon the aspect of Edith Stein’s thought which
recognises that emotions and values are essentially connected, and that careful
attention to the givenness of emotional states provides the most immediate
12 We might alternatively use the phrase “implied empathy” (empathy which is implied within
the phenomenological structure of reading a literary work).
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context for a clarification of one’s own value commitments. We found that Stein
suggests that feelings possess not only an “intensity” but a certain “depth”, and
that she explicates this “depth” in terms of a correlation with levels within a
personal value hierarchy. It is in these ways that Stein aligns her own position
with Scheler’s understanding of the emotions and of values, and in particular
with the Schelerian view that the emotions can be understood as conduits
through which humans grasp values in a kind of axiological intuition, and that
each person has a basic personal moral tenor which implies a subset of values to
which the subject is particularly drawn. The significance of the relation between
feeling-states and values for the question of moral cognitivism in a literary
context is that it opens the door to a way of explaining how literary experience
can on occasion be a source for the reader of discoveries in the realm of values,
and of the kind of moral dispositions that an acceptance of such value
perceptions would seem to motivate, and how, furthermore, such personal-level
evaluative and moral development could properly be said to derive from an
expressly literary experience. The idea that the exact nature of the evaluative
suggestions apprehended during the course of reading a literary work should be
understood as being directly tied to the detailed and complex emotional
experience that the work itself seems to be offering would seem to imply that
such evaluative suggestions are to be regarded as part of the unique fingerprint
of the work, and that for this reason they simply could not have been grasped in
their specificity were it not for the encounter with the literary work qua literary
work. Indeed, one of my primary purposes in the course of this chapter is to
substantiate, on the basis of both theoretical and critical reflection, the view that
literary works can rightly be regarded as potential sources of sophisticated and
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complex evaluative and moral suggestion, by virtue of the imaginative-empathic
acquisition by the competent reader of ostensible intuitions pertaining to the
domain of values, intuitions which are themselves deeply implied within the
work. At the same time, I believe that as we proceed, it will also be important
for us to remain open to the possibility that there may be other respects in which
literary empathy substantially differs from non-literary or non-artistic
interpersonal encounters, and that there may indeed be aspects of studying a
work of literature that can provide levels of intersubjective insight that simply
do not take place in non-literary contexts.
It is therefore now appropriate for us to turn our attention in more detail
to the processes of seriously studying a work of literature, which I take to be the
most fertile context in which moral learning, or at least morally relevant
contemplation, is likely to take place in the encounter with a literary work.
Anybody who has successfully studied literature at university level (or a
comparable standard) will have developed and honed, in the accumulation of the
texts studied, their own personal approach to studying literary works. It is not
my intention to try to legislate for how scholars ought to go about reading
literature, but to identify important universal or transpersonal aspects of this
activity which, I would suggest, must inevitably arise, and particularly in the
case of those whose reading patterns, either deliberately or pre-reflectively, are
oriented toward an intersubjective relation to the work and its implied author.
Without wishing to appear excessively programmatic in the way that I structure
our discussion, I believe that the interests of clarity will be served if I begin by
drawing attention to a central (perhaps even governing) dichotomy or “dialectic”
that, I would suggest, needs to be at work in any attentive and diligent reading
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process. This dialectic is to do with a complementary and alternating
relationship between lived experience of the work and reflection upon it, on the
part of the critic. During phases of lived experience of the work, the critic strives
to enter into, and dwell within the life of the work, by which I mean the lived
experiences that the work itself seems to be offering. During reflective phases,
the critic extracts him/herself from emotional involvement in the work, and tries
to render coherent all that s/he has read, thought, and experienced, not only in
the most recent lived experience phase, but in all of the previous lived
experience and reflective phases that have occurred since the process of studying
the work began. In the chapter on Edith Stein and the problem of empathy, we
noted the way in which Stein registers an important and unavoidable circularity
in the ongoing processes of attempting to acquire ever more accurate
apprehensions of someone else’s presently lived experience and personality. We
found that in order to reproduce an Other’s experience it is necessary first to
transpose oneself into their personality, but that the only way to properly grasp
someone else’s personality in all of its particularity (I refer here especially to
value commitments) is to acquire a reproductive representation of their lived
experiences for oneself. I argued in that chapter that Stein is proposing that it is
only as an outcome of an ongoing and, in principle, potentially endless cycle of
epistemic corroboration, correction, and clarification that one might attain a
coterminous convergence upon veridical apprehensions of the Other’s
personality (on the one hand) and lived experiences (on the other). Literary
works, I would suggest, need to be carefully read and re-read for exactly the
same reason: the meaning of any given sentence attributed to the voice of an
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implied author both determines and is determined by the underlying authorial
personality implied by the text as a whole.13
If we wish to sustain the idea that the encounter with a literary work is
capable of appresenting a foreign subjectivity to the reader, then we need to
enquire in more detail into the phenomenology of such literary intersubjective
experience. At the level of the reader’s lived experience, I want to suggest that
the notions of “voice” and “speech” turn out to be deeply relevant to the
phenomenally descriptive facts of being absorbed in a literary work. One
particularly natural and plausible account is that the reader simply imagines
hearing a voice as s/he reads. In the case of a monological poem, or the portions
of a novel attributed to a narrator, the voice will be that of the implied author of
those passages. If a play is being read, or a portion of dialogue from a novel,
then the voices in question will naturally be those of the characters to whom the
lines are attributed. This account seems particularly well suited to situations in
which the reader has not encountered the literary work in question before. If one
is new to a work, and does not know what to expect, then there is little that one
can initially do except expose oneself to its otherness, to meet the work wholly
on its own terms, to simply listen to what is being said. There can be little doubt
that this kind of encounter with pure otherness is an important part of what it is
to experience a work of literature. I want to suggest, however, that there is a
slightly different and more sophisticated way in which the reader can experience
13 Rightly (in my opinion), Robinson (2005) implies something similar about a reciprocal inter-
relation between interpreting a literary work at any given point, and the understanding that
emerges of the implied author’s personality from the work as a whole, or even from multiple
works ostensibly by the same implied author (p.186). However, I am concerned in this context
about her statement that “[c]onstruing the implied author so that she is consistent with what is
known about the real author is a further plausible constraint on what counts as an appropriate
interpretation”, because she does not explain how she would reconcile this view with her
admission two sentences earlier that “an author might deliberately try on a new persona in a
particular novel” (ibid.). In many other important respects, of course, my debt to Robinson
(2005) remains.
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a voice, a mode of reading which takes us deeper into the question of empathy,
and which becomes much more relevant as the reader progresses into the work,
and begins to understand the different characters involved, including the
personality of the implied author. In this more mature mode, the reader
transposes him/herself into the personality of whoever is speaking, and imagines
what it might be to utter the words of the text.14 Introducing the notion of a voice
into literary discourse in this way helps us to begin to see how the account of
empathy developed by Husserl and Stein might be relevant to literary studies,
because, for one thing, in the place of talking expressly in terms of making sense
of a text, it moves our discussion closer to the ideas of a bodily encounter and
bodily expression. We are entitled to enquire, however, whether we strictly need
to introduce the notion of a “voice” at all. Could one not articulate the nature of
reading a literary work in terms of an encounter with an Other’s thought,
without configuring the access to this thought as being necessarily mediated by a
voice? An initial response to this important question might begin by simply
observing that sound has always been important to literature, and that many
poems cannot be properly understood unless certain of their phonic and prosodic
qualities are fully taken into consideration. I believe this point certainly leads us
in the right direction, but the key to my more detailed answer, which I hope will
emerge more clearly as the remainder of this chapter proceeds, will lie in the
idea that certain forms of thought, and, of particular interest to us at this point in
my thesis, the patterns of moral thought, often turn out to be intricately and
inescapably bound up with patterns of rhetoric. My suggestion, then, is that the
14 I want to allow for the possibilities either that the reader is deliberately performing such acts
of the imagination, or that such acts should turn out to be deeply embedded within reading
processes, the complexities of which might well remain opaque to the reader, whose self-
awareness as a reader may extend only to some kind of background awareness of being deeply
absorbed in the literary work.
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advantage of introducing the notion of “voice” into our discussion in the ways
that I have described is not only that it provides us with a way of beginning to
see how the kinds of acts of empathy whose phenomenological nature we
discussed in previous chapters might turn out to be nested in some way within
more complex structures of literary experience, but also that it fits extremely
well with a mode of reading which is, as a matter of critical fact, often highly
useful or even technically necessitated, within the context of competent and
thorough literary study.
It may be that for many readers, perhaps even the vast majority, the lived
experience of reading a literary text, or indeed any text at all, involves an
awareness, at some level of consciousness, of the way the text might sound if
read aloud.15 When one sees a written word that one recognises, the sound of the
word seems to be appresented straight away, demonstrating a tight phenomenal
linkage between the written word and its conventional sound. To know a word
normally involves knowing how it is pronounced, and when one recognises a
written word, it seems as though the word’s sound is invoked as part of the
recognition.16 If I am right about this aspect of the phenomenology of reading a
text, then it helps to support and explain my proposal that the notion of “voice”
15 One theorist who certainly maintains that an essential part of reading a literary work involves
apprehending the sounds of words is Roman Ingarden, who proposes that the literary work
consists of several heterogeneous strata, the most fundamental of which is precisely the sound
stratum. (See Ingarden (1973a) pp.56-61, and Ingarden (1973b) pp.12, 15.)
16 To see more clearly what I mean by this, it might help to try silently reading - first slowly and
carefully, then at a faster rate – a sequence of (unconnected) words such as the following:
adjuvant, colluctation, desideratum, exculpate, hortatory, irenic, parataxis, recondite. I want to
make two observations about the phenomenology of doing this exercise, although my
observations are tentative due to the very limited nature of this exercise, which is by no means
intended to be a formal phenomenological investigation. Firstly, I would suggest that one finds
that the word sounds are more salient when reading slowly and carefully, and recede somewhat,
but not entirely, from conscious awareness when one reads them more quickly. Secondly, I
would suggest that the less familiar one is with a word, the more salient its sound properties
become when reading it. When one becomes more familiar with a word, its sound properties are
less prominent when it is read, but, again, do not entirely disappear.
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could be an important way of accounting for imaginative empathy with the
experiences of an implied author.
The apparent immediacy of the phenomenal connection between a
word’s written appearance and its sound, whether salient or in the background of
one’s awareness, is surely traceable to the way in which these two aspects seem
to become fused when a word is encountered and learned for the first time. Yet
it is perfectly possible in principle to learn how to read a given language without
having any knowledge of the way it sounds. To learn to read a particular
language, one requires only an adequate knowledge of its grammar, and of the
meaning of its written words. Observation of this fact seems to lead us to
consider the extent to which one could empathise with an implied author of a
literary work written in a language that one can read but of whose spoken
aspects one has no knowledge. Suppose, for example, that I am taught Arabic
grammar and the meaning of Arabic words in written form, and that all spoken
aspects of Arabic are excluded from my education. In this case, assuming that I
have been sufficiently well taught, I should be able to read an Arabic work of
literature, and understand the content of the thoughts which are being expressed.
This would mean that I would be able to understand not only the surface action
of what is being described, but the thematic subtexts of the work, the implied
author’s contemplative preoccupations, the aspects of situations that s/he finds to
be morally salient, his or her implicit value commitments, aspects of the way
s/he experiences the world and other people, and so on. Insight of this kind into
the implied author’s conscious life would equip me to attempt a transposal into
his or her personality and situation, and to try to imagine what it might be to
think the thoughts being expressed in the text. A certain mode of imaginative
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empathy, then, can take place during literary experience without imagining the
implied author’s voice, or imagining speaking the words for oneself, and without
attention to phonic and prosodic qualities of the text.
Nonetheless, I want to draw attention to two advantages held by the
mode of literary imaginative empathic experience which attends to the way the
spoken text would sound. Firstly, as I indicated earlier, the complex production
of meaning in a literary work is often intricately bound up with its phonic and
prosodic qualities. Although a comprehensive elaboration upon all aspects of the
relevance of such qualities to a work’s meaning lies beyond the scope of the
present chapter, it should help if I make a few observations to substantiate my
point. The relevance of these qualities becomes especially prominent in works of
poetry, the genre of literature in which the multifarious capacities of language to
produce sophisticated meaning are perhaps most clearly and fully exploited.
Rhyme, for example, is semantically as well as formally important because it is
often suggestive of a contemplative linkage between the words involved.
Departure from a seemingly established rhyme scheme can in turn also be
significant, as it may, for example, signal some kind of disruption in the
narrator’s line of thought, or the idea of a breaking of norms or conventions at
some level. The employment of rhyme is typically less prominent in novels,
short stories, and some dramatic works, but the question of diction remains
important in these genres, not least through the use of such phonic devices as
alliteration, assonance, onomatopoeia or other phonic plays going on, sometimes
between thematically important words. Rhythm, too, remains profoundly
important in all literary genres, for it can be indicative of the linguistic register
and degree of formality being employed, or the implied mood of the narrator,
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e.g. measured, agitated, ruminative, abrupt, inconsistent, and so on. It is for
reasons such as these that a detailed understanding of the meaning of a literary
work always needs to take into consideration questions relating to the way the
work will sound, or could potentially sound, if it were to be read aloud.
The second advantage of the “voice” component of literary experience
that I wish to discuss is no less important than the first, and relates to the
phenomenology of the co-givenness of the implied author’s mental life. Let us
return first to the example in which I am reading the Arabic literary work
without knowledge of the way the Arabic language sounds when spoken. Let us
assume furthermore that I am “fluent” in reading Arabic to the extent that there
is no translational activity taking place in my conscious reading process, and that
I would therefore be inclined to say that I am “thinking in written Arabic” as I
read. In this kind of scenario, it would seem that I have some flexibility as to
how I use my imagination to configure my intersubjective relation to the implied
author or narrator. Perhaps the most obvious way would be to imagine, across a
divide which is both temporal and spatial, the implied author having the
thoughts corresponding to the sentences that I am presently reading. The divide
in question could be very wide, both in terms of time and space. Yet I am
simultaneously reading the text in front of me and imaginatively apperceiving
the implied author’s mental life. The implied author’s mental life is co-given
through an heteronomous act of the imagination founded upon the written text
before me. Yet by further modifying my imaginational activity, I can attempt to
narrow the divide. I could, for example, try to imagine being in the same room
as the implied author, and reading the text just as s/he writes it. Yet in this kind
of imaginational exercise of varying my proximity to the implied author, I begin
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to discover that there is something about my separation from the implied author
which remains constant: we remain both linked and yet ineluctably separated by
the text, and the text, at once a bridge and a barrier throughout my imaginational
variations, refuses to change.
By contrast, I want to suggest that the phenomenological structure of co-
givenness of the implied author’s experience is different, and in an important
sense, more properly analogous to sense perception, in the context of imagining
empathising with a spoken voice. When somebody speaks, there are intrinsically
phonic and prosodic features of the utterance, most notably intonation and
inflection, which can influence the precise meaning of the utterance, and in
particular its affective content. And intonation and inflection are normally
understood, I would suggest, empathically at the level of bodily expression. In
the listener’s experience, intrinsically phonic and prosodic qualities of a speech
act, such as intonation and inflection, announce an individual’s act of expressing
him/herself; they announce that the utterance, as Stein eloquently puts it, “is
borne by a consciousness” and “lives by the grace of a spirit”.17 If the bodily
expression of such qualities is spontaneous and not contrived, then we are
entitled to assume that the empathic co-givenness of the Other’s primordial
experience in this context essentially conforms to the structure of conjunctive
co-givenness of bodily expression that we discussed in chapter 4 (‘Edith Stein
and the Problem of Empathy’), in which one can, under the right conditions,
“see” how the Other feels.
At the level of the fulfilling explication, I would suggest that, by drawing
upon phonic and prosodic features of an utterance, in conjunction, of course,
17 Stein (1989), p.80.
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with the requisite linguistic knowledge (about grammar, the ideal meanings of
words, and so on) and inferences regarding the likely meaning of the utterance
in the actual discursive context, the listener can attempt to reproduce the
speaker’s lived experience, in a manner which parallels the empathic
reproduction of somebody’s non-verbal bodily expression of emotion or mood.
To be sure, we need to recognise that very often literary works leave largely
unspecified the precise inflection and intonation of the implied author’s voice.
This means in turn that the very experience with which the reader imaginatively
empathises depends to some extent upon the way the reader chooses to fill in
such gaps. But my claim at this point is that such creative imaginative
involvement on the part of the reader is important to moral cognition, because it
facilitates a form of empathy which involves quasi-perceptual imaginative
awareness of the implied author’s emotional state, and hence a more vibrant
empathic experience than can be attained in other modes of reading (c.f. my
Arabic example) in which considerations pertaining to the spoken voice play no
part. The more vibrant an empathic experience that one has, the more likely one
is to be moved, and as this chapter proceeds, I want to develop the idea that the
experience of being moved itself carries moral epistemological significance,
because it signals that deep-seated value commitments in the reader are being
aroused, even if the reader is unable to articulate straight away just what those
value commitments actually are, and whether they are justified.
Let me take a step back for one moment from my detailed account of
literary experience, and reiterate that I am trying neither to legislate for how
students and scholars of literature should go about their studies, nor ultimately to
adopt an essentialist stance, either toward the processes involved in literary
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criticism, or towards some mistakenly transcendent idea of “literature”. It does
not, in my view, (a view which has benefited from certain Keatsian and
Starobinskian insights considered in earlier chapters, as well as reflections
articulated by other literary thinkers (I am thinking here in particular of Paul de
Man)) ultimately make sense to treat “literature” as a static concept curiously
abstracted from the passage of history, or to expect it to function adequately as
such, within either literary theoretical or philosophical discourse. We might say
that the synchronic state of literary art in its dialectical relation to prevailing
culture is subverted at all times by a refusal of self-identity, by an immanent
tendency toward diachronic mutability, toward the subversion of culture, the
rhetorical “profanation” of language and grammar of the kind that we discussed
in chapter 5, the overturning by literature of what literature itself once was; that,
as Paul de Man suggests, there is “something about literature, as such, which
allows for a discrepancy between [literary] truth and [critical] method”;18 and
that, consequently, literary “theory”, in spite of its name, cannot in the final
analysis properly regard itself as theoretical through and through, but instead as
being contaminated by what de Man calls a “necessarily pragmatic moment that
certainly weakens it as theory”.19 In this sense, it would seem that Keats’s
“chameleon poet” can not only disrupt the conceptual frames of systematic
philosophers, but surprise theorists of literature too in ways that can never be
fully predicted.
Yet, as de Man also suggests, literature’s resistance to theory is really
only one side of what can more properly be regarded as a kind of literature-
theory dialectic or double-bind. For experienced literary scholars, a
18 De Man (2000), p.333.
19 De Man (2000), p.337.
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contemplative shift toward the controlled reflection upon the formation of
critical method is arguably inevitable, and certainly justifiable in virtue of a
commonality and recurrence in the modalities of the production and reception of
meaning and value across multiple literary works, or even large subsets of the
canon. We might say that great literary works are always unique but never
wholly sui generis, in the sense that their greatness is connected with their
embeddedness within, and relation to, a tradition that precedes them, and usually
with a contemporary milieu of co-influencing works. For this reason, the
apprehension of patterns (I do not say laws) in the way that literary works often
seem to operate is an important part of literary scholarship which can in my
view inform the development of a meta-critical and meta-rhetorical discussion
engaging with such questions as the cognition of moral values in a literary
context. But, as I have just implied, the development of a meta-critical position
must always begin (in a manner not dissimilar to that of phenomenological
enquiry in general) with a concrete engagement with the “facts on the ground”
of literary experience, with the “actuality” of a critical encounter. In this respect,
there is, I believe, no better terrain to explore, given our present interests in the
field of moral intuition, in the idea of a meditating implied author, and in the
essential structures of imaginational and intersubjective experience, than the
poetry of William Wordsworth.
Wordsworth’s The Old Cumberland Beggar (1798) is an important and
remarkable poem for many reasons. Its various yet interconnected aspects
include reflections upon existence at the margins of the human condition, upon
the subjective origins of virtue and the disposition toward sympathy, the
question of human decay and the relation of alienated life to a certain kind of
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communion with nature. Yet it also provides at times, rather remarkably, what
appears to be a polemical engagement with the politics of social justice, and the
question of how society should respond to the problem of vagrancy.
Preoccupations with a poem’s rank or canonical status within its poet’s oeuvre
are not always profitable, but an indication of the character of this poem’s
significance within our language is provided in Harold Bloom’s according it the
status of Wordsworth’s most humanising poem,20 and in his regarding it as
Wordsworth’s “finest vision of the irreducible natural man”.21 Its subject is a
human being reduced to a primordial state, yet somebody who in the movement
of Wordsworth’s poetical representation is somehow “transfigured”, to use
Bloom’s apt term, into a being of value, and one of strange or alienated beauty.
My intention in what follows is to show how a moderately detailed reading of
this poem can begin to be of assistance in illuminating the more general question
of how an encounter with a literary work can give rise to ostensible intuitions of
value, as well as being phenomenologically suggestive with respect to the
structures of virtuous experience.
In the manner that I briefly described earlier in this chapter, we need in
the first instance to try to approach this text on its own terms, to expose
ourselves to its otherness, to simply listen to what is being said. In its very
textual constitution of monological blank verse, we encounter the otherness of
an implied authorial consciousness seeking to employ and exploit the available
linguistic resources of its day, namely late eighteenth-century English. Yet in the
experience of this foreign subjectivity we find an account of an encounter with
otherness which constitutes the poem’s primary field of attention: a pastoral
20 Bloom (1971), p.140.
21 Bloom (1971), p.178.
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crossing of paths with a vagrant. We encounter not simply an “Other”, in the
sense of “another person” or “someone else”, but rather somebody for whom
multiple levels of alienation from society would seem to have coalesced and
hardened into one peculiarly fated way of life. The figure in question, this “Old
Cumberland Beggar” of the poem’s title, is not only destitute, but without
companions. He wanders alone from village to village, and has been wandering,
we are given to understand, for many years, indeed at least since the narrator
was a child. This man is alienated, too, in consequence of his lacking the dignity
and sociality concomitant with some form of employment. The language of the
poem, as we might well expect, is stratified far beyond the ostensible level of
bare description. But it also does not neglect, for all its poetical accomplishment,
the crucial intimation of certain basic facts about the beggar’s alienated
condition. Perhaps most saliently, his state of being is either described as
“solitary” or connected with “solitude” on no less than six separate occasions
within the space of the poem’s 197 lines. Furthermore, the man’s alienation
from others is also illustrated for the reader in the poem’s depiction of his social
situation, in which we find that many people, especially the young, “pass him
by”22 rather than stop to communicate or assist. We might note, too, that this
man is fundamentally alienated from others through his poor state of physical
and mental health; that his cognitive faculties appear to have deteriorated
significantly; that, although he is not blind, it is not always clear that he is
consciously perceiving anything. He moves extremely slowly and there is some
evidence that he is hard of hearing. When he walks, his posture is so severely
stooped that he is forced to look at the ground. One of his hands shows signs of
22 Line 65.
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paralysis and involuntary tremors. In this old Cumberland beggar we encounter
someone whose otherness in relation both to those who ignore him, and to those
with whom he interacts, in relation to the poem’s narrator, in relation, indeed, to
the attentive and careful reader of the poem, is overdetermined by his absolute
solitude, by his mendicancy, by his gerontic infirmity.
Elsewhere in the poem, however, the nature of the man’s alienation is
not something which is strictly shown or exemplified for the reader in the
descriptive manner just considered, but is instead intimated in a more indirect
fashion. One of the ways in which this more oblique form of suggestion takes
place is connected with the configuration and arrangement of compositional
elements. For example, in the first stanza, the man is portrayed as
[…] seated, by the highway side,
On a low structure of rude masonry
Built at the foot of a huge hill23
At the descriptive level, these ostensibly plain lines hardly call out for scrutiny.
Yet regarding the poem as a whole, it is not hard to see the legitimacy in the
view that these lines are suggestive of the man’s relation to the society from
which he attempts to eek out an existence. His position at the edge of the road is
symbolic, I would suggest, of his situation at the margins of society. He sits
aloof from, yet within sight of, the mainstream bustle of the world, from trade
and commerce, from having an exchange value, from being pleasing to the
utilitarian eye. Placing the man on some “rude masonry” reflects his lack of
cultural sophistication and subtlety, and suggests that his mendicant lifestyle
has, with the passage of time, eroded some of the airs and graces normally
23 Lines 2-4.
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concomitant with a fuller cultural participation. Locating the man “at the foot of
a huge hill” emphasises his lowly position in society, and conveys the sense that
he has nowhere further to fall. My claim here is not that picking out deeper
significations of this kind is the only correct way of reading these lines, but
rather that the poem’s treatment of alienation, even in the opening lines of the
first stanza, has already moved beyond the descriptive and the perceptual, and
toward a symbolic production of meaning.
In his alienation from society, the man does not recede into some kind of
nondescript hinterland defined solely in terms of exclusion. Instead, it seems that
in his very demotion to the margins of society, the man has simultaneously
moved ever more deeply into the domain of “Nature”, a movement conveyed,
for example, in the inadvertent sharing of his meal with birds.24 This movement
does not only correspond to a change in physical circumstance or location, a
transition from employment to beggary, from lodgings to homelessness, from
domestic affections to solitude. The movement toward nature also signals a
transition to a different mode of being, to a form of consciousness in which
relationality toward others as others becomes much less prominent. Let us note
that while the narrator observes the beggar, and has some affection for him,
having known him from childhood, the beggar in his senility does not appear to
reciprocate. The narrator looks at the beggar, but his gaze is not returned. We
find instead that the “I saw” of the poem’s opening two words is answered in the
closing lines with the “eye of Nature” into which the beggar has now become
almost totally absorbed. The phonic play employed here between the words “I”
and “eye” keys into some of the most important thematic concerns of the poem
24 Lines 19-21 and 194-5.
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as a whole. The poem is concerned with ways of seeing and knowing people,
particularly those who have become alienated from a society within which they
nonetheless continue to try to subsist. But it is also concerned with the “I” of
subjectivity, and its different ways of being in the world, the most primal of
which, the poem seems to suggest, are overlooked in the bustle of everyday
social interaction, but which become salient in the experiences of those alienated
from society. (In several of his poems, Wordsworth is indeed preoccupied with
the experiences of such people as discharged soldiers, vagrants, and the mentally
ill.)
Wordsworth does not fully reduce the state of being “in the eye of
Nature” into some kind of anaesthetised nirvana devoid of struggles and anxiety.
(Line 186 informs us that “Few are his pleasures”. For the man’s struggles, see
lines 172-6; for his anxiety, see lines 177-8.) But at the same time he does
connect it with a kind of tranquillity that he associates with a giving of oneself
over to the processes of nature. The phrase “He travels on”25 is repeated as if the
man has become some kind of unstoppable natural force, and has been
assimilated into the often “wild”26 processes of nature. Being “in the eye of
Nature” is therefore suggestive of being within the eye of a storm, and the
curious tension between turbulence and tranquillity that that can bring. The
poem suggests that observing the beggar’s way of life helps to bring to light a
mode of consciousness in which the perceptual awareness of “I saw” gives way
to a dissolution or a transcendence of selfhood, and a radical stillness of
consciousness connected with being absorbed into the very processes of nature.
25 Lines 24, 44.
26 Line 14.
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Wordsworth’s notion of being “in the eye of Nature” is one which is only
named explicitly in the emphatic culmination of the poem’s closing lines. Yet
with the benefit of a careful reading and re-reading of the poem, it is possible to
see that ostensibly contingent images connected with turning and encircling, in
addition to images of being enclosed by, yet oblivious to, the natural world as
such turn out to crop up remarkably often. In the first stanza we find that while
the man is absorbed in his humble meal, he is “Surrounded by those wild
unpeopled hills”.27 While he is virtually bent double and forced to look at the
ground by his severe stoop he is surrounded by “fields with rural works, of hill
and dale, / And the blue sky”.28 While he struggles merely to survive, he has
been “borne” by something beyond himself, the “tide of things”, into a “vast
solitude”.29 And “whether heard or not” by him, he has “around him […] [t]he
pleasant melody of woodland birds”.30
To purport to make exhaustive sense of Wordsworth’s “eye of Nature”
and its related images is not my intention, but I wish to suggest that an
exploration of its complex and stratified significations can take us deep into the
poem’s implicit understanding of different modes of human relationality. Part of
the function of these recurring images is to convey not only a sense of the man’s
physical isolation as he wanders the Cumberland landscape, but a sense too of
his being cut off from ordinary social relations, separated even from those who
happen to cross the path of his travels, from our narrator who has known him for
many years, and from those who in the face of his alienation nonetheless seek to
offer him some form of charity. It is his declining health – his own physiological
27 Line 14.
28 Lines 49-50.
29 Lines 163-4.
30 Lines 184-5.
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nature – which often impairs his ability to look others in the face, to hear them,
even to grasp them as other people. The repeated images of being enclosed and
wrapped up within nature serve as a metaphor for the beggar’s intersubjective
isolation, as though his physiological impediments have found an external
projection in the form of a natural barrier seeming to separate him from others.
The poem, I would suggest, is thereby raising an important question of
intersubjectivity, one which only becomes salient because of the nature of the
beggar’s predicament. Can such an individual, in his social isolation, really be
reached through empathy? What prospect can there be of understanding and of
reproducing his deteriorated conscious experience? The difficulty in resolving
this empathic problem is partly what makes the beggar so remarkable, so worthy
of our literary, moral, and phenomenological enquiry. If we turn our attention
now to the acts of attempted empathy that our narrator undertakes, we must
therefore not be surprised to find an empathy characterised by a certain
“negativity”, that is, an empathy which is often formulated in terms of normally
present mental activities intuited to be fully or partially absent from the beggar’s
conscious life. We find, for example, that when the beggar takes out some
scraps of food from his bag, he regards them in a curiously perfunctory, even
unthinking or unconscious, manner:
[…] from a bag
All white with flour, the dole of village dames,
He drew his scraps and fragments, one by one;
And scanned them with a fixed and serious look
Of idle computation.31
31 Lines 8-12.
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The beggar’s contemplation of his meal is formulated in the language of blind
machinery and automation. The equivocation implicit in the predication of his
“computation” with “idle” provides an early intimation of the beggar’s
deteriorating cognitive powers. Later on, we find that his perceptual activities
have also taken on an automatic or pre-conscious quality, for he is “seeing still /
And seldom knowing that he sees”.32
Something also seems to be missing, or to have fallen away, from his
sense of relatedness to others, for we find that “he appears / To breathe and live
but for himself alone”.33 It is as though, either through natural ageing, or through
the loneliness of his mendicant lifestyle, his subjectivity has become pared back
– “reduced”, to invoke a phenomenological term – to his sphere of ownness,
such that the idea of “someone else” is no longer even thinkable. His concerns
and cares relate to “himself alone” not because he is selfish in any normal sense
of the term, but because “himself alone” precisely represents the extent of his
understanding of his situation in, and relation to, the world around him.
The value and significance of these acts of negative empathy undertaken
by our narrator lie in their ability to disclose important lacunae conditioning the
beggar’s conscious experiences. These distinctive empathic acts merit our
expressly phenomenological interest, because they seem to differ from the form
of empathy that we explicated in chapter 4 as a reproduction of the other’s lived
experience. The lacunae by definition lie outside of the beggar’s presently lived
experiences, yet the empathiser’s apperception of them is precisely what is so
helpful in rendering the beggar’s mental life intelligible. It is as though one
acquires an understanding of the beggar’s lived experience precisely through an
32 Lines 53-4.
33 Lines 164-5.
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apperception of what is absent from it, and it is not clear at this point that the
lived experience itself could in practice be reproduced by somebody who was
not in a similar state of mental ill-health, or who had not been in such a state at
some point in the past. I don’t wish to rule out the possibility in principle of
somebody like our narrator attaining authentic empathy for the beggar, but it
does seem clear that the kind of negative empathy finding articulation in the
poem amounts to a different kind of empathic act. Yet negative empathy would
seem to be connected to the idea of authentically empathising with the beggar,
by virtue of its taking place being a condition for the possibility of transposal
into the beggar’s subjectivity in all of its concrete fullness. One would perhaps
have to perform some kind of reduction resembling certain aspects of the
reduction to the sphere of ownness discussed in chapter 2. Certainly, one would
have to bracket intersubjectivity (“he appears / To breathe and live but for
himself alone”).34 Yet in addition one would have to bracket many acts of
reflection, for, as we noted earlier, his thought is described as “idle”,35 and we
are told that he “seldom know[s] that he sees”.36 We find, then, that in the poem
negative empathy ultimately beckons the narrator and the empathic reader
toward a reduction or recession of subjective processes, toward a self-
simplification of consciousness if the actual reproduction of the beggar’s
alienated experience is to be thought at all possible.
As we noted earlier, this beggar is not intrinsically valued by everybody,
and is often ignored. There is something special about the narrator’s approach
and relation to the beggar which makes possible not only a certain nascent form
of empathy, but a perception of his intrinsic worth, a feeling of pity (“Poor
34 Lines 164-5.
35 Line 12.
36 Line 54.
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Traveller!”)37, and volitions that he should be treated charitably, and his way of
life respected. We must consider how the poem characterises the path to such
human concern. For one thing, the narrator approaches and meets the beggar
according to the normal routine of the beggar’s existence. The beggar wanders
the countryside alone, and the narrator too (like the historical Wordsworth) is a
solitary walker (“I saw an aged Beggar in my walk”)38. Such an embodied and
perceptual encounter within Wordsworth’s Nature is conducive not only to the
appresentation of the beggar’s subjectivity (the narrator apperceives in this
context “the hope whose vital anxiousness / Gives the last human interest to his
heart”)39 and the fact that “life is his”40 but also that such subjectivity should be
treated with “Reverence”41 and that “a spirit and pulse of good, / A life and soul,
[is] to every mode of being / Inseparably linked”.42
In addition, the narrator has known him for many years (“Him from my
childhood have I known”)43 and has spent sufficient time observing him to
become well acquainted with his motivations, and to explicate in the acts of
negative empathy we considered earlier the unusualness of the beggar’s
conscious experience. It is as though the narrator has reached the point where he
knows the beggar better than the beggar knows himself. In this sense, the
narrator’s cognition of the beggar seems to transcend and even completely
surround the beggar’s mental life. The extent and duration of the acquaintance
seem to motivate a feeling of attachment, an attachment that the narrator seems
37 Line 58.
38 Line 1.
39 Lines 177-8.
40 Line 168.
41 Line 177.
42 Lines 77-9.
43 Line 22.
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to express in his apprehension that “we have all of us one human heart”.44 The
valuing of the beggar, then, is partly informed by a valuing of all life as an
intrinsic good, but also by a personal valuing that has grown over time, and that
is bound up with a deep and even transcendent form of intersubjective knowing.
We might call this the poem’s vision of compassion.
Part of the significance of the poem’s deep preoccupation with encircling
and rotational imagery is bound up with its implicit understanding of what is
involved in a compassionate response to alienated life. When a man on
horseback notices the beggar, the horseman stops, gives the beggar money, and
observes him with a look described as “Sidelong, and half-reverted”.45 A toll-
gate operator notices the beggar as she “turns her wheel”46 and “quits her
work”.47 A post-boy turns his vehicle “with less noisy wheels to the roadside” to
avoid colliding with the beggar, and “passes gently by”.48 The effect of these
successive depictions of different people manifesting what are, on closer
examination, strangely similar patterns of response is to produce a certain
suggestion that the phenomenology of compassion involves or requires at some
level an experience of a stopping or a slowing down, together with a sensation of
turning back, encircling, or swerving around, concomitant with a changing of
perspective or understanding. This suggestion about the phenomenal character
of compassion seems to be connected in the thought of the poem to a movement
within consciousness from an objectifying perception of an Other toward an
44 Line 153.
45 Line 32.
46 Line 34.
47 Line 35.
48 Lines 37-43. I refer somewhat vaguely here to a “vehicle”, because the type of postal vehicle
involved is not explicitly specified in the text. However, readers of this poem attentive to its
historical context of 1798 will infer that it can reasonably be assumed to be a horse-drawn coach
or wagon.
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inner perception articulated by our narrator in the assertion that “we have all of
us one human heart”,49 and is consonant with a movement of contemplative
reassessment, as well as with a bodily impulse to embrace, to surround, to
protect.
I would suggest, then, that compassion can rightly be said to be one of
this poem’s themes, and perhaps even its central theme, with the proviso that a
critical thematic claim of this kind should best be understood as a delineation of
a certain topos of human experience that the work itself seeks to explore, and not
as an attempt to transcend the poem with a pre-given concept. The concept of
compassion is itself in play (to some extent) at this point in our critical analysis
of the poem, open to question, and amenable in due course to new insights and
perspectives. Yet the assertion that “compassion is a theme of this poem” does,
of course, remain meaningful in itself because the idea of compassion already
has a conventionally agreed place within our language, and already occupies a
relatively stable position within the competent reader’s conceptual frameworks.
We might say that “compassion” in its most immediate sense refers to
sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings, predicaments, or misfortunes of
others. Yet compassion in this initial sense, and certainly pity, can at best be
understood as moments of a broader and richer sequence of emotional
experiences that the poem strives to convey, for as Bloom helpfully points out,
the narrator’s response to the beggar’s condition is not ultimately to regard it as
charged with pathos, but instead to accord it an extraordinary form of dignity.50
We can assume that our narrator would perceive pathos if the beggar were to be
institutionalised in a workhouse, a possible eventuality to which the narrator is
49 Line 153.
50 Bloom (1971), p.181.
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ardently opposed. The poem takes us on an emotional journey which may at
times involve pity, a journey which entails a certain movement of consciousness
toward compassion, brought about, in the manner that I suggested earlier, in an
attempt to acquire an empathic understanding of the beggar’s alienated state of
being, but which ultimately moves beyond pity and perhaps even beyond
compassion (depending on how broadly “compassion” is in the end construed)
into a certain reverence for the beggar’s apparent loss of selfhood and his
benign, and in some respects tranquil, assimilation into impersonal forces of
nature.
The motivational connection between values and emotions, that we
considered earlier, provides grounds for supposing that reflection upon the
nature of one’s emotional journey through a literary work can help to illuminate
the evolution of a sequence of value perceptions that the work implies. In The
Old Cumberland Beggar, the emotional journey expressed by the narrator is
entwined with a stream of moral enquiry which may be configured in the first
instance as relating to how one ought to respond to vagrants such as the one
described. But, as I indicated earlier, an intertextual perspective reveals a more
general Wordsworthian preoccupation with encounters with what Bloom calls
“alienated life”, with hapless individuals living on the margins of society, and
the idea that encounters with such people can be charged with transformative
potential, in the sense of forming an experiential locus for progress and
discovery in the field of values and moral reflection. In the poem’s early stages,
the beggar in his helplessness readily becomes, if not for all concerned then
certainly for some, an object of pity, but perhaps even prior to pity there is a
combination of curiosity and fear which is registered in the uncanny idea that
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this man is so advanced in years that he seems to have almost stopped ageing
(“Him from my childhood have I known; and then / He was so old, he seems not
older now;”).51 In the poem’s incremental disclosure of more and more details
about the extent of the beggar’s physical and mental deterioration, it gradually
dawns upon the reader that in this encounter one is faced with a genuine tragedy
– tragedy in the sense of an absolute value being lost, namely the man’s mental
faculties and, more specifically, his ability to engage in human relationships. Yet
in the poem’s empathic movement toward compassion, the narrator finds a way
of averting two otherwise quite understandable responses. One of these is a
detached insistence upon utility, articulated in the idea that the beggar is to be
regarded as a burden upon society, and that the apparent lack of purpose in his
existence should be dealt with by transferring him into a workhouse. The second
response that is also forestalled is a descent into despondency over the
irrecoverable loss of important parts of the man’s possible range of human
experiences. Instead, the poem’s consciousness actually moves through a
sympathetic involvement with the beggar, and a feeling of sadness over his
absolute loss, into a kind of double affirmation: an affirmation both of his
freedom and of his fate. We find that in this double affirmation a sympathetic
impulse to wholly protect and a utilitarian impulse to control or institutionalise
are countered by a bitter-sweet letting go of the man into “Nature”, and an
alteration in perspective away from unequivocal grief over his fate. So the man’s
tragedy is not repressed but overcome in a certain way, because his fate is not
denied but ultimately affirmed, and this affirmation is connected with a
recognition of the value of his freedom, and a recognition that there is something
51 Lines 22-3.
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beautiful about the working out of his freedom, even as he recedes from the
domain of human life and sociality into that of “Nature”. The arrival at the
apprehension of a certain beauty in the tragedy brings about a kind of catharsis,
not on this occasion in an Aristotelian pairing of pity and fear (two emotions,
interestingly, which we noted are involved early in the emotional life of the
poem) but in what we might call a dialectic of love and letting go, which
suggests that in this particular encounter it is in acquiring a perception of the
intrinsic value of human life and human freedom that one can escape not only
the despair of irretrievable loss, but a dehumanising and unfulfilling ethics of
utility.
A sense of repeated acts of deliberate and reverential passivity in relation
to the beggar is conveyed in the poem’s climactic stanza by a series of more than
a dozen imperatives exhorting such things as that we “let him pass […]!”, “let
his blood / Struggle with frosty air and winter snows”, and, in the final line, that
we “let him die!”.52 The relentless chain of imperatives not to intervene conveys
an important feature of the phenomenological structure of valuing the freedom
of a loved one, and of how such an experience is likely to unfold over time, by
suggesting that this peculiar mode of intentionality seems to be characterised by
a continual tension between attentiveness and distantiation. It is not that one
makes a single decision to allow the Other to get on with their life, but rather
that impulses to intervene, assist, or protect are being continually counter-
balanced and subdued by deeper desires that the Other should be allowed the
opportunity to flourish, to the extent that their capacities allow, and within the
context of their own autonomy.
52 Lines 162, 173-4, 197.
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The question of utility is one which the poem does not in the end seek to
straightforwardly dismiss, but to engage with, and in a curious way, overcome.
The qualitative poverty of the old man’s everyday experience, his endless
rounds of begging from the villagers, his obliviousness to the beauty of the
countryside, his lack of reflective thought, the essential solitude of his being, all
give cause for wondering about the value of his existence or the purpose of his
life, and wherein such value and purpose might lie. One way in which the poem
tries to answer the utilitarian concern is not by wholly rejecting the notion of
contribution as a valid basis for the valuation of another person, but by drawing
attention to certain immeasurable intersubjective contributions relating to
personal transformation and human flourishing that the beggar’s presence turns
out to be capable of making. The poem’s resistance to utilitarianism is partly
signalled in the immeasurability of such consequences. But it is signalled too in
a reversal of motivational priority between consequences and valuing. The
beggar is not valued in the first instance because of the beneficial effect he
might have on others; instead, others are moved to compassion and charity
because they acquire a perception of his intrinsic value as a human being. The
notion of “utility” in this poem is curiously redeemed in the narrator’s
suggestions that sympathising and repeated acts of kindness can have subtle but
life-long consequences for the giver, perhaps most notably in a disposition
toward virtue.53 So a certain conception of “utility” remains valuable within the
morality of the poem, but within the context of a kind of ethics which values
virtues such as instinctive and spontaneous sympathy, kindness, and compassion
above all else. Indeed, when our narrator exhorts statesmen to “deem not this
53 For a notably unequivocal articulation of this position, see lines 99-105.
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man useless […] !”,54 he does so not out of a desire to exclude the question of
utility from all aspects of moral deliberation, but to endorse a certain conception
of moral utility which does not fit easily with utilitarianism, a kind of utility
whose active presence is difficult to measure, but which nonetheless involves a
genuine contribution to a collective sense of community and societal well-being.
It is in stanzas 4 and 5 that the most progress is made in addressing the
theme of the moral value of utility. In these stanzas, Wordsworth not only
suggests that the beggar is to be valued because all life has intrinsic worth, but
implies that the beggar should also be valued on what are ultimately
consequentialist grounds, in the sense that having the experience of encountering
the beggar is held to have the potential to be beneficial for the subject. My
purpose at this point is not to assess the moral philosophical validity of this
position, but rather to enquire as to whether, in addition to conveying this
position as a moral position (which Wordsworth accomplishes fairly explicitly),
the poem also makes suggestions, either in terms of the essential
phenomenological structures involved, or in terms of phenomenal character,
regarding the phenomenology of benefiting at what Stein would call a “spiritual”
level from an encounter with such a beggar. It has to be admitted that some
portions of stanzas 4 and 5 seem to be devoted to expounding the implied
author’s opinions, and this (at times) somewhat assertoric mood (in the place of
a preference for more figurative expression) does not seem to be especially
conducive to phenomenological disclosures of the kind that presently interest us.
One of the narrator’s observations which does, however, appear to be
phenomenologically relevant is provided in the context of the somewhat
54 Line 67.
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complex passage in stanza 5 in which the “easy man”, who beholds in the
beggar a “silent monitor”, is likened to a growing pear benefiting from the sun.55
Part of the subtlety and ambiguity of this passage stems from the fact that the
term “monitor” could be interpreted as meaning either a warning or a reminder.
In one sense, the beggar could be taken to be providing a warning, to those who
are more comfortable, not to be complacent, and even to take prudent steps to
avoid ever becoming homeless. Alternatively, the beggar as “monitor” may be
understood to be not only reminding more fortunate observers to “count their
blessings”, so to speak, but, in accord with earlier parts of the poem, reminding
them too of their previous and formative sympathetic encounters, and their own
past acts of charity and kindness. The poem appears to be suggesting that such
warnings and reminders can benefit their recipients, and can even be
transformative over time, in processes analogous in some respects to the
ripening action of sunlight upon fruit. The possible phenomenological
suggestions implicit in this parallel include the ideas that, for thoughtful and
sympathetic observers of the beggar, an experience of warmth, or something
akin to warmth can be involved, and that one can experience a kind of growth
which is imperceptible at the moments in which it takes place, yet which is
clearly and undeniably observable after a certain amount of time has passed, and
that such growth may be apprehended as valuable not only because of the
feeling of warmth and well-being that accompanies it, but because it leaves one
changed in a way that can be recognised by oneself and by others as being
desirable, not only because such growth is likely to have good consequences of
its own later in one’s life, but perhaps also because the perception of the results
55 Lines 116-132.
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of such growth by others can involve an apprehension of beauty. Part of the
rhetorical power of a simile of this kind lies in its ability to implant
phenomenological suggestions like those that I have just enumerated simply in
virtue of the reader’s grasping and appreciating its meaning as a simile.
I want to suggest that our critical encounter with Wordsworth’s The Old
Cumberland Beggar has provided us with a concrete exemplification of the
ways in which a poem can make morally serious suggestions pertaining not only
to the question of which things ought to be held to be valuable, and the question
of their comparative value, but pertaining also to questions of what it is to
experience such values (their lived experience), of the range of possible
situations in which a certain value can become salient, and of what a bare or
abstract claim to hold a certain value, and to regard it as more valuable than
another one (e.g. human freedom in relation to utility) can in fact commit one to
in particular cases. My hope is that this chapter’s analysis of this poem does
slightly more than scratch the surface of its thematic concerns, although The Old
Cumberland Beggar, like all great poetry, is surely a work whose deepest levels
of meaning ultimately resist adequate summary or paraphrase. Yet acceptance of
this fact should not prevent us from attempting to reflect upon and summarise
our own critical experience of the work. Such an attempt may help to further
clarify just how the work manages to intimate important insights into the realm
of values, and how it seems on occasion to produce phenomenological
suggestions about the structures of virtuous experiences and their phenomenal
character.
Earlier in this chapter I indicated my view that considerations pertaining
to the spoken human voice are very often, if not invariably, central to acquiring
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an adequate grasp of a poem’s meaning, and I have drawn attention to some of
the reasons why this is true in the particular case of The Old Cumberland
Beggar. One reason is that the poem employs a phonic play between “I” and
“eye” which is bound up with a thematic concern with a transition in
consciousness from objectifying perceptual awareness to more primordial modes
of relationality to the world and to other people, a transition which seems in turn
to be connected with a dissolution of selfhood. A further reason is that the poem
makes frequent and important use of exclamatory vociferations which can
hardly fail to be correlated with the idea of an embodied narrative subject giving
vocal expression to deeply felt emotion. Part of the function of such outbursts is
that, in their apparently heartfelt transparency, they serve to confirm and locate
the precise values and evaluative terrain that the poem is seeking to explore. The
pitying cry “Poor traveller!”56 implies a valuing of alienated human life, but
also, in its pity, a valuing of what the beggar has lost, namely his physical and
mental health, and the social relations that we must assume he once had. With
the command “[…] let him pass, a blessing on his head!”,57 the narrator implies
a valuing of human freedom, and of a transformative state of being in
communion with nature. The demand “deem not this Man useless […] !”58
implies a certain idea of human value which is not properly intelligible within a
utilitarian conceptual scheme, and a valuing of certain unquantifiable fruits
associated with the poem’s vision of what we might call a “virtuous” or a
“blessed” way of life.
At one level, exclamatory vociferations of the kind just cited provide the
reader with perceptions that the narrator values certain things, in virtue of the
56 Line 58.
57 Line 162.
58 Line 67.
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reader’s acquisition of imaginative-empathic objectifying apprehensions of
particular acts of valuing on the part of the narrator. Yet careful study of the
poem, I have suggested, can also provide the reader with a phenomenally rich
grasp of the lived character of such valuings, a level of literary empathy
corresponding to what we noted Stein designates the “fulfilling explication”.
The reason certain lines in the poem, such as the ones recently mentioned, can
be said by the attentive critic to be moving is that they come freighted with an
emotional content built up, developed and informed by the text that surrounds
them, or even by disparate portions of the text, or by the poem itself taken as a
whole. As I have sought to elaborate in the course of this chapter, the capacity of
a literary work to harbour such emotional content is attributable in large part to
the implied author’s deployment of rhetorical technique.
The purview of rhetoric is, of course, far wider than the production of
evaluative and phenomenological suggestion. Very often, rhetoric operates
primarily at the level of ideas, and is involved in the suggestion of ideational
associations which are relevant to the contemplative and thematic concerns of
the work, whatever such concerns may be – moral or otherwise. But such
ideational associations themselves can sometimes be relevant to moral enquiry.
For example, the statement “His age has no companion”59 not only indicates the
beggar’s advanced years, but reinforces a sense of the poem’s ongoing concern
with the solitude of his existence. Rhetoric of this kind has the ability to select
and focus attention, to bring to light aspects of scenes, situations, or characters
which the implied author appears to take (consciously or otherwise) to be
morally salient. Yet rather than doing so overtly, in the manner of everyday
59 Line 45.
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language usage, literary language often accomplishes this so subtly and
eloquently (and yet without ultimate loss of conceptual acuity for the attentive
reader) that the nature of readers’ lived experiences of the work can be pre-
consciously coloured and influenced by thematically important implicit moral
saliences. Implicit ideational association, then, is one way in which evaluative
and moral concerns can be implanted into a reader’s experience without
requiring in the first instance the reader’s conscious attention or reflection.
Yet one of my central claims in this chapter has been that where rhetoric
is concerned with conveying the nature of a lived experience, it very often does
so through some kind of engagement with the phenomenology of the experience
in question. For example, a certain depressive mood is created in the passage we
considered earlier in which the beggar is depicted sitting “at the foot of a huge
hill”.60 Such a mood is invoked, I would suggest, not only in virtue of an
ideational association stemming from the topographical fact that a valley could
be construed as a depression in the landscape, but because there is something
about the lived experience of being depressed which bears a resemblance to that
of sitting in such a location. The poem conveys, through a succession of
rotational images, the idea that a transition from empathy to compassion
involves something that could be construed as a feeling of “turning”; through a
series of “let” imperatives, the idea that valuing the freedom of a loved one
involves a repetitive and insistent loosening of impulses to constrain or protect;
through the image of a pear ripening in the sun, the idea that the consequences
of virtue can include something like a feeling of warmth and flourishing.
Phenomenological rhetorical techniques of this kind often work (as rhetoric
60 Line 4.
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must, if certain value perceptions are to be effectively conveyed, or even deeply
implanted) prior to the reader’s grasp of how the text is operating, on the sly as it
were, or to put it more technically, and without implying disparagement, at the
levels of seduction and pre-conscious insinuation. Such techniques work to draw
the reader into a series of lived experiences that are necessary in order for the
reader to make progress in the domain of values and moral reflection, and make
discoveries which constitute the substance of the literary work’s thematic
enquiries.
Therefore important aspects of critical method are, I would suggest,
concerned with an entering into the life of the work, with a transposal into the
personality of an implied author, with an imagining of what it might be to utter
words ascribed to such a person, and with an opening of critical awareness to the
moral epistemological significance of the possibility of being moved. But the
critic’s job is also to reflect upon all of this, to revert if necessary from the
fulfilling explication, or even from sympathetic involvement, to a safe distance
afforded by the objectifying dimension of empathy. In the modes of reflection
and rhetorical analysis, the critic seeks to track down some of the textual origins
of the work’s suggestive power, and an important aspect of this process involves
a certain critical vigilance for ostensibly minor features of the work which on
closer attention can turn out to be capable of guiding the reader into the most
complex and subtle emotional experiences and intuitions of value that the work
has to offer. In this difficult and protracted process, we find, as we noted
Starobinski has also observed, that the search for what lies deepest in a work
often leads back to what was already waiting at the surface – to a pear feeding in
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the sunshine, to the turning of a wheel – and toward a discovery of what such
images always truly were within the life of the literary work.
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Chapter 7 - Literature and Moral Justification
I want to begin our discussion in this chapter by briefly recapitulating
upon the account of the phenomenological structure of literary experience that
has been developing in the preceding chapters. One important reason for doing
so is that it will place us in a strong position to understand and explain some of
the various contributions that literary experience can make to the complex and
diverse processes of moral justification. A further reason, however, which we
must also bear in mind, lies in the possibility that the structures of literary
understanding may themselves be capable of indicating certain avenues of
justification appropriate to literarily motivated moral enquiry, even if such
justificatory avenues are strictly extrinsic to literary experience. The suggestion
of a fruitful justificatory avenue should be regarded as a contribution to moral
justification, even if the acquisition of such moral justification lies, perhaps
necessarily, beyond the purview of any literary work’s moral explorations.
The phenomenological account that has emerged involves a layered
structure of multiple conscious acts, which are nested one within another. To
reinforce our understanding, let us take a few moments to move both forward
and then backward through the different layers of this structure. In the first
instance, the reader places him/herself, through an act of the imagination, into an
encounter with the implied author of the text. The reader then acquires an
apperceptive understanding of the implied author’s conscious life through acts
of empathy performed within the imaginary encounter. I argued in chapter 4
(‘Edith Stein and the Problem of Empathy’) that the structure of such acts of
empathy itself involves a nesting of two distinct acts of the imagination. In a
literary context, the first such component act of authentic empathy is a
Chapter 7 - Literature and Moral Justification
Page 225 of 302
transposal into the Other’s personality on the basis of the values and motivations
implied across the text as a whole. The second act is a reproduction of the lived
experience which is being expressed. Due to our present interest in the relation
between literature and moral knowledge, our attention has been drawn to the
implied author’s intuitions of value and virtuous experiences. Such experiences
may themselves be, in the Husserlian sense, reproductive re-presentational acts,
such as imagining, or remembering. For example, in the closing lines of The Old
Cumberland Beggar, the narrator is valuing something which is not perceptually
present to him, namely a temporally extended state of affairs in which the
beggar is permitted to spend the rest of his life roaming the countryside. In
desiring that something should be the case, the narrator is valuing an imaginary
possible state of affairs. We might say that the volition involves a subjunctive
value perception nested within an act of the imagination. The act of imagining is
reproduced and dwelt within by the empathic reader. In the manner that I
indicated, the empathic reproduction is undertaken within a prior transposal into
the narrator’s personality; and the transposal is undertaken in the context of an
imagined sensory encounter with the narrator, an imaginary encounter in which,
if one is to meet the requirements of the kind of detailed literary study upon
which I elaborated in the previous chapter, one needs to “hear” the narrator’s
voice.
In the terminology of the Husserlian discussion of chapter 3 (‘Husserl
and the Imagination’), we are entitled to regard the phenomenological structure
that we are encountering here is an example of iterated intentional implication.
The reader’s apprehension of an implied primordial value perception is mediated
by a stratification of multiple implied acts of imaginative personal transposition
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and re-presentation. And we find that this nested intentional structure is itself
suggestive of what is, in phenomenological terms, the primary and canonical
modality for the justification of such an intuition of value, namely perceiving for
oneself and in person the state of affairs in question to be of value. Two separate
axiological points are worth bearing in mind here, and will inform much of this
chapter’s discussion. Firstly, (I shall return to this fundamental point in due
course) moral values do not change from one situation to another, and are
potentially applicable not only in all actual situations, but in all possible
situations. Indeed, a large part of their moral epistemological significance lies in
their constancy, for they are not governed by contingency or expediency, but
themselves govern what is right, what is good, what is virtuous, and so on – in
morally serious literature as much, I want to suggest, as in real life. Secondly,
values are not experienced in the abstract, but precisely in our experience of the
particularity of the world. We experience values in the first instance as value-
properties of other entities, e.g. the courage of a (particular) soldier, the beauty
of a (particular) painting, the value of a (particular) beggar’s freedom. For these
reasons, to the extent that literary works demonstrate a marked tendency to deal
in the particularity of concrete events and situations, and (through the use of
rhetoric) to implicitly evaluate objects of experience often in the very process of
purporting merely to describe, the domain of literature itself seems to be
pointing outside of itself to an essentially non-literary context for the
justification of its evaluative (and hence moral) suggestions: the domain of
practical experience.
The domain of practical experience is, indeed, from a moral
epistemological standpoint, an extremely important justificatory context. If one
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turns from Wordsworth’s poetry and goes to meet a homeless person face-to-
face, then one has placed oneself in an optimal position for the clarification of
one’s own feelings in relation to the other person, and, as we noted in chapter 4,
the clarification of one’s own feelings provides the primary context for the
exploration of values. As we also noted in chapter 4, perceptions of value affect
desires; effective desires, i.e. volitions, motivate in turn the actions that one will
be inclined to undertake - to bring about, or contribute to, the fulfilment of such
volitions. In the aggregation of many similar virtuous acts, one acquires a
collection of value perceptions which over time will corroborate and enrich
one’s understanding of the value(s) involved. And in conjunction with this
evaluative development, one begins to derive satisfaction from performing
actions which such value perceptions necessarily motivate. In processes of
habituation, one increasingly (and in a non-frivolous sense) enjoys doing what
one believes (on the basis of repeatedly confirmed value commitments) to be
morally right, and develops what we might call a taste for what is noble. In this
sense, practical experience provides a most important setting for the
development of a disposition toward virtue. The justification for such a
disposition, and for the value commitments that underwrite it, is acquired in
virtue of processes intrinsic to such practical experience. Ideas about value and
virtue which bore initially the character of mere suggestion, or even plausible
suggestion, come to be internalised and embraced as one’s own through the
observation of, and the conscious volitional intervention in, the affairs of the
world around us.
Now, it is true that my very understanding of real situations and people
may well be influenced by literary works that I have previously studied, but such
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influences can hardly be construed as a priori features of the way in which I, or
any responsible person, should view the world. Instead, such literary suggestions
themselves in principle require confirmation in the domain of practical
experience. If I come across somebody consistently exhibiting personality traits
reminiscent of the character Macbeth, then I might, on careful reflection, and in
conjunction with other non-literary modes of thought (e.g. psychoanalytical,
historical) cautiously formulate extrapolative hypotheses (I say hypotheses, not
beliefs) about this person by drawing upon my understanding of Shakespeare’s
insightful and sophisticated characterisation of Macbeth. But the degree of
authority that I attach to such hypotheses stems not from mistakenly regarding
Shakespeare’s Macbeth as justificatorily foundational, but from the fact that
certain moral suggestions to be found in that play have been accorded, by myself
and by others before me, a degree of justification precisely on the basis of
contemporary real-world experience.
The view that I have just outlined of the moral justificatory significance
for the virtuous moral philosopher of practical engagement in the world appears
to constitute something of a set-back to those versions of aesthetic moral
cognitivism which imply that, from the secluded comfort of one’s armchair, the
very encounter with a work of literature can be regarded as a source of moral
justification for putative value commitments and beliefs about virtue. There are,
of course, other avenues of moral justification distinct from practical experience,
and we shall discover in the course of this chapter that literature is highly
relevant to some of them. However, before proceeding in alternative directions,
it is worth considering whether the position of aesthetic moral cognitivism can
respond in some way to what has been discussed so far.
Chapter 7 - Literature and Moral Justification
Page 229 of 302
An important line of response to what I have said about the justificatory
importance of practical experience centres on the observation that there are
many possible experiences, e.g. experiencing the trauma and aftermath of a
terrorist attack, or losing a parent to Alzheimer’s disease, which may be highly
relevant to moral enquiry, but for which the arrangement of practical experience
by the enquiring moral philosopher is not a feasible or desirable option. Moral
philosophical enquiry with an interest (and, in particular, a phenomenological
interest) in such scenarios will be obliged to pursue alternative modes of
epistemological justification. Such modes, e.g. testimony (broadly construed),
imaginative introspection, and the method of reflective equilibrium (I want to
argue that literature can be involved in all of these), to the extent that they are
employable where practical experience is not, might be said in this respect to
hold a certain epistemic advantage over practical experience.
Yet it is important that any explication of this epistemic advantage
should not confuse the notion of justificatory availability with that of
justificatory authority, and nor should it confuse partial justification with
adequate justification. These important distinctions are illustrated in the
following example. Suppose I am in a busy shopping street and I break my
glasses (which have a correct prescription of, say, -5 dioptres) in an accident.
Suppose further that in my bag I have an old pair of glasses made to an out-of-
date prescription of, say, -2 dioptres. Then, provided the old pair helps me to see
more clearly, even to some small extent, the best option would seem to be to put
it on. But just because wearing the old pair is the best available option, it does
not follow that it mysteriously acquires an elevated level of justificatory
authority in relation to what I believe I am seeing, beyond what is merited by a -
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2 dioptre pair of glasses being worn by someone whose correct prescription is -5
dioptres. The epistemological distinctions which emerge from this example
(between justificatory availability and justificatory authority, and between
partial justification and adequate justification) will turn out to be fundamental to
my overall account of the relation between literature and moral knowledge. Both
distinctions will be worth bearing in mind as we proceed through this chapter
and consider different modalities of moral justification.
For reasons which rest upon the notion (which I shall shortly discuss) of
personal credibility, an individual’s moral testimony could be regarded as a
potential source of (at least partial) moral justification, and given our present
concerns, this observation seems to invite us to consider whether there might be
circumstances in which moral suggestions found in a literary work could
themselves be regarded as “testimony” in some sense. One reason for
developing a notion of a distinctively literary form of testimony is connected to
the relation between literature and culture. Literature is an important repository
of cultural values, and if a literary work is held to be of canonical status, then we
expect it to illuminate, as well as resist and attempt to revise, the way in which
the culture in which the work arose understood certain values. If a literary work
manages on certain occasions to somehow reproduce cultural values, or
represent aspects of the way in which values are wrestled with and forged within
a given culture, then we might justifiably call this a kind of “cultural testimony”.
This is relevant to moral reflection because it is important for moral
philosophers to be aware of implicit cultural assumptions, blind spots, and biases
which might otherwise go undetected and unexamined.
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We need to consider, however, whether the moral suggestions found in a
literary work can on occasion be regarded as a form of testimony about moral
values, as well as about cultural values. The analogy between reading a morally
serious work of literature and receiving moral testimony from a real person is
not entirely straightforward. One’s acceptance of the testimony of a real person
requires, as I said, his or her credibility as an attester in the relevant subject area.
An attester can be held to be credible if s/he is sincere, competent (in a position
to know), coherent, and has a track record of reliability. If I listen to a recorded
interview with Bertrand Russell and hear him assert that “Love is wise, hatred
foolish”, then I will be inclined to accord his statement a degree of authority
greater than that of mere suggestion, because of what I know about the historical
person Bertrand Russell. But this structure of testimonially grounded
justification is not applicable to the views of an implied author, who is
constituted heteronomously, in the manner that we discussed in chapter 5
(‘Starobinski’s Conception of the Implied Author’), on the basis of the literary
text. So there seems to be a structural reason for being more cautious about
testimony given by an implied author, even if the implied author’s imaginary
credentials happen to be impeccable. However, an implied author can certainly
be coherent, and could appear to develop a track record of reliability in moral
questions. So a modified conception of “testimony” could be applicable to an
essentially intersubjective approach to literary experience of the kind that I have
developed. Imaginative empathy of the kind that we discussed at length in
previous chapters could be said to become an experience of (at least partially
reliable) literary testimony when one feels prepared, to some degree, to trust the
implied author’s value commitments and moral judgement on certain matters.
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Such tentative and qualified trust can only rationally arise when one realises, on
the basis of careful study and reflection upon a work, and preferably upon
multiple works by the same author and ostensibly by the same implied author,
that the implied author has a track record of suggesting evaluative and moral
stances that have turned out, for the morally enquiring reader, to be worth taking
seriously.
We need to observe that the tentative growth of such testimonial trust
can be compromised if the implied author demonstrates in the course of a
literary work tendencies toward moral inconsistency, contradiction, or
incoherence. This remains the case even if the implied author occasionally
dispays moral brilliance, if the reader sometimes or even often finds him/herself
agreeing with the implied author’s moral judgements, or if the reader finds non-
testimonially grounded routes to justifying those judgements with which s/he
agrees. Conversely, if the attentive reader attains a relatively clear and consistent
overall apperception of the implied author’s value commitments and approach to
moral problems, then this could provide partial grounds, in conjunction with a
track record of reliability, for a tentative testimonial trust in moral suggestions
contained in the work, not least because a stable and reliable evaluative attitude
is, by the standards of any mainstream theoretical school of ethical thought, and
especially from the perspective of virtue ethics, an admirable and morally
relevant trait in a moral agent. This is one modest way in which the moral
epistemic status of a literary work (I leave aside aesthetic considerations in this
chapter) can begin to be put to the test in the very context of literary experience.
However, I would still maintain that such tentative quasi-testimonial
trust could not be regarded as justificatorily adequate on its own. Acceptance of
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moral testimony about values not only requires that the attester be credible, but
also ultimately requires that the testimony itself cohere with the recipient’s
evolving set of personal moral values, which govern the individual’s ability to
identify what is morally salient about a given situation. I want to suggest that
such value commitments do not, to anyone but a proponent of some form of
strong intuitionism (a position that I reject),1 flow spontaneously from ostensibly
self-evident and perspicuous insights into a noumenal realm of objective values,
but need instead to be arrived at through a complex and difficult process of
reflective equilibrium. In the method of reflective equilibrium, as Jeff McMahan
argues, one tries to work one’s way back to a personal set of moral values
capable of underpinning and explaining disparate moral judgements. One has to
work hard in order to discover the very values that one antecedently and
unreflectively believes in.2 During this process, one rationally includes
experiences that come from a wide variety of justificatory sources, drawing
upon testimony, practical experience, the experience of art, and all of one’s
memories of these.
Let us look more closely at the ways in which literary experience can
support such a method of reflective equilibrium. It would suit the cause of
aesthetic or literary moral cognitivism if we could somehow argue that the
encounter with a literary work can itself provide a setting in which entire
contemplative processes aimed at morally reflective equilibrium can take place.
But precisely the inverse of this picture seems now to be emerging: properly
wide-ranging, eclectic, and open-ended moral ruminations themselves provide a
context in which literary experience can certainly participate in, but never
1 For reasons to be sceptical about strong versions of moral intuitionism, see McMahan (2001).
2 McMahan (2001), pp.105-6.
Chapter 7 - Literature and Moral Justification
Page 234 of 302
responsibly dominate, moral reflective activities. On this view, literature can
properly be regarded as a moral cognitive participant but not, strictly speaking,
as a teacher of moral knowledge. In the last chapter, I sought to develop the
view that a central aspect of literature’s relation to ethical thought lies in the idea
that there is something special about literature’s capacity for moral suggestion. I
explicated this capacity in terms of an essentially rhetorical ability to deftly
deliver and implant complex evaluative perspectives into the reader’s
experience, a seductive ability that very often produces its effects in a manner
which is phenomenologically prior to the reader’s conscious grasp of how the
text itself is operating. Unreasoned and lacking in explicit justification in their
literary context as they may be, such suggestions are not ultimately
justificatorily insignificant in a reader’s moral life, provided that the reader feels
that a substantive or even original evaluative point has been well made, and that
what is being suggested comes from an implied author whose implied moral
judgement the reader has come to respect, and coheres with moral testimony that
the reader has received from real individuals whom s/he thinks trustworthy, and
coheres too with the reader’s own practical life experiences and with beliefs the
reader already holds. So justified moral understanding does seem to be capable
of developing in certain ways precisely in the accumulation of disparate
suggestions, suggestions which themselves are not explicitly justified in their
own narrow contexts, but which often seem to be capable of corroborating, as
well as conflicting with, one another, in the ongoing and in principle
interminable morally reflective processes of sifting, comparing, and revisiting of
one’s own life experiences, including one’s experiences of art and of literature.
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According to the model of ethical reflection that I wish to advance, then,
the way we feel about individual scenarios, and the judgements we are inclined
to form when considering them in isolation, have a contributory role to play but
do not in the first instance govern what counts as morally right or valuable,
because they need to be weighed and balanced against a multiplicity of other
experiences and sources of moral suggestion before something approaching a
responsibly considered moral judgement can be formed. In other words, I want
to suggest that the moral intuitions that we form non-inferentially and non-
reflectively about particular situations should carry deliberative weight but not
decisive normative authority. Yet, as McMahan indicates, there are good reasons
for enquiring whether non-inferential and non-reflective moral intuitions should
be taken into account at all.3 We know from the social sciences that moral
intuitions can originate in prejudices inculcated during one’s upbringing, in
religious indoctrination, or in unconscious self-interest. This kind of
psychological observation has led some philosophers, e.g. Peter Singer, to argue
that moral intuitions should be excluded from ethical deliberation. According to
Singer, moral enquiry is primarily theoretical, and is not validated through the
consonance of its implications with our intuitions.
One way of problematising the exclusively theoretical approach to moral
philosophy is to consider the way counter-examples often function in the very
context of moral theory. If a moral theoretical proposition P is being considered,
then a counter-example will claim that there is a situation S in which we would
not be inclined to accept that P is the case. So counter-examples cited in this
way themselves appeal to our moral intuitions. While counter-intuitive scientific
3 McMahan (2001), pp.94-5.
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theories such as relativity theory are capable of effectively combating our
intuitions about what is really the case through their explanatory and predictive
power, moral theories do not have a similar capacity to make us give up our
moral intuitions, because they do not explain or predict empirical facts in this
kind of way. Now it is certainly true that our moral intuitions about situations
can be modified as a result of moral reflection (and very often they need to be),
and that moral theoretical thought is an important part of such reflection. But as
long as a moral theory produces practical conclusions that conflict with our
intuitions, we do not feel philosophically comfortable about accepting the
theory, even if we are unable to articulate why we feel the theory is mistaken.
The Schelerian explanation for this is that feelings are precisely the context in
which value perceptions take place. The fact that moral intuitions can often be
non-veridical is a reason not for discarding them from ethical deliberation but
for recognising the importance of modifying them in the process of reflective
equilibrium that I have described.
Implicit in much that I have said is that this entire reflective process is
pervaded by acts of introspection as one attempts to reach the “equilibrium” of a
mature set of values. Indeed, the conscious activity of introspection seems to
offer us a potentially promising line of enquiry into the processes of moral
justification in a literary context. For reasons that I am about to explain in more
detail, introspection is a fairly common component of moral justificatory and
confirmatory efforts. And it now seems plausible (I shall substantiate this point
even further as this chapter develops) to suggest that introspection on the part of
the reader is not out of place in the context of a contemplative reading
experience. For one thing, as I indicated in chapter 4, the empathic
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understanding of a foreign personality is conducive to comparing one’s own
value commitments with those of the Other. In this context, the empathiser sees
where value commitments are shared, and where one holds a value commitment
which the Other has not acquired, or vice-versa. Similarly, it is natural during
the reading process to compare one’s own evaluative attitudes, moral character,
and approaches to moral problems with those of the implied author. Aesthetic
moral cognitivists ought to be encouraged by the apparent moral relevance of
introspection to literary experience, because it opens the door to the possibility
that there may be occasions on which a reader could rationally decide that what
a literary work is suggesting is in fact morally justified, without turning to
cognitive activities extrinsic to the encounter with the literary work. To find out
if this is the case, we need to think in general terms about the justificatory
significance of introspection in moral thought, and to consider in tandem with
this the scope for such introspective justificatory activities to take place during
literary experience.
There are several ways in which introspection occupies a special place
within moral enquiry over against other epistemic fields. On the Schelerian
axiological view, which we noted also influences Stein significantly, the
underlying reason for this is formulated in terms of the clarification and
unfolding of one’s own personal hierarchy of value commitments. Husserl’s
writings on the phenomenology of valuing are less extensive than those of
Scheler, but he was not uninvolved in this field, and it is clear that he too
recognises that the experience of values is often, if not always, a comparative
experience.4 One naturally seeks to acquire evidence to either corroborate or
4 Hart (1997b), p.194.
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challenge suggestions of the form “A is of greater value than B” through an
introspective attending to the respective depths of one’s feelings for A and for B.
Some acts of valuing, e.g. those found in the bonds between parents and their
offspring, seem to be so profound that they do not appear to be compatible with
any kind of ethical deliberation. A mother’s love for her child is primal,
absolute, unconditional. Such values, which we might call absolute values, seem
to be self-verifying in the context of introspection. Yet complex and
controversial moral questions articulated in the form of value comparison, e.g.
“Is systematic state intervention in the problem of vagrancy preferable to relying
upon spontaneous charity within communities?”, can rarely be resolved by
means of a single act of introspection. In such cases, the diligent moral
philosopher typically proceeds by drawing upon activities such as reason,
debate, testimony, memory, practical experience, and perhaps even the
experience of art. But during such processes, one will inevitably return again
and again to introspective acts of value comparison. In the accumulation of such
temporally disparate and intermittent introspection, one hopes not to oscillate
endlessly between contradictory commitments, but ultimately to converge upon
a settled clarification of where one genuinely stands. Moreover, the realisation
that one’s mind is settled with respect to a particular matter is itself acquired in
an act of introspection.
This leads us to a related point concerning the role of introspection in
moral life. Virtue ethicists from Aristotle onward have emphasised and explored
the observation that the individual who, with appropriate guidance, strives to
lead a virtuous life can, in the passage of time, develop, as M.F. Burnyeat puts it,
a “settled state of character” in the face of life’s succession of ethical
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challenges.5 This is not to say that one somehow completely ceases making
ethical mistakes, but rather that one converges in time upon a firm and stable
moral character, and begins to feel, as Sarah Broadie puts it, “at home with the
noble and with reason and structured agency”.6 Yet this important idea of feeling
“at home” with virtue is not the exclusive preserve of virtue ethics, but is
undoubtedly also present in the ethical thought of twentieth-century
phenomenologists such as Husserl, Stein, and Scheler. Certainly for Husserl and
Stein, one’s feelings are rational to the extent that they are in tune with the realm
of one’s own true values,7 and ethical life essentially requires, in Husserl’s own
words, that we “prefer according to our best knowledge and conscience the best
of what is attainable”.8 When the virtuous individual encounters and
contemplates a morally demanding situation, certain of its features become
salient and indicate what is called for.9 As I indicated earlier, just exactly what
becomes salient is governed by the agent’s personal value hierarchy or moral
tenor. The feature of the virtuous agent’s distinctive personal way of viewing
particular situations that I wish to draw attention to at this point is that there is
no reason for us to think that it should be capable of being formulated
propositionally, codified, or rendered compatible with a deductive paradigm,
either by the moral agent concerned, or even in principle. In fact, John
McDowell argues that one’s fundamental conception of how to live is only
5 Burnyeat (1980), p.73. The possession of a settled state of character is, of course, a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for virtue, for an immoral person might have a settled immoral
state of character.
6 Broadie (1991), pp.109-110.
7 OPE, p.101.
8 Melle (2002), p.237. Emphasis mine.
9 The perception of moral saliences is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for virtue, for an
akratic person may see correctly what is called for, but fail to act. On the Aristotelian account,
the akratic person is not yet fully at home with rationality.
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intelligible through the perception of saliences.10 Moral philosophers are
sometimes inclined to think that there ought to be a neutral external standpoint
from which moral rationality can be demonstrated. But for McDowell, the
rationality of virtue, and of the desire to live a good life, is not demonstrable
from an external standpoint. And in this respect, introspection would seem to be
a particularly important, and certainly the most immediate, non-discursive
avenue in which virtuous moral agents might perceive their own general and
settled evaluative attitudes as such.
Questions of refining, unfolding, or converging upon a settled evaluative
attitude which is congruent to one’s personality and moral tenor bring us now to
an important reason why literary experience can provide an important context
for moral introspection. Great artworks collectively provide a variety of morally
complex situations, vividly portrayed, far in excess of the range of experiences
that any one person could possibly have in the course of a lifetime spent without
art. In the case of literature, this very variety affords readers opportunities they
would not otherwise have had to examine their own affective response to
situations, to explore the personal value commitments that seem to motivate
such responses, and to allow values that would not otherwise have to been felt to
begin to unfold within their personality. It affords readers, furthermore,
opportunities to reflect upon their own general moral evaluative attitude and to
consider how flexible it is in assessing different situations; to reflect, also, upon
how confidently one is able to pick out aspects of situations that seem to be
morally salient. For any morally serious reader, such careful and attentive
introspection can often turn out to be a less than comfortable experience. Indeed,
10 McDowell (2003), p.137.
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part of the moral epistemological significance of literature lies in the way it can
often disrupt our prejudices and leave us feeling uncertain on important moral
issues. Naturally, my suggestion here is not, for example, that a committed and
thoughtful consequentialist might suddenly reject consequentialism simply on
the basis of reading a literary work. Yet, a utilitarian like J.S. Mill, who
famously read, and was deeply affected by, Wordsworth’s poetry while
suffering from depression, might well read The Old Cumberland Beggar and
find himself seriously re-evaluating, perhaps for the first time in his life, the
place and significance of spontaneous compassion in moral life, and the value of
human freedom. Such literary disruptions to ethical frameworks do not merely
signal that one’s moral assumptions may be in certain respects inadequate, but
point to specific avenues of moral enquiry which need to be rationally pursued if
one is to make progress toward acquiring the kind of well-rounded and stable
moral character whose centrality in moral life is so often emphasised in the field
of virtue ethics.
In one sense, then, literary introspection can take place in moments of
contemplation during the process of reading and criticism, when one introspects
upon certain characteristics (e.g. stability, confidence, or their opposites) of
one’s own evaluative attitude toward what one has read. Yet there is a different
sense in which introspection, albeit in a modified form, can be said to take place
during literary experience, and which is also relevant to moral justification. This
relates to imagining oneself in a counterfactual situation depicted in the work
(e.g. imagining for a time not being the narrator but actually meeting for oneself
the beggar described in The Old Cumberland Beggar), and attempting to explore
what one’s own value commitments might then be. In short, one is performing
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an act of introspection within an act of the imagination. Let us call this
imaginative introspection.
I am making a clear distinction, then, between the conscious activities
during literary experience of imaginative introspection and imaginative
empathy. (My conception of the latter has been developed at length across
several of the preceding chapters.) I employ these two phrases not as metaphors,
but because, on the broadly Husserlian view that I have set out, I believe they
accurately reflect important phenomenological structures involved in literary
experience. Our phenomenological discussion of the imagination in chapter 3
(‘Husserl and the Imagination’) relating to the capacity of conscious acts to be
nested one within another helps us to explicate the two activities in question as
acts of introspection and of empathy taking place within a phenomenologically
prior context of imagining. In Art, Emotion, and Ethics,11 Berys Gaut’s approach
to the question of aesthetic moral cognitivism is not explicitly
phenomenological, and he does not use the phrases “imaginative introspection”
or “imaginative empathy”. He does, however, place great emphasis upon the
moral confirmatory significance of imaginative involvement in literature, and it
is clear in this context (I have in mind here in particular his book’s seventh
chapter, entitled ‘The Cognitive Argument: The Epistemic Claim’) that
sometimes he is referring to imaginative introspection, and on other occasions to
imaginative empathy. In earlier chapters, we have considered the question of
imaginative empathy in some detail, and in this chapter, its relevance to an
expanded conception of “testimony” in a literary context. For our present
purposes, it is important that we now consider more closely the notion of
11 Gaut (2007).
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imaginative introspection. Gaut’s account of the epistemic significance of
imaginative involvement in a literary work can help us to do this.
I am in agreement with Gaut on certain general epistemological points
that he makes which support the view that imaginative introspection can under
certain circumstances be epistemically worthwhile and justificatorily
contributive. Perhaps most fundamentally (and this point is relevant to
imaginative empathy too), moral values applicable in a counterfactual situation
should rationally be applicable in actuality, and vice-versa: moral values range
across the set of actual and possible counterfactual situations. This means that
value commitments that come to light during imaginative introspection can be
regarded, if not as discoveries then at least as partially justified hypotheses,
about one’s own present and actual value commitments. In addition, the
principle of universalisability of moral judgements requires that moral
judgements be applicable to anybody meeting the criteria proper to the
judgement. Since “anybody” includes the person making the moral judgement,
imaginative introspection can be an important tool in confirming or disproving
such universalisability.
Gaut makes further valid points which are pertinent to imaginative
introspection when he observes that some epistemic advantage is held by the
imagination over direct experience in virtue of the facts that (1) two mutually
exclusive future possibilities can both be imagined and compared, but not both
directly experienced, and (2) that some experiences are so unlikely or
undesirable that one is rationally obliged to resort to the imagination in order to
find out more about how one would respond to them.12 I do not disagree with
12 Gaut (2007), p.156.
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these last two claims in themselves (in fact, I think they are important
observations) but I am concerned that the manner in which Gaut deploys them
seems designed to make them serve as a consolation for his reluctant admission
that the imagination has “lesser epistemic authority”13 than practical experience.
Granted, Gaut is careful never to explicitly claim that justificatory availability
can compensate for a shortfall in justificatory authority. But he also manages to
avoid drawing much attention to the important conceptual distinction between
justificatory availability and justificatory authority, and this omission risks
making his position appear more convincing than it really is. I will also want to
suggest in due course that there are good reasons for thinking that Gaut needs to
pay more attention to the distinction between partial justification and adequate
justification.14 To begin to see why this might be the case, we need to look more
closely at his account of the potential role for literature in imaginative
introspection.
During practical moral deliberation, one is often concerned not simply
with the set of all possible situations, but with situations which correspond either
to the way the world is now, or to the way the world will be in the future: one is
concerned, in short, not only with the possible, but with reality, and with the
way reality is likely to be. One context in which realism becomes important is
when we seek to seriously investigate kinds of possibilities that seem to be
intricately bound up with what it is to be human. One need only turn to
Shakespeare to find examples of the kind of possibilities that I have in mind
here. Somebody who is both insecure and jealous may be inclined toward
murder. The Machiavellian machinations of somebody gripped by political
13 Gaut (2007), p.156.
14 In many other important respects, of course, my debt to Gaut (2007) is significant.
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ambition may end in personal disaster. These are not laws of human behaviour
(as if human behaviour were amenable to laws), but there is truth to them to the
extent that they delineate patterns that have recurred throughout human history,
and to the extent that they can indicate on certain occasions what is likely to be
the case, or how matters are likely to end. If, as part of a serious moral enquiry,
one is to try to imagine such a situation, or even to imagine being caught up in
one, then one’s imaginings would need to be informed and constrained by
justified psychological beliefs concerning the way the people involved would be
likely to behave, and what their motivations would be likely to be. Psychological
realism is therefore particularly important to the exercise of the imagination in
the context of moral enquiry, but there can also be occasions on which one’s
understanding of what is likely will also need to be informed by what is known
scientifically or statistically. Consider the following example. Suppose someone
(let us call him William) is inclined toward believing that there should be no
systematic state intervention in the problem of vagrancy, and that homeless
people should have to rely upon spontaneous charity from the local community.
As part of his moral deliberation, William decides to investigate the
universalisability of this judgement by imagining himself being a homeless
person living rough in the countryside of, say, northern England. His intention is
to see if, in the imaginary situation, he still believes there should be no state
intervention. However, before William even begins his imaginative
introspection, he realises that he is going to have to do some research into
overnight temperature ranges for this part of England, and some statistical
research into the probability of a homeless person in this part of the country
receiving charitable assistance. Imaginative introspection, then, in a moral
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context, often requires background psychological knowledge and understanding
of human motivations, but can also require many other kinds of knowledge, e.g.
scientific or statistical. It is important to note that the acquisition of such
background knowledge is not part of the imaginational activity itself, but a
prerequisite for it.
Gaut makes some helpful points regarding how literary works and their
careful readers can contribute to the project of attempting to imagine in a
realistic manner. For one thing, many literary works are not aimed at fantasy but
at realism, and such works can guide the reader into realistic imaginings. The
putative realism of a work needs to be independently verified, and this is
addressed by one aspect of Gaut’s account of using the imagination in a
disciplined way: one’s imaginings must fit with the available independent
evidence and cohere with things that one already knows. This is surely right, but
I believe two further points of qualification, to which Gaut pays insufficient
attention, need to be added. Firstly, the source of verification involved here is
not the literary work, but background knowledge (e.g. psychological, scientific,
statistical) which is extrinsic to the literary work. Secondly, it seems strange to
try to wrap all of the verificatory effort into imaginational activity, since an
important part of such effort (i.e. gathering background knowledge) is a
prerequisite for the imaginational activity. Granted, the literary work is
contributing to imaginative introspection by guiding the reader into realistic
imaginings, and imaginative introspection can contribute to moral justification.
So at this stage we need to limit our acceptance of Gaut’s position to the view
that literature can contribute partially to the processes of moral justification by
means of imaginative introspection.
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In chapter 3 (‘Husserl and the Imagination’) we began to develop, with
Husserl’s assistance, a conception of “fullness” with respect to imaginative
content. I concluded that this notion seems to have three important dimensions,
which I referred to as completeness of scope, fidelity (to reality), and vividness.
Vividness in this context really refers to richness of detail, and is therefore not
equivalent to fidelity: an act of the imagination may be faithful to reality but
have a disappointing level of vividness, and vice-versa. All three dimensions are
relevant to our present discussion of imaginative introspection. We have just
discussed fidelity, and I shall shortly have an important point to make about
completeness of scope, but let us turn for the moment to the question of
vividness.
Vividness is important to imaginative introspection because the more
vivid one’s imaginings are, the more likely one is to become emotionally
involved, and to form clear evaluations with respect to the people and situations
that are being imagined. If one imagines a situation vividly, then it is as if (but
only as if) one is perceiving the situation for oneself. Great literary works
typically display an assured yet unostentatious ability on the part of the implied
author to depict scenes vividly, and thereby to facilitate an absorbed imaginative
involvement on the part of the reader, in which the reader’s deepest moral
commitments may come to light, perhaps even for the first time. Part of the
burden also falls upon the committed reader, who with sufficient practice can
develop an imaginative faculty capable of great vividness, sometimes even on
the basis of relatively meagre levels of rich detail provided within the literary
text.
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There is, nonetheless, a tension here that we need to be wary of. In the
previous chapter, I sought to develop in some detail an account of the structure
of literary understanding which stressed the centrality of imaginative-empathic
engagement with an implied authorial consciousness. I argued for an approach
to literary criticism in which vivid involvement in the life of a literary work
requires an imaginative transposal on the part of the critic into the implied
author’s motivations and personal way of being in the world. To this account we
add, in this chapter, the observation that once one has entered into the life of the
work in this way, and is able to imagine vividly a given situation which it
describes, one could also then imagine oneself being in the situation, and
undertake activities of imaginative introspection. So imaginative introspection
can work in concert with, and benefit from, imaginative empathy, because
imaginative introspection benefits from vividness, and great vividness is one of
the things that imaginative empathy in a literary context can provide. Yet this
line of thought seems to be bringing to light something about vivid imaginings
which suggests that, for all their importance within the processes of rational
moral enquiry, they may not be as straightforwardly conducive to moral clarity
as one might initially think. Vivid imaginings are essentially perspectival: it is as
if one were really there, perceiving events not only from a certain spatial
viewpoint, but from a certain personal viewpoint. One finds that, purely due to
the way a literary work has been written, certain aspects of vividly imagined
situations are more salient than others. Vivid imaginings, then, do not constitute
a pristine and neutral horizon for moral contemplation, but are instead already
invested with and pervaded by myriad implicit value commitments which work
to condition any subsequent moral deliberation. Part of the difficulty here is
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connected with the fact that literary works often produce their complex
evaluative effects, as we noted in the previous chapter, prior to the reader’s
grasp of how the text’s rhetoric is operating. Even the most ostensibly dry and
clinically detached police procedural novel can deeply implant within the
unsuspecting reader, through subtle and understated turns of rhetoric, through
the inclusion of certain ostensibly minor details and the exclusion of certain
others, value perceptions that can skew the way situations are understood, that
influence which characters one feels sympathy for, that can determine to some
extent whether the reader feels suspicious, uneasy, trusting, and so on. The
capacity of a literary work to seduce the reader into feeling a certain way is
partly what distinguishes literature from scientific texts, for example, or from an
impartial police witness statement suitable to be considered in a court of law.
Paradoxically, then, while the very vividness of the imaginings that can take
place during literary experience can support imaginative introspection, the
perspectival character of such vivid imaginings suggests that further justificatory
work will still be required. If moral justificatory progress is being made here, its
justificatory character is contributive, not decisive.
The double bind that seems now to be emerging might be restated as
follows. Allowing literature qua literature to contribute where it can to moral
justificatory efforts (in particular those in which imaginational activity is
pivotal) requires concessions on the part of the moral enquirer to literature’s
perspectivism, and to that extent a displacement in these phases of moral activity
of the pretensions to discursive objectivity that are sometimes held to be of a
piece with rational moral enquiry. For those of us even remotely inclined to
explore the extent of the potential cognitive significance of the imagination, the
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answer surely cannot be that we aim for a wholesale repression of vivid
imaginings from moral philosophical activity. A better alternative might be to
indulge at certain moments the biases and tendentiousness that vivid imaginings
(especially those deriving in some way from literary experience) to a greater or
lesser extent usually bring, and then seek in due course to draw them back into
broader overarching processes of rational moral deliberation. The paradox is that
while realistic vivid imaginings can support moral justification in the ways that I
have discussed, their doing so involves adopting and emphasising certain
perspectives, and closing off others which could still be pertinent to the moral
issue in question. The problem we still face, in other words, could be described
as one of completeness of scope, if completeness of scope in imagining a
morally demanding situation requires the ability to see the situation from all
morally relevant angles. In a moral context, for our purposes, this corresponds to
the third dimension of imaginative fullness that I mentioned earlier. It is not
unheard of for a literary work to repeatedly return to the same scene, describing
it each time from a different perspective, and perhaps even from the points of
view of different characters. This is one way in which a literary work can begin
to mitigate the problem of completeness of scope. I want to suggest, however, a
more general way of broadening one’s perspectival scope on moral problems
which can still involve imaginative introspection in the context of literary
experience, and which does not rely upon a given literary work treating the same
situation from multiple perspectives. This more general solution is for the reader
to seek out multiple works which all engage with the same, or very similar,
moral issues, and to undertake activities of imaginative introspection during the
encounter with each work. This approach takes advantage of the facts not only
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that one’s value commitments tend to come to light most saliently during the
actual experience, or vividly imagined experience, of particular situations, but
also that precisely these value commitments, if truly one’s own, in principle
span all possible situations, and are therefore certainly applicable across multiple
literary works which aspire, minimally, to portraying possible situations. For
example, having studied Wordsworth’s The Old Cumberland Beggar, one might
then seek out other works by Wordsworth, and then works by other authors,
which undertake morally serious thematic enquiry into the nature of encounters
with homeless people, or more generally, with individuals living, in some sense,
on the margins of society. The exploration of a complex moral issue of this kind,
I want to suggest, can always benefit from being investigated in different ways,
and in particular by exploiting the moral epistemic advantages that can flow
from imaginative involvement in the perspectives belonging to different
personalities.
My underlying point, which is supported by the different lines of
investigation pursued in this chapter, is that moral philosophical enquiry,
because it is (at least in the view of an approach to ethics that stresses the
importance of values and virtue) so closely bound up with personal moral
development, needs to be conceived in gradualist terms, and that important
moral issues with which literary works very often substantively engage are
rarely if ever capable of being exhaustively or even adequately “decided” on the
basis of the putative insights contained within a single literary work, no matter
how seemingly thorough and convincing that work’s thematic elaborations
might be. We have certainly found that literature can contribute substantively to
the processes of moral justification, and that this contribution can gain greater
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justificatory authority if multiple relevant literary works are taken into account.
Even so, we must accept that the nature of literature’s role in moral justification
ultimately remains contributive rather than decisive. Indeed, at every turn in this
chapter, we have found grounds for epistemological caution in relation to the
question of literary aesthetic moral cognitivism: caution, because the
phenomenological structure of literary experience itself points beyond literature
to practical experience as a proper domain for moral justification; caution,
because literature’s status as a potential source of moral testimony is partially
compromised by the fact that the implied author is not ontically transcendent to
the work, but instead is constituted heteronomously on the basis of what is given
in the text; caution, because the complex processes of reflective equilibrium
necessarily take in a variety of sources of experience and justification, of which
literature is but one; caution, because part of the verificatory effort involved in
ensuring imaginative realism is extrinsic to literary experience; and caution,
because the perspectival character of realistic vivid imaginings evoked by any
given literary work structurally entails a risk of excluding morally pertinent
ways of viewing a depicted situation, and is liable, in virtue of the very
deployment of rhetoric that renders literature precious to us, to be pervaded by
implicit and even subtly tendentious evaluative suggestions.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion
Page 253 of 302
Chapter 8 - Conclusion: Some Closing Remarks on the
Relation between Aesthetic and Ethical Value
In the preceding two chapters, attention has turned directly to the
question of the moral cognitive value of literature. I have argued that literature
qua literature does have an epistemologically significant capacity for moral
suggestion, but that it is ultimately misleading to claim that literature teaches us
about morality, or that literature can strictly speaking be regarded as a source of
moral knowledge, owing to the conspicuous frangibility of literature’s various
contributions to the processes of moral justification. Cognitivist protestations
which involve resorting to the mantra that putative knowledge need not be
indefeasible begin to have the look of straw grasping when, as I have argued, it
becomes in the end rather difficult to accept in good epistemic conscience that
literature satisfies the justification condition.
Questions remain, however, about the exact nature of the relation
between aesthetic and ethical value in a literary context. If a given literary work
contains important moral insights which are conveyed in a literary manner, it is
not immediately obvious at this juncture in our discussion why that in itself
should count as a reason for valuing the work aesthetically. Conversely, we need
to try to decide whether a work which manifests an ethical flaw which is
pertinent to the determination of its overall aesthetic value should be deemed in
that regard to be aesthetically deficient.
Intuitively, it seems right to say that one of the reasons we value
Wordsworth’s The Old Cumberland Beggar as a work of art is precisely because
it gets something right about the intuition of the intrinsic value of human life,
and about the phenomenology of compassion, and that if an early draft of the
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poem were to be found to suggest something false about these topics then that
would count as a reason for aesthetically valuing the published work more
highly than the earlier draft. It also seems right to say that we value this poem
aesthetically not only because it invites (through exclamatory vociferation, for
example) a response which is morally right (e.g. compassion for the beggar) but
because it genuinely arouses, under its own rhetorical steam, such a response in
the reader. Concrete observations like these which cite a specific literary work
provide some evidence to support two kinds of general argument that the ethicist
might deploy: a cognitive argument (according to which there are occasions
when we value a literary work aesthetically because it conveys thematically
relevant moral truth by artistic means), and a merited-response argument
(according to which a literary work possessing an aesthetically relevant ethical
flaw is to that extent aesthetically flawed because it prescribes and attempts to
arouse a response which is unethical and therefore unmerited, since responses to
art are subject to ethical criteria).
Yet, as Berys Gaut demonstrates, there is a third kind of argument that
ethicists use, and this is the argument that ethical virtue is beautiful. For a
number of reasons, this is the aspect of the case for ethicism that I wish to
concentrate on in this chapter. Firstly, regardless of whether ethicism turns out
to be true or not, the general claim that a person’s ethical virtue is always in
principle capable of being seen to be beautiful (I shall call this the virtuous
beauty position)1 has enormous significance for our understanding of the nature
of value, implying as it does the idea of a fundamental linkage between the
1 I propose to use the term “virtuous beauty” in order to give Berys Gaut’s phrase “moral
beauty” a more precise focus. In this chapter, I shall not be concerned with the broader question
of whether morality in general coincides with the beautiful. Shaftesbury, for example, believed
there to be a primordial metaphysical unity of the good, the beautiful, and the true.
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fields of ethics and aesthetics. (I don’t deny that the cognitive and merited-
response arguments have significance here as well). Secondly, Gaut himself
admits that justifying the virtuous beauty position is difficult,2 and I believe that
on the basis of the phenomenological investigations into intersubjectivity and
the imagination contained in earlier chapters, and by adopting a
phenomenological approach to the question of virtuous beauty itself, I may now
be in a position to make some headway on this matter. Thirdly, I also want to
show that an investigation into the virtuous beauty position can take us so deeply
into the question of ethicism that it positions us to adjudicate on whether
ethicism is correct, without requiring very explicit engagements with ethicism’s
cognitive and merited-response arguments.
My main conclusions will be three-fold. Firstly, I want to argue on
phenomenological grounds that the virtuous beauty position can be sustained,
notwithstanding an important prima facie objection that the experience of
observing virtue in someone else fails to meet the central aesthetic criterion of
disinterestedness. Secondly, I shall conclude that, precisely because the virtuous
beauty position, on my formulation, is at root correct, occasions can arise in
which ethical flaws in an artwork really do count as aesthetic flaws. Thirdly,
however, I shall also argue that certain puzzle cases, in which virtuous beauty
conflicts irremediably with some other valid aesthetic value, can serve as
counter-examples to show that ethicism is false, on the grounds that it would be
illogical to regard, even in pro tanto fashion, a failure to satisfy the virtuous
beauty criterion as an aesthetic flaw, given that the actual satisfaction by a given
2 Gaut (2007), p.118.
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artwork of some other valid aesthetic value logically entails sacrificing virtuous
beauty.
In my approach to the virtuous beauty problem, I propose to develop a
phenomenological account of beauty in general, and then to argue for the
applicability of such an account to the experience of virtue in someone else. As
my exploration of the experience of beauty unfolds, I will develop a pluralistic
account of aesthetic value, in a discussion which includes, but is not limited to,
the aesthetic values of formal unity, harmony between subject and object, and
the experience of freedom. For this reason, my readers should not be too
surprised to find Kant’s aesthetic theory figuring fairly prominently in the course
of this chapter. My intention is neither to burden the reader with an
unnecessarily detailed exposition of Kant’s position, nor to attribute to Kant
views which remain matters of hermeneutic controversy within Kant
scholarship. Yet it seems to me that Kantian thought has such an important
bearing upon the general question of the relation between aesthetics and
morality, and the question of virtuous beauty in particular, that a failure to
engage properly with Kant on these topics would either indicate a misguided
philosophical attempt to reinvent the wheel, so to speak, or give an incorrect
impression of ignorance of what Kant has already usefully contributed to the
discussion. Kant can assist us in understanding some of the complexities of
certain aesthetic values which are deeply relevant to the concerns of this chapter.
This is not to say that I intend to adopt uncritically what Kant has to say.
On the contrary, I will ultimately argue that there are reasons for doubting the
plausibility of Kant’s claim that one is rationally entitled to impute one’s own
assessment of an object’s beauty to others, and that Kant underestimates the
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centrality of the image in aesthetic experience. Nonetheless, the account of the
phenomenology of beauty that I develop will in the end retain certain
recognisably Kantian roots, such as the importance of unity in the manifold of
experience, harmony between the object and one’s cognitive faculties, and the
experience of freedom, but will also seek to modify the Kantian view to address
what I regard as a kind of suppression in Kantian thought of the intersubjective
dimension of the encounter with beauty, and the importance of critical
discussion and debate, and to recognise that the aesthetic value of mimesis turns
out to be pertinent, for phenomenological reasons that Kant does not anticipate,
but which are not incompatible with his philosophy, to the experience of natural,
as well as artistic, beauty. To begin with, however, it is appropriate for our
phenomenological investigation to consider a concrete example of what it is to
have an experience of beauty, and I can think of no finer artistic mind to assist
us in this effort than that of Claude Monet.
Monet’s Still Life with Flowers and Fruit (c.1869)3 is dominated by a
very generous bouquet of flowers arranged in what appears to be a suitably stout
blue and white vase. This oval vase, which is almost completely overshadowed,
serves as the picture’s understated origin from which still life seems to radiate in
broadly orthogonal directions. In the vertical axis, the dense floral bouquet
seems to erupt upwards and outwards in a notably conic debouchment of colour.
Meanwhile, scatterings of fruit extend both toward the viewer and across to the
right on a crisp white tablecloth whose creases from having been neatly folded
adumbrate in ridges and valleys a faint grid of squares on the material. To the
3 One of my intentions behind the following brief account of this painting is to be faithful to the
phenomenology of my own experience of the work, rather than to impose a theoretical or
philosophical agenda upon it. The reader should not assume that all of my passing observations
about this painting will necessarily be taken up later on in this chapter, although many of them
will be.
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left, a wicker basket of pears seems to echo the conical or bowl-like outline of
the bouquet. The rounded forms of apples and grapes lying at surface level seem
to be answered by those of the flower heads which are for the most part in full
bloom.
One of this painting’s great strengths lies in its conveying a convincing
sense of the bouquet’s volume and dimensionality, and this is partly attributable
to the implied artist’s subtle and assiduous understanding of the play of light and
shade, a preoccupation which seems to have fascinated Monet for the entirety of
his long artistic career. Daylight pours in from the left to create an almost
dazzling effect when it strikes the white flower petals. The very flower heads
which catch the light are shielding the ones behind them, which are thus plunged
into a cool and subdued shade. The conspicuous absence of any detail at all in
this painting’s dark backdrop, which intimates an almost eerie kind of void, has
the effect of accentuating the sense of detail provided in the flowers, so much so
that it is perhaps rather easy to think that there is more detail in their brushwork
than there really is.
Indeed, one of the great paradoxes of impressionism lies in its
remarkable discovery that an attenuation in the level of detail can sometimes be
deployed to actually heighten the precision of the overall impression. In this
painting we find that adept brushwork and chiaroscuro seem to combine to
produce just such an effect. And the unity of the overall impression, the
singularity of effect, seems to be enhanced and reinforced in Monet’s thoughtful
organisation of colour, by the way the yellow of the sunflower to the extreme
left is answered by that of the pears, the green of the leaves by that of the apples,
the darkness of the purple grapes by the shaded mauves and reds of the flowers,
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and by the darkness, too, of the void-like background. So successfully are these
techniques demonstrated here that we might say without phenomenological
exaggeration that accompanying the pictorial givenness of flowers, fruit, linen,
and so on, there is to be had a certain kind of imaginative co-givenness of scent,
of warmth and coolness, and of materiality and of texture.
For a second time, then, we seem to have found ourselves reflecting
upon the way in which the indeterminate dark backing seems to be functioning
and contributing to the overall sense of the picture. On the one hand, it seems to
be participating in a quite fundamental way in the implied artist’s organisation
of colour across the picture as a whole. There is a sense in which the darkness is
not strictly separated from the domain of still life, but instead begins to seep into
it – in the depths of the bouquet that the sunlight cannot penetrate, in the
shadows that the illuminated objects must cast, and in the rich darkness of the
purple grapes. On the other hand, as we noted earlier, the extremely vague,
almost unfinished character of the backdrop turns out to be a perfect way within
the miracle of impressionism to emphasise and even elevate the apparent level
of detail that one thinks one perceives in the flower arrangement.
This amorphous and nebulous backdrop might even prompt us to think
more abstractly about the forms that the picture presents. As I implied earlier, it
is possible to discern a distinctly geometrical subtext pervading the forms
depicted, in the propagation of conical form from the flower arrangement to the
wicker basket, in the circular forms principally of the vase and the flower heads,
and in the grid of squares delineated by the creases in the tablecloth. Yet I also
want to suggest that from the very geometrical and formal qualities of the
objects depicted seem to flow some important ways of interpreting the picture
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symbolically. At one level, it is as though the elaborate shape of the vase of
flowers resembles and represents a colourful tree which has shed some of its
fruit onto the table-top. In this sense, Monet’s compositional decision to have
the fruit scattered fairly freely across the surface has the effect of emphasising
and reinforcing the production by the picture of ideas of growth, flourishing,
plenitude, and fruitfulness.
This painting can assist us further in developing our understanding of the
phenomenology of beauty if we start to think now in slightly more general terms
about the nature of the experience that it offers, in terms both of its phenomenal
character and of the essential structures of experience that are involved. The key
phenomenological observation that needs to be made at this point is that the
mode of intuition principally involved during appreciation of the picture as a
work of art conforms to the structure of picture-consciousness that we discussed
in detail in chapter 3 (‘Husserl and the Imagination’). This is to say that three
kinds of intentional object are given to consciousness: the so-called “picture-
thing” (the physical artwork which is directly perceived), the “picture-subject”
which in this case is a plurality of physical objects (e.g. flowers, fruit, tablecloth,
etc.) which are represented, and the “image-object” which is a semblance of the
picture-subject, and which does not exist either in reality or ideality but is
constituted heteronomously by consciousness on the basis of perceiving the
picture-thing. Perception is necessarily involved during aesthetic appreciation of
this painting, but the aesthetic appreciation cannot be wholly explained in terms
of perception, because one’s mode of attention is essentially contemplative
rather than merely perceptual. During aesthetic absorption in this picture, one
contemplates the way in which the picture-subject appears in the image-object.
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Now, the concept of contemplating the way in which something appears
in an image does not logically entail taking pleasure in doing so. For example,
one would not necessarily expect a doctor to contemplate with any pleasure the
way in which a bone tumour appears in an x-ray. Yet contemplating the way in
which objects appear in Monet’s painting is pleasurable, and the taking of such
pleasure is not an incidental but an intrinsic part of the appreciation of the work.
It should help us to understand the phenomenology of beauty more fully if we
try to clarify what it is that we are taking pleasure in when we contemplate the
way objects appear in a painting. I want to suggest a number of different
possible answers to this question, and my answers will highlight different
dimensions of aesthetic value.
Firstly, there is the idea that mimesis in itself is an aesthetic value.
According to Aristotle, it is simply a fact of human cognitive life that the human
subject enjoys grasping a semblance as a semblance. Grasping a semblance as a
semblance is a way of understanding what one sees, something that humans
always enjoy. This is not to say that the only way to enjoy an artwork is through
mimesis. For example, one might enjoy looking at a non-mimetic work of
abstract modern art because one finds it to be soothing. Yet even in the case of a
non-mimetic artwork, one’s enjoyment of the work is very often attributable in
some degree to the fact that one has begun to come to terms with it in some way,
that is, to begin to understand it. Monroe Beardsley goes so far as to claim that
during aesthetic experience “there is always something going on that can be
called, in a broad sense, understanding”.4 But we don’t need to adjudicate on the
essentialist overtones of this latter claim in order to accept the Aristotelian claim
4 Beardsley (1982), p.293. Emphasis mine.
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that humans enjoy understanding what they see, and that mimesis is enjoyable
for this reason. Yet if we do so then we are left with the problem of the doctor
looking at the x-ray. Are we forced to accept that the doctor does, after all, enjoy
looking at it? A plausible Aristotelian answer would be a pro tanto one. To the
extent that the doctor recognises what the image shows, s/he will be cognitively
satisfied, and to the extent that the doctor fails to recognise what the image
shows, s/he will be cognitively dissatisfied. This kind of explication of our
response to non-artistic mimesis is consistent with the Aristotelian view that
everyone enjoys imitation.
Phenomenologically, there does indeed appear to be an essentially
cognitive kind of pleasure to be enjoyed in the apprehension of a semblance as a
semblance. And we are entitled to believe that this kind of pleasure is capable
under the right conditions of being a specifically aesthetic pleasure because
sometimes (but not always) we value an artwork precisely because of its
representational accuracy. The astonishing realism of Van Dyck’s depiction of
silk is a reason to value his painting aesthetically. Yet when viewing Van
Dyck’s depiction of silk and valuing it aesthetically, one is not fooled into
believing that one is actually looking at silk. On the contrary, one values it
aesthetically precisely because one knows that it is a depiction, and grasps it as
such in an act of picture-consciousness. This kind of example seems sufficient to
justify the claim that mimesis in itself is sometimes aesthetically valuable.
Yet if evidence were needed that mimesis and aesthetic value are not
identical, then our discussion so far has already provided it. For one thing, we
have already noted that some artworks are non-mimetic. Secondly, some objects
are mimetic but not regarded as aesthetically valuable, e.g. most medical x-rays.
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This observation seems to suggest a possible way of structuring the way we
understand aesthetic values. There may be some aesthetic values which only
become salient in virtue of the artwork being non-mimetic. Secondly, there may
be some aesthetic values which are capable of being perceived in both mimetic
and non-mimetic artworks. Finally, there may be some aesthetic values which
necessarily can only be perceived in mimetic artworks.
The appreciation of shape and form is an aspect of aesthetic experience
which can take place both without and within the context of consciousness of an
image as an image. To be sure, a non-mimetic artwork, such as an abstract
sculpture, could still be said to represent certain ideal or abstract forms, whilst at
the same time understood not to be purporting to imitate anything in the real
world or any possible real world. Yet such an artwork might well be thought to
be aesthetically pleasing not because it represents anything, but because it is a
beautiful form. For example, a sculpture of a regular geometrical form such as a
sphere, a cube, or a cone, could be said to be beautiful because of its reflective
and rotational symmetry. Yet in the case of a mimetic artwork, the
phenomenological explication of the apprehension of formal beauty seems to
become more complicated, because it depends upon whether the predicate
“beautiful” is being applied by the observer to both the picture-subject and the
image-object, or only to the image-object. On the one hand, a viewer of a
painting may understand the painting to be portraying the picture-subject as
being beautiful when viewed in a certain way, or under certain conditions. For
example, a painting might plausibly be suggesting that St. Paul’s Cathedral is
beautiful when viewed from a certain perspective. On the other hand, the viewer
may understand a painting to be portraying a prosaic or even ugly subject as
Chapter 8 - Conclusion
Page 264 of 302
only appearing in a beautiful way. An example of this might be a painting
depicting the back of a refrigerator when viewed through an intense heat-haze,
or through the ripples of a swimming pool. But in the case of both examples (the
paintings of the refrigerator and of St. Paul’s Cathedral), it is the image-object
which invites contemplation, and it is the image-object which is decisive in
determining the beauty of the artwork.
It might be worth noting at this point just how resistant the notion of
beauty is to the straitjacket of necessary conditions. If it seems implausible to
claim that all beautiful objects are mimetic, it seems more so to claim that
beauty requires symmetry. Closer to the mark would be to note that both
symmetry and asymmetry are aesthetically relevant properties, and that often it
is precisely an interplay between symmetry and asymmetry which is a source of
aesthetic value. (Monet’s Still Life with Flowers and Fruit seems to exemplify
this, as does the human face.) One reason why symmetry arouses our aesthetic
interest is that it seems to evince a differentiation from randomness, a movement
from disorder to order, and therefore a certain sense of purposiveness or design,
even if the purpose informing such purposiveness, and the conscious intentions
behind such ostensible design, seem harder to specify.
The experience of such apparent purposiveness in an artwork seems to
lend the object a unity which is itself an aesthetic value. Unity is perhaps the
best candidate that we have for a quality shared by all works of art, and this is
connected to the fact that all artworks exist within the context of an art/criticism
dialectic. If an ostensible artwork were to lack unity at all levels of
interpretation, including those of form, of content, and of meaning, then it would
become difficult to see how a coherent critical account of the work could be
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written. And if in principle no coherent account of a work could be attained,
then it is hard to see how it could be said to merit worthwhile critical attention at
all. Aristotle favoured mimetic works that imitate a single object, because he
regarded unity as a fundamental aesthetic concept.5 This apparent privileging of
single-object mimetic works seems justified only to the extent that such works
can support a simplicity and concentration of contemplative experience which
can never quite be matched by works depicting several objects. But in this
context Aristotle seems to neglect the idea that a picture depicting multiple
objects could possess unity at other important levels – at the levels, for example,
of meaning, or of overall impression. Had Aristotle thought as deeply about
paintings as he did about tragic drama (I don’t believe he did), then he would
very quickly have realised that what counts in a mimetic artwork is not that it
should ideally portray a single object, but that it should possess unity of subject
matter, and unity in the treatment of such subject matter. It is not that a picture
should have only one component, but that its parts, like those of the action of a
good play, should blend into an harmonious whole, and that each part in its
proper place should be indispensable to the work. What Aristotle says of an
excellent tragic drama is surely also true of other mimetic works: “If the
presence or absence of something has no discernible effect, it is not a part of the
whole.”6
We need to bear in mind, however, that very often an important
dimension of aesthetic experience lies not merely in apprehending an artwork’s
unity and internal harmony, but in a subjective feeling and lived experience, on
the part of the observer, of being somehow in harmony with the life of the
5 Aristotle (1996), §§ 5.3, 5.4, p.15.
6 Aristotle (1996), § 5.4, p.15.
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artwork. We might say that we sometimes find a way, through a peculiar act of
consciousness, of entering into the internal harmony which is represented,
signified, symbolised, or evinced by formal and empirically observable features
of the work. Although I will in due course call into question certain important
aspects of Kantian aesthetics, I want to argue at this point that Kant’s account of
the judgement of taste provides us with a very helpful explication of this kind of
harmonious aesthetic satisfaction, as well as illuminating an important aspect of
the relation between aesthetics and ethics.
Kant refers to the intentional object of the contemplation of beauty as the
“form”, which is apperceived in the examination of the formal relatedness of the
object’s sensible characteristics.7 The form, then, depends upon sensuous
perception, but is not itself to be identified with sensation. Instead, one
apperceives the form on the basis of sensations. In these respects, it is worth
noting that in the case of pictorial works of art, the Kantian form corresponds
quite closely to what I earlier referred to as the image-object, which is
constituted heteronomously on the basis of sensuous perception of the physical
artwork. Yet for Kant, the object of the judgement of taste need not be an
artwork at all, for it could be an object of natural beauty, such as a landscape, the
aesthetic appreciation of which does not depend upon being aware of a picture
as a picture. This is not to say that Kant thinks that beautiful natural forms are
not representational. On the contrary, I will in due course propose that there is a
fundamentally important sense in which Kant believes that all objects of beauty
are in fact capable of being representational, namely in their representational
capacity with respect to the phenomenology of moral agency. But in all cases,
7 I am following here Crawford’s reading of the Kantian form (Crawford (1974), pp. 89, 96-8,
105, 108-10, 123).
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the bearer of beauty, that is, the intentional object of experience to which the
predicate “beautiful” is being applied, is neither what is represented nor the
sensations upon which such representation depends, but the Kantian form itself,
which orders the sensuous manifold and gives it unity.
For Kant, the ultimate cause of aesthetic pleasure is harmony between
the object and the cognitive faculties. In the apprehension of a beautiful form,
activity which is both harmonious and non-conceptual is stimulated between the
faculties of the imagination and the understanding. The result is a lived
experience of formal subjective purposiveness, which is to say that during
aesthetic experience of the beautiful it is as though the beautiful object were
designed for an humanly intelligible purpose, or that the object of taste seems
perfectly pre-adapted to what at root governs a priori our cognition of the world.
On the one hand, we might say that the imagination for its part finds a way of
bringing the form into sharp focus for the understanding. On the other hand, one
might say that subjectively one has a peculiar sense of legislating a principle
with which the sensible world for once obediently seems to comply. It is
precisely this harmonious experience of formal subjective purposiveness in the
experience of the beautiful which is the source for the observer of aesthetic
satisfaction and pleasure. For Kant, the crucial difference between aesthetic and
empirical cognition is that in an empirical context the faculty of the
understanding regulates the imagination by supplying determinate concepts.
This means that empirical judgements are in principle susceptible to
confirmation through the verification that the determinations of any concept
employed in a judgement are themselves empirically observable. But in the
judgement of taste, the object of understanding is not something whose
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exemplification can be determinately specified in advance. This leads Kant to
the view that in the judgement of taste the form apprehended sheds light upon an
indeterminate type of concept, which in Kantian terminology is the same as a
supersensible idea. In this sense, Kant believes that the beautiful, like the
sublime, has the capacity to lead us toward the contemplation of the
supersensible. Natural beauty accomplishes this by expressing the idea of the
supersensible in general, the very idea that nature was designed for our powers
of cognition, and is amenable to our empirical investigation. And art can echo
this experience of formal subjective purposiveness by presenting, in miniature as
it were, a formal ordering of nature.
Under the Kantian terminology, what we would call “values”, in the
sense of aesthetic or moral values, must be taken to be present in all but name in
the form of supersensible ideas. While we should not forget that Kant takes the
domain of supersensible ideas to include non-evaluative ideas like eternity,
fame, and the idea of the supersensible in general, it is also clear that he thinks it
includes ethical virtues and values like love, freedom, and patience.8 Evidence
that, for Kant, values belong to the realm of the supersensible comes not only
from the examples of aesthetic ideas that he provides, but from his
understanding of the way ideas are experienced. On the one hand, as
constituents of the supersensible substrate of nature, ideas are experienced as
being subjectively transcendent and universally communicable. On the other
hand, the sensitivity of the faculty of the understanding to aesthetic ideas, and
the sensitivity of the faculty of reason to rational ideas, govern and delimit
which ideas can be experienced. In this broad sense, the account of values
8 Kant (1911), § 49, p.176.
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provided by Scheler, and broadly adopted by Stein, that we have discussed in
previous chapters, is not uninfluenced by the Kantian account of the subjective
transcendence of values, and the delimiting role of the sensitivity of the faculties
of the understanding and reason to values.
Opinion is divided within Kant scholarship on the question of whether
Kant is in fact employing an implicit appeal to notions of moral duty in order to
complete his transcendental deduction of the universal validity of the judgement
of taste. But there is little room for doubt that, at a minimum, Kant believes the
encounter with beauty to be capable of bringing to consciousness important
aspects of the phenomenology of moral agency. This is why Kant construes taste
as “in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of
moral ideas in terms of sense”.9 Crawford, for one, takes Kant to be implicitly
identifying the supersensible substrate of our moral and aesthetic faculties with
the supersensible substrate of nature, and to believe that the ultimate ground of
the experience of beauty is the ultimate ground of morality.10 Guyer, for another,
accepts at the very least that Kant either “assumes” or “seems to assume” that
aesthetic ideas “paradigmatically” have moral content.11 The slightly vague
nature of this admission by Guyer is indicative of the fact that Kant does not
devote as much energy as one might have hoped toward substantiating his
posited linkage between the respective grounds of the experience of the moral
and of the beautiful. It is as though there is an implicit premise in Kantian
thought that the most important aesthetic value is to illuminate the basis of
morality. For example, when Kant enumerates some aesthetic ideas in § 49,
9 Kant (1911), § 60, p.227.
10 Crawford (1974), p.140.
11 Guyer (1996), pp.15, 17.
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most (but not all) of them bear undeniably moral overtones.12 Yet § 52 does
seem to provide an occasion on which the premise surfaces, for Kant observes
that the pleasure that we take in merely charming or entertaining artworks which
are devoid of moral content is shallower and less abiding than the “self-sufficing
delight” which may be derived from works which are “either proximately or
remotely, brought into combination with moral ideas”; that one eventually loses
interest in a work aimed at mere enjoyment, and finds that one’s mind is
“dissatisfied”.13 It is a pity that Kant does not elaborate at this point upon exactly
what he has in mind with his distinction between the “proximate” and the
“remote” bringing of an artwork into combination with moral ideas. Part of the
Kantian answer must be that beauty can harmonise with morality in virtue of the
fact that the apprehension of formal subjective purposiveness is a condition for
the possibility of freely-willed practical engagement in the world. If, as I wish to
suggest, Kant is implying that the experience of beauty can be representational
with respect to the phenomenology of moral agency, then it is reasonable to
assume that Kant believes beauty to be capable of introducing us to the same
kind of experience of freedom which is relevant to practical reason.
One way in which Kant provides evidence of a fundamental link between
art and morality is to make observations about the way people change over time
as a result of artistic experience. Kant points out that a person’s exposure to
moral ideas in art seems to facilitate a smooth transition from the enjoyment of
art to being naturally morally motivated and disposed toward virtue.14 He also
12 Kant (1911), § 49, p.176: Kant’s list includes “[…] the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity,
creation, […] death, envy, and all vices, as also love, fame, and the like […].”
13 Kant (1911), § 52, p.191.
14 Kant (1911), § 59, p.225: “Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to
habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap, for it represents the imagination, even
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believes that the ability to attend to beauty in a disinterested manner prepares us
to love other people and nature disinterestedly.15 Kant is not claiming that one’s
exposure to art is a necessary condition for the acquisition of certain privileged
pieces of moral knowledge, but it is part of his account that a sustained interest
in art can in due course mould one’s disposition and motivations to conform to
what is moral, and help one to develop the ability to relate to others and to the
world in a manner devoid of private interest. This in turn is consonant with the
more general idea that I developed in chapter 6 (‘Literature’s Capacity for Moral
Suggestion’) that the experience and study of art provides an opportunity to
develop one’s understanding of the structures and phenomenal character of
moral experience.16
We don’t need to commit ourselves to the relatively strong reading of
Kant according to which Kant is claiming that the experience of beauty is
representational with respect to the noumenal world, in order to see the validity
of the more moderate interpretation that Kant believes the experience of beauty
to be representational with respect to important aspects of the phenomenology of
virtuous experience and the intuition of moral values. For the simple reason that
representation is always subject to a correctness condition, the question of
warrant in the judgement of taste would now seem to become rather pressing. If
a work of art seems to be portraying a moral value, like compassion or freedom,
in a certain way, then a desire to assess the portrayal’s veridicality is both
in its freedom, as amenable to a final determination for understanding, and teaches us to find,
even in sensuous objects, a free delight apart from any charm of sense.”
15 Kant (1911), § 29, p.119. It would seem to be an implication of Kant's position that
judgements of taste could serve as a gentle propaedeutic to moral virtue in the sense that
judgements of taste devoid of personal interest could help to prepare one to make moral
judgements contrary to one’s personal interest.
16 Readers who are mindful that in Critique of Aesthetic Judgement natural beauty rather than
artistic beauty seems to be configured as the paradigm case may rest assured that nothing in my
exposition of Kant’s understanding of beauty is intended to obscure or contradict this fact.
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cognitively and morally appropriate. The seductive propensity of rhetoric upon
which I elaborated in chapter 6, and the seductive capacities of art in general,
must mean that an experience of harmony between an artwork and one’s
cognitive faculties, and a pleasurable combination of the imagination and the
understanding, imply in themselves a requirement for further verification. Seen
from this perspective, the normal discursive practices of the provision, exchange
and evaluation of art criticism would seem to be an integral part of the processes
of the aesthetic exploration of the domain of values, and, at their best,
verificatory in character of the proposition that a given artwork offers to the
aesthetically sensitive observer a genuine encounter with the realm of morality.
What strikes me as notable about Kant’s aesthetic theory is that there
seems to be no place for justificatory efforts in relation to the judgement of taste
in the context of critical discourse and exchange. In Kant’s view, it seems that if
one takes an artwork to illuminate certain moral ideas, experiences a self-
sufficing delight in such putative illumination, and feels the aesthetic pleasure of
formal subjective purposiveness on the basis of a disinterested attending to the
form, then one is already justified from a first-person perspective in arriving at
the judgement of taste, and the judgement that one has had through sensory
experience of the artwork an encounter with the basis of morality. The reason
for this is that Kant thinks that one has already ensured the objectivity of one’s
experience of the work by restricting the subjective grounds of one’s judgement
to what is universally communicable. For this reason, on the Kantian model, in
soliciting the agreement of others that a work is beautiful and expresses moral
ideas, one is not seeking to acquire confirmation from others for a provisional
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hypothesis of one’s own, but imputing one’s own judgements about the work’s
beauty and moral worth to all rational observers.17
Kant eschews the term “objectivity” in connection with the way one
should experience an artwork, but he does presuppose that all that is
aesthetically important about a work is intersubjectively accessible. The Kantian
mechanism for ensuring intersubjective accessibility is to restrict the grounds of
the judgement of taste to the form which consists only of what is universally
communicable. Yet this requirement seems to neglect the possibility that there
may be important aspects of aesthetic experience which depend upon and are
governed by the observer’s subjectivity and life experience, and which are in
this sense objectively indeterminate.18 As we noted in chapter 6 when touching
upon Wolfgang Iser’s treatment of indeterminacy, readers of a literary work may
fill in lacunae in the work in their own autonomous and personal ways, making
it practically impossible to disentangle the reader’s own subjectivity from the
experiences that the work itself seems to be offering.
Even if we leave to one side for the moment the issue of the importance
and value of indeterminacy in aesthetic experience, the Kantian position still has
to explain why we should regard it as plausible to think that experiencing the
form disinterestedly is practically attainable. In Kant’s view, all rational
judgements presuppose a common sense, and with respect to aesthetic
judgement, Kant understands the common sense to be a capacity for
experiencing a feeling that is universally communicable. This does not commit
Kant to actual concurrence of the same feeling by different people
17 Naturally, I am not claiming that Kant makes the epistemological mistake of overlooking the
defeasibility of the judgement of taste.
18 The standard Kantian response to this objection will be that such aspects are peripheral to the
disinterested level at which Kant’s account operates. My suggestion is that we need to take
seriously the possibility that something important is being lost here.
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contemplating the same object. But he does seem to be saying that experiencing
a universally communicable feeling of aesthetic harmony with a given beautiful
artwork is within the range of reliable competence of all rational human
subjects. And it is difficult to see why this must follow from the fact that the
judgement of taste must presuppose a common sense in order to be intelligible
as a judgement. I concur with Kant’s motivating intuition that the fact that we do
on occasion exclaim to others that “This is beautiful!” in the absence of
objective proof, and become suitors for their assent, is epistemologically
significant and interesting. But the fact that an exclamation is epistemologically
significant does not mean that it has no hyperbolic element. Kant either ignores
or suppresses the hyperbolic element of such exclamations and accords them a
straight-faced normativity. He ends up construing it as rational to impute to
others one’s own feeling prior to hearing what they might have to say by way of
an account of their own aesthetic experience, something that in my experience
sensible appreciators of art deliberately refrain from doing. Kant invites our
verdictive judgement on beauty prior to our consultation with others, but I would
suggest that we are more likely to be in some kind of proximity to objectivity in
the context of critical discourse and exchange.
Instead of convincingly resolving the antinomy of taste, then, the
Kantian train of thought seems to have led us into a fresh double-bind. On the
one hand, the fundamental intuition that there is something deeply important to
be gotten right in the way that we interpret art, and that we are not rationally free
to respond in any way we wish, seems right, on pain of an hollow relapse into
solipsism. On the other hand, the Kantian insistence that one not only aspire to
but actually attain an experience of artworks that one would be justified from a
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first-person perspective in imputing to others seems to be both implausibly
demanding for the subject and actually to run against the grain of the
phenomenology of aesthetic experience. The structure of this post-Kantian
problematic of aesthetic experience is in fact remarkably similar to a tension
presented in the phenomenological investigation of the apperception and
understanding of the presently lived experiences of a foreign subjectivity. On the
one hand, the empathic fulfilling explication is understood to be ultimately
subject to an unequivocal correctness condition. On the other hand, as we noted
in chapter 2, foundational phenomenological considerations pertaining to the
encounter with a foreign subjectivity determine that a disjunction in subjective
processes between the empathiser and the Other is not an unfortunate by-product
of contingent human cognitive frailty, but something which is in fact
constitutive of the other person being another person. On a Steinian view, the
answer is not to insist upon an implausible phenomenal unity with the Other, but
to constitute within consciousness an approximation to the Other’s experience;
to converge in time through the development of an ever richer and more accurate
apprehension of the Other’s personality; not to legislate for what co-empathisers
should experience, but to regard the experiences of co-empathisers as potential
sources of correction and corroboration for one’s own empathic experience. The
encounter with a work of art can also be understood in intersubjective terms, as
an empathic encounter with the experiences of an implied artist. In this
interpretive context, one’s grasp of the experience implied in a given work is, as
a matter of descriptive fact, phenomenally given as being subject to a
correctness condition. But it is not given as something which can be necessarily
imputed to other art observers and critics. Instead, one develops one’s own
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understanding of a work over time, and takes the critical accounts of others as
possible sources of modification or confirmation of one’s own perceptions and
reflective judgements.
The idea that the encounter with a work of art can be plausibly
configured in intersubjective terms seems to invite a converse corollary. Is the
encounter with someone else capable of having an aesthetic dimension? Plato
certainly thought that this was the case, holding that virtue is a kind of beauty,
and wickedness a kind of deformity.19 Certain aspects of Plato’s account in The
Republic of justice in the individual can help us to begin to understand why it
makes sense to say that somebody who manifests virtue can be said to have a
beautiful soul. But we are also well-placed now to pursue an investigation into
the putative beauty of virtue because we have, in the course of this chapter so
far, developed a phenomenological account of certain important aspects of the
experience of beauty, and, in previous chapters, a detailed understanding of the
phenomenology of intersubjectivity. We can draw upon Plato’s account of
justice in the individual, and upon the Husserl-Stein account of the encounter
with a foreign subjectivity, in order to clarify why important aspects of the
phenomenology of beauty should turn out to be potentially applicable to the
encounter with a virtuous person.
One aspect of virtue that Plato emphasises is self-control. Plato
conceives of self-control as the bringing of one part of the soul, such as the
appetitive element, under the discipline of an essentially higher kind of element,
such as spirit or reason. The different elements vie among themselves for
dominance, and if appetite is not controlled by spirit and reason, then it will
19 Plato (2003), p.154.
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control them, and the individual will have become a slave to base instincts and
drives.20 The virtue of temperance is the subordination of spirit and appetite to
reason. The higher relational virtue of justice refers to the state of the soul in
which each element properly performs its own function under the rule of reason.
Self-disciplined people may in this sense be said to be mentally at peace with
themselves, and their external actions adumbrate a state of internal harmony in
their subjective processes. The encounter with self-discipline in someone else,
then, is capable of appresenting to the observer a state of internal harmony in the
Other, and the apperception of such internal harmony, as we noted earlier, can
be an important part of the experience of beauty.
On the Platonic account, then, it seems that the most prominent reason
for regarding a just soul as beautiful is in virtue of its internal harmony. But
another plausible explanation for the fact that it seems right to say that someone
who behaves virtuously has a beautiful personality lies in the idea that observing
such a person could involve the co-givenness of aesthetically pleasing forms and
shapes. We might remark favourably on someone else by saying that they have a
personality which is balanced, stable, or well-rounded. By this we usually mean
that they can be relied upon not to respond unwisely to unusual or challenging
situations, or that they can be said have a consistent and clear moral faculty. We
noted in chapter 4 that Edith Stein finds the personality of the Other to be given
to the empathising consciousness as being layered in a manner which reflects the
Other’s personal hierarchy of value commitments. In investigating what it is to
feel a value deeply, Stein discovers an introspective awareness of a feeling
issuing from deep within one’s own person. She also observes that our deepest
20 Plato (2003), pp.150-151.
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feelings seem to radiate from the centre of our being, and are capable from there
of permeating the entire personality. To apperceive someone else’s personality,
then, is to become aware of a certain topology, of a certain configuration of
form, symmetry, and layering. The virtuous personality seems to be stably
centred on its deepest value commitments, stratified in the sense of exhibiting a
kind of nuanced sensitivity and capacity for discrimination across different kinds
of value, and well-rounded in the sense of being able to reliably acquire value
perceptions and pick out moral saliences in a wide range of circumstances.
We don’t need to commit ourselves to specifying the precise nature of
the co-givenness of such geometrical or quasi-geometrical forms during the
empathic contemplation of the Other’s personality in order to recognise that
there must be an important morphological dimension to the way in which the
Other’s personality is understood. Even if personal-level attributes such as
having “integrity”, being “centred”, being “well-rounded”, or being “balanced”
are being applied only figuratively, it is hard to see how they could mean
anything at all if they did not possess at some level a morphological or
topological connotation. So even if a shape is not phenomenally co-given during
the contemplation of the Other’s personality in the same way, for example, that
the back of a building is appresented when viewing it from the front, it seems
fair to say that a formal structure of some kind will be given to a linguistically
competent reflective or pre-reflective consciousness at some level of linguistic
or ideational association. To the extent that the Other is thought to have
“integrity”, I would suggest, the implied form will possess unity or contiguity; to
the extent that the Other is thought to be “centred”, the implied form will
possess rotational symmetry; to the extent that the Other is regarded as “well-
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rounded”, the implied form too will be rounded; and to the extent that the Other
is thought to have a balanced evaluative attitude, the implied form will manifest
reflective symmetry. I would also suggest that to the extent that the Other is
thought to be refined or discriminating, the implied form will be likely to be
finely stratified, or finely nuanced in some corresponding fashion.
The abstract form in question here is not given authentically to
consciousness. Instead, what is given to consciousness is an imaginational
reproduction of a non-posited primordial intuition of the abstract form. The
abstract form itself is understood to be a non-mimetic representation of the
Other’s personality, and is correlated with an understanding (which is refined
over time) of the Other’s motivations. The imaginational reproduction is
constituted heteronomously on the basis of an aggregation of encounters with
the Other, or more precisely, on the basis of an aggregation of temporally
distributed acts of authentic empathy. One can only build up a picture of the
form correlated with the Other’s personality on the basis of the acquisition of an
aggregation of images of the Other’s lived experiences. The structure of this
kind of personality consciousness is homologous to picture-consciousness in the
sense that to the picture-thing corresponds the objectified aggregation of
empathic images, to the image-object corresponds the imaginational
reproduction, and to the picture-subject corresponds the abstract form itself. As
we discussed in chapter 4, one strives over time to converge toward an ever
more accurate apperception of the structure of the Other’s personality. But the
structure of such apperception remains during such efforts homologous to
picture-consciousness, and can at no point be construed as intuitionally
presentational, not only because one does not have empathic access to the
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entirety of the Other’s life experience, but because the access to the Other’s life
experience that one does acquire is itself given representationally as an image.
So we find two senses in which mimesis can be said to be involved in the
cumulative empathic comprehension of the Other. The Other’s lived
experiences, as we discovered in chapter 4, are given to the empathising
consciousness in the manner of a semblance; but in addition to this, an abstract
formal representation of the Other’s personality is also capable of being given to
the empathising consciousness in the manner of a semblance.
According to Stein’s account of the flourishing of the human personality,
the encounter with another person provides an important context within which
moral values lying dormant within the individual may be somehow awakened
and activated. One of the striking features of Stein’s account of this unfolding of
values is the way in which it centrally involves a tension between a
confrontation with what is alien and new, and a pre-reflective moment of
recognition of what was already deeply yet latently one’s own. It is the kind of
tension which makes it plausible to think that there is something about the
experience of the unfolding of values that could be construed as aesthetic, and
that one might say on such occasions, quite properly and not merely figuratively,
that it seems as though the Other has a beautiful personality, or a beautiful
aspect to their personality. On the face of things, in her thesis, Stein is not
primarily interested in the nature of aesthetic experience, but she does imply a
possible connection between empathy and aesthetic value in her observation that
the unfolding of values may take place not only in the encounter with another
person, but also in the encounter with a work of art, or with the natural world.
And while the Kantian view of the judgement of taste that we discussed earlier
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seems to neglect the idea that there may be some fundamental sense in which the
object of beauty may remain locked in alterity, it does seem to be capable of
explaining why there may be an aesthetic dimension to the unfolding of values,
because it explicates the aesthetic feeling of harmony between the subject and
the beautiful form in terms of the sensitivity of the faculty of the understanding
to the realm of supersensible ideas.21
My thesis has sought to explore two principal aspects of the relationship
between ethical and aesthetic value, and to develop a certain way of viewing
these two aspects as mirror-images of one another. On the one hand, I have
sought to develop the idea that encounters with artworks can be understood in
intersubjective terms, as empathic encounters with the experiences of implied
artists, including their value perceptions, character, and moral dispositions. On
the other hand, I have sought to sustain the idea that the notion of beauty is
capable of being properly applicable to the phenomenology of observing
someone else behaving virtuously, and that the virtuous beauty position can for
this reason be upheld. A certain conception of disinterestedness is certainly
applicable in this context, because the judgement that someone else is virtuous,
like any judgement in the Kantian sense, cannot permit of any personal bias, and
implies universal validity for all rational subjects. Yet observing virtue in
someone else is not disinterested in the sense of being indifferent to the
existence of what one is observing. On the contrary, any morally competent
observer could not fail to value the existence of virtue in the world. So the
rational perceiver of virtue is disinterested in the moral sense of being impartial,
21 As I indicated in chapter 4, on a Steinian view, the unfolding of values should be understood
to be capable of taking place only to the extent to which the empathiser has at least some latent
affinity for the attitudes being evinced.
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but not in the metaphysical sense of being indifferent to the other person’s
existence or possible existence in the world.
The question of the object’s existence turns out to be central to Kant’s
notion of interest. As Donald Crawford points out, Kant characterises interest as
a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the existence [Existenz] of an object or in
the idea [Vorstellung] of a certain thing existing,22 or alternatively as
“satisfaction in the presence [Dasein] of an object or action”.23 Part of what
Kant intends to encompass with his notion of interest is interest stemming from
personal desire (e.g. sensual interest) which he calls empirical interest. But Kant
also wants to include what he calls intellectual interest, including moral interest,
which is devoid of personal desire, because it is an interest which can be
ascribed to any rational subject. Moral interest, though devoid of private bias,
still involves a satisfaction in the object’s existence, or the idea of its existence,
because pleasure in the good, be it an intrinsic good or an instrumental good,
values and desires that good’s existence in the world.
Kant’s notion of disinterestedness depends analytically upon his notion
of interest: disinterestedness is to be understood as the absence of interest. The
judgement of taste involves a disinterested feeling of pleasure in the object, and
as such is devoid, as Diane Collinson puts it, of “any interest in the actual
22 Crawford (1974), pp.38-40, referring to Critique of Judgement §§ 2, 41. As Crawford points
out, in § 2, Kant regards interest as “das Wohlgefallen das wir mit der Vorstellung der Existenz
eines Gegenstandes verbinden”. Crucially, the term Vorstellung is ambiguous in this context. On
the one hand, it could mean “idea”, which would lead to the interpretation that interest is “the
satisfaction which we combine with the idea of the existence of an object”. But on the other
hand, Vorstellung might mean “representation”. Since, according to Kant's philosophy, what we
are aware of is always a representation, in this case the term Vorstellung has no special force in
the sentence quoted above, leading to the alternative interpretation that interest is “the
satisfaction which we combine with the existence of an object”. When it comes to the awareness
of values, as I intend to elaborate in what follows, the distinction between interest in the
existence of the object, and interest in the idea of the existence of the object, turns out to be
rather important.
23 Crawford (1974), p.39, referring to Critique of Judgement § 4.
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existence of what appears”;24 it is devoid of moral, sensuous, prudential, and
private interest.25 On the face of things, this would seem to rule out judging a
virtuous person to be beautiful because of their virtue, because, as I suggested
earlier, it is not possible for a morally competent observer to fail to have a moral
interest in what is manifestly morally good. So there is, to say the least, a prima
facie tension between the Kantian understanding of disinterestedness and the
virtuous beauty position. And Kant himself remarks that
Everyone must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is
tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure
judgement of taste. One must not be in the least prepossessed in
favour of the real existence of the thing, but must preserve
complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of
judge in matters of taste.26
We can begin to make some progress in resolving this apparent tension
by noting that the Kantian account allows for the co-existence or co-presence
within the judge’s mind of the judgement of taste with interests of the kinds that
Kant specifically excludes from the judgement of taste. It is not that interests
foreign to the judgement of taste need to be expurgated from the judge’s stream
of subjective processes, but rather that enquiry into such desire is, as Donald
Crawford puts it, “completely beside the point”.27 The fact that Kant is prepared
to accept the principle of co-presence is demonstrated in his observation that
social interest in the beautiful (e.g. the motivation to produce art for others, to
adorn ourselves with beautiful accessories, to go to galleries with others, or to
24 Collinson (1992), p.134.
25 Kantian disinterestedness should be understood to be devoid of cognitive interest, including
moral cognitive interest, but we can admit of the possibility that the judgement of taste is
conducive to non-conceptual moral thought of some kind, precisely because of the free play of
the imagination and the understanding.
26 Kant (1911), § 2, p.43.
27 Crawford (1974), p.42.
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communicate one’s taste) is constantly at work when one is in society, and that it
does not compromise the validity of the judgement of taste. We might say that
our social interest in the beautiful is a kind of background interest that we carry
around with us much of the time when living in a society. Kant’s point,
however, is that there is nothing about our sociability or our sociality which
necessarily conditions the judgement of taste.
What Kant seems to be implying is that the performance of the
judgement of taste is capable of preserving its own purity by bracketing many
kinds of interest – personal, moral, prudential, sensual, and social. If this kind of
bracketing were not possible, then one would not be able to guarantee the
impartiality required for the claim to universal validity. But in his account of the
empirical deduction, Kant argues that we only believe we are justified in
imputing our own feeling of pleasure in the beautiful to others because we
become conscious precisely of our own disinterestedness. And the
consciousness of one’s own disinterestedness could only be possible if one were
able to bracket any interest which could jeopardise the judgement of taste as a
universally valid judgement.
On the Kantian view, then, disinterestedness is really something more
than an abstracted or theoretically inferred moment of the judgement of taste. It
is instead something which can itself become an intentional object of conscious
introspection. And because Kant is prepared to accept the possibility of the co-
presence within consciousness of interest with the judgement of taste, he seems
to be committed in principle to the possibility of some kind of bracketing of co-
present interest during the experience of the beautiful. If, as I suggested earlier,
we take the Kantian notion of disinterestedness to relate to both interest in the
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existence of the object, and interest in the idea of the object’s existence, then we
must assume that Kant believes both of these kinds of interest to be capable of
being bracketed by the subject. This means that if we are to adjudicate on the
question of whether the Kantian account of beauty is compatible with the
virtuous beauty position, we need to try to verify phenomenologically whether
both interest in the existence of another’s virtue, and interest in the idea of the
existence of another’s virtue, are capable of being bracketed from conscious
attention during the experience of observing their being virtuous.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the reason that Kant stresses the
importance of a lack of concern for the beautiful object’s existence is that he
wants to make a distinction between a non-contemplative attitude (be it directly
perceptual or morally evaluative) and one which is aesthetically contemplative.
In the aesthetic appreciation of a landscape or a painting, one is not primarily
concerned with the existence of what one sees, or the existence of the picture-
subject, but with the way in which such objects appear. By analogy, it seems
plausible to suppose that when one contemplates aesthetically someone else’s
virtuous personality, one is attending primarily to the way in which the Other’s
personality is appresented through their external actions and expressions, not
only in the present moment, but on the basis of an aggregation of historical
encounters retained in the observer’s memory. So one could argue that when one
attends specifically to the beauty of someone’s personality, one is not essentially
concerned with their existence, but with the way in which their personality
appears, just as when one contemplates the beauty of the painting by Monet that
we considered earlier, one is not essentially concerned with the existence of the
bouquet of flowers depicted, but with the way in which the bouquet appears.
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In fact, this kind of metaphysical neutrality is something that Husserl
invites us to adopt in the transcendental attitude, in which one attends to the way
in which objects appear to consciousness, and in which one becomes in an
important sense indifferent to the veridicality of one’s intuitions. It is not that
after the reduction one has abandoned the world in favour of a Cartesian
immanent sphere of intentional content, but that, as Husserl puts it, “every
interest in the actuality or nonactuality of the world […] is put out of play.”28
This is not to say that we may not attend to the doxastic aspect of perception, but
that we suspend our acceptance of it. So it is not that the very idea of the
existence of objects becomes bracketed, but that one suspends judgement on the
existence of objects given to consciousness. And in the Husserlian investigation
into valuing, the being of values remains in the first instance out of
consideration, but the idea of their existence and the way in which values may
seem to be subjectively transcendent does not. Phenomenologically, to hold a
certain value commitment does not commit one to adjudicate one way or the
other on its metaphysical existence, but it does seem to entail at some level the
idea of the value’s existence, because values to which we are justifiably
committed are phenomenally given as being objective in the sense of being
intersubjectively verifiable in principle, and it is precisely in terms of
intersubjective co-constitution that Husserl explicates the notion of being.
It seems to me that we don’t need to adjudicate on the metaphysical
status of values in order to recognise that the idea of virtue existing is operative
as an intrinsic part of valuing virtue in someone else. If we take rational
experience in general to be conditioned a priori by moral value commitments,
28 Poellner (2007), p.447, referring to Husserl (1970), § 53, p.179.
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then we would have to accept that the bracketing of all interest in the idea of
virtue existing is something that could never be rationally attained. This means
that if we understand Kant’s stipulation of disinterestedness to require the
bracketing of all interest in the idea of the object existing during the judgement
of taste, then virtue becomes something that could never be held to be beautiful
in the Kantian sense. But a less demanding account of disinterestedness which
does not preclude all interest in the idea of the object existing, such as the
account corresponding to the reading of Kant which takes the statement about
interest quoted earlier in footnote 22 only to refer to interest in the object’s
existence, or the account of disinterestedness provided by Shaftesbury, would
not preclude the possibility of regarding someone else’s virtue as being
beautiful.
Virtue in somebody else does not always seem beautiful, even to
someone who possesses some knowledge of what it is to be virtuous, or to
someone who is skilled in recognising virtue in others. Someone acting with
great courage in trying to save my life might suddenly push me into a shop
doorway as I walk down a street, but my encounter with virtue on such an
occasion could hardly be said to involve an apprehension of beauty. Yet my
contention at this point is that certain features of the essential nature of virtue,
and of the phenomenology of the experience of virtue in someone else,
predispose virtue toward being seen, under the right conditions and from an
appropriate standpoint, as being beautiful. One of the underlying reasons for this
lies in the Platonic insight that virtue is connected with a state of internal
harmony in the person. But the apprehension of beauty is also attributable to the
facts that the Other’s lived experience and personality are capable of being given
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to the empathising consciousness in the manner of a semblance; that the
discovery and unfolding of values can involve an experience of what Beardsley
would call felt freedom, and a feeling of being in harmony with the Other; and
that observing someone behaving consistently in different situations according
to a stable set of moral principles can be the basis for an experience of
uniformity in variety. One thing that a work of literature can accomplish is to
place the reader in the right kind of vantage point from which the virtue of an
implied author can be apprehended as beautiful, because empathy as Husserl and
Stein understand it is, as I have argued, capable of being implied within the
phenomenological structure of reading a literary work. When implied authorial
moral virtue is grasped imaginatively as being beautiful by a textually attentive
empathising reader, the apperceived moral virtue can be said to be contributing
to the aesthetic value of the work.
In the course of this chapter, I have sought to explicate the aesthetic
value of virtuous beauty in terms of a set of more fundamental aesthetic values
like internal and external harmony, mimesis, felt freedom, active discovery, and
uniformity in variety. These fundamental aesthetic values are ones which have
tended to recur in one form or another throughout the history of western
aesthetic thought; their philosophical roots, perhaps most notably in Platonic,
Aristotelian, and Kantian thought, are not difficult to see.29 At the hands of a
29 It would have been remiss of me had I not at least sketched out for the reader some of these
philosophical aesthetic roots in the course of this chapter’s discussion. I should add that I don’t
regard the ones that I have picked out as being fundamentally mutually incompatible. Kant never
placed a great deal of emphasis upon the importance of mimesis, presumably because he wanted
to provide an account of beauty relevant to both natural and artistic objects. But I don’t regard
this as a reason for supposing that Kantian aesthetics is incompatible with the Aristotelian
valuing of mimesis. To be sure, Kant would be among the first to point out that the virtuous
person does not imitate virtue, just as the eagle does not imitate majesty (see Kant (1911), § 49,
p.177), and that artistic genius is not something that would-be artists can profitably attempt to
imitate. But it does not follow from the Kantian position that mimesis has no role within the
phenomenology of the apperception of virtuous beauty, or of the majesty of an eagle. On the
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skilled artist, I want to suggest, such fundamental aesthetic values can be
coordinated and combined to produce an appresentation of virtuous beauty in the
implied artist or implied author, or alternatively in characters depicted within the
work. But we need to recognise that they could also be combined to produce
other second-order aesthetic values, such as satirical acuity, grotesquerie, comic
incongruity, or moral doubt and uncertainty. We find emerging here, then, a
kind of aesthetic pluralism operating at two distinct levels. At the basic level,
there seems to be a pluralism of the fundamental aesthetic values to which
aesthetic thought seems to return time and again. Yet at a secondary level, we
discover a plurality of derivative values that different combinations of
fundamental aesthetic values can produce.
In a sophisticated work of art, the overall aesthetic value is usually the
product of a complex interaction of different subsidiary aesthetic values.
Sometimes an attempt to satisfy one particular aesthetic value can compromise
the satisfaction of another. Let us suppose, for example, that while composing
The Rape of the Lock (1712), Alexander Pope imagines an episode which in
itself is extremely amusing due to its comic incongruity, but which involves
neither mock-heroic allusion to classical myth, nor incisive satirical critique of
the eighteenth-century English aristocracy. Suppose further that, on reflection,
Pope realises that although including the episode would increase the comic value
of the poem, it would also compromise the work’s overall aesthetic value, on the
grounds that the episode does not blend well with the satirical nature of the
poem that Pope envisages. In this case, a version of the poem (say, an early draft
contrary, if my phenomenological argument in this and earlier chapters is correct, then virtuous
beauty and the virtuous personality are given to an empathising consciousness in the manner of a
semblance, and for very similar reasons, I would suggest, so is the majesty of an eagle. And, as I
pointed out earlier, the notion of the Kantian form already fits extremely well with the fine arts
of painting and drawing, which, in Kant’s day at least, were almost invariably mimetic.
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by Pope) which includes the episode but which is otherwise identical to the
published version could be said to be aesthetically inferior to the published
version. It makes sense here to ascribe an aesthetic flaw to the early draft, since
the tension between comic incongruity and satirical acuity can be rectified
without diminishing the overall aesthetic value of the work. The successful
poem addresses a number of different aesthetic values, including comic
incongruity, mock-heroic allusion, and satirical acuity, and manages to blend
them into an harmonious whole.
There are, of course, some aesthetic values which The Rape of the Lock
does not purport to address at all, e.g. tragic poignancy. It doesn’t seem right to
say, in pro tanto fashion, that The Rape of the Lock is aesthetically flawed to the
extent that it fails to address the aesthetic value of tragic poignancy. What
counts from a critical perspective is not that all aesthetic values are catered for,
but that the work satisfies a recognisable subset of important aesthetic values
which blend well together in the particular context of the work. Robert
Browning’s dramatic monologue My Last Duchess (1842) satisfies a number of
important aesthetic values such as fidelity to certain unpleasant facets of human
nature, and the skilful appresentation of a grotesque personality. The
appresentation of virtuous beauty is not an aesthetic value which this work
purports to satisfy. And it doesn’t seem any more plausible to claim that My Last
Duchess is aesthetically flawed to the extent that it fails to depict virtuous beauty
than it is to say that The Rape of the Lock is aesthetically flawed to the extent
that it neglects tragic poignancy. My Last Duchess requires of its readers a
certain minimum level of moral competence in order for the poem to be
adequately comprehended, and a critic who expresses disapproval of this work
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for its lack of virtuous beauty can be said to have misunderstood the nature of
the work.
One reason why ethicists maintain that an aesthetically relevant ethical
flaw in a work must count as an aesthetic shortcoming is that ethical virtue is
beautiful, and wickedness ugly. If ethical virtue is beautiful, then according to
the ethicist’s logic, a literary work which evinces an immoral attitude is
aesthetically flawed because such an attitude is ugly. Accordingly, on the
ethicist view, Browning’s My Last Duchess will have to be regarded as
aesthetically flawed to the (considerable) extent that it evinces an immoral
attitude. But, as I indicated earlier, one is only entitled to ascribe an aesthetic
flaw to a work if the putative “flaw” could be rectified without diminishing the
overall aesthetic value of the work. In the case of My Last Duchess, this is not
possible, because the overall aesthetic value of the work depends upon its
evincing an immoral attitude. There is a tragic conflict between the aesthetic
value deriving from exhibiting to the reader a grotesque personality, and the
aesthetic value of virtuous beauty. In order to be the valuable work of poetry that
it is, My Last Duchess needs to evince an immoral attitude.30 My Last Duchess
therefore represents a counter-example to the ethicist claim that an aesthetically
relevant ethical flaw must count as an aesthetic flaw. The reason that ethicism
runs into difficulty here lies in its insistence upon the criterion of virtuous
beauty, when virtuous beauty is an aesthetic value that some works quite
properly do not purport to satisfy. If a particular aesthetic value is logically
precluded from belonging to the subset of aesthetic values that a work purports
30 The immoral attitude evinced is not prescribed for the reader, but exhibited to the reader. For
this reason, the ethicist’s merited-response objection to this counter-example, that the work
prescribes an attitude which is immoral, and therefore unmerited, cannot be raised.
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to satisfy, then the work in question cannot be said to be aesthetically flawed to
the extent that it fails to satisfy that particular aesthetic value.
In the opening stages of this chapter I developed a phenomenological
account of the experience of beauty, involving such aesthetic criteria as mimesis,
internal harmony, external harmony, active discovery, felt freedom, and
uniformity in variety. I proceeded to argue that all of these recognisably
aesthetic criteria are capable of being satisfied in the experience of observing
virtue in someone else, along with a certain form of disinterestedness which
permits of an interest in the idea of the existence of values, and in particular, an
interest the idea of the existence of a virtuous personality. The upholding of the
virtuous beauty position formed the central basis for my conclusion that
occasions can arise in which ethical flaws in an artwork really do count as
aesthetic flaws. However, in order to undermine ethicism, it is sufficient to
locate, within the extraordinary richness and diversity of English literature
(which happens to have a long tradition of villainous “Vice” figures), a plausible
counter-example in which implied authorial moral defect is neither dispensable
to the aesthetic meaning and value of the work, nor undermined by the work.
Browning’s My Last Duchess, properly understood as a remarkable example of
Victorian grotesquerie, fulfils this role.
Coda
In the introductory chapter, I argued that a careful attempt to extract a
coherent theoretical understanding of poetry from Keats’s posthumously
collated letters turns out to raise certain important and, on Keats’s account,
unanswered literary theoretical and meta-critical questions pertaining to the
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artistic disclosure of truth, the relation between reason and literature, the
relevance of emotion to moral truth, the relevance of intersubjectivity to the
encounter with a literary work, the nature of the cognitive capacities of the
imagination, the moral cognitive significance of literature, and the relation
between ethical and aesthetic value. The research hypothesis that I outlined in
that chapter, based upon certain important features of Keatsian meta-poetical
thought, was that the resources of Husserlian phenomenology may be able to
assist us in investigating the problems that Keats seems to be raising. However,
it was perhaps not immediately obvious at that early stage just why it should be
that theoretical problems suggested by the letters of an English Romantic poet
should be amenable to elucidation not only by the philosophical thought of
Immanuel Kant, whose prolific life, as it happens, was drawing to a close when
Keats was an infant, but also by the thought of later phenomenologists like
Husserl and Stein.
As its title indicates, this chapter as a whole, and not merely this brief
coda, represent the concluding thoughts of my thesis’s investigations. There is
little point in mechanically repeating at this late hour conclusions which have
been stated clearly enough either in the course of this concluding chapter, or in
the concluding paragraphs of the preceding ones. It may, however, be worth
spending a few moments now to reflect at a meta-argumentative level upon the
nature of the discussion that has now unfolded, and in particular upon how it has
been possible to acquire some traction in the application of Husserlian
phenomenology to questions about literature.
Historically, the lives of Rousseau and Keats did not quite overlap
(Rousseau died some seventeen years before Keats’s relatively short life began
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in 1795), but in terms of their respective takes on the inter-relations between
emotion and truth, and the implications of such inter-relations for literature,
Keats’s letters show that, whether he knew it or not, intellectually, in important
respects, overlap they certainly did. They both loved truth, and valued highly the
love of truth. But they were both dissatisfied with reason, and suspicious of self-
conscious reflection. They both saw truth as bound up with the passions, and
configured intersubjectivity in terms of a disclosure of the truth of others. They
both wanted to pre-empt a topology of the self as comprising an inside and an
outside. They both had aspirations toward primordial unity with others, and
understood, in their own ways, literature to be a passage toward the authentic
disclosure of the truths of phenomenal being.
For all of these reasons, Starobinski’s critical encounter with Rousseau
has helped us to begin to find a way into some of the literary theoretical and
meta-critical questions that Keats seems to be raising. One way in which
Starobinski accomplishes this is by bringing to light certain blindspots in
Romantic conceptions of literary self-expression and of the intersubjective
significance of literature. One of the Romantic aporia that concerns Starobinski
is the mistaken conflation of self-expression with self-disclosure, a conflation
which neglects the important idea that something is always deferred in the
empathic encounter with the Other. The necessity of a truncation in empathic
precision means that what Starobinski calls the “purity of immediate sentiment”
is irretrievably lost for even the most careful of readers, other than the author
him/herself. The result, by implication, is a proliferation of possible meanings
for different readers, and the hermeneutic danger for critics that in attempting to
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see what cannot be seen, one is often prone to fill in the void with a narcissistic
projection.
It would be too restrictive to try to cast Starobinski as simply an
Husserlian literary theorist, for his thought is also influenced, in ways whose
adequate exploration lies beyond the remit of this thesis, by Merleau-Ponty and
Sartre. We may say with certainty, however, that Starobinski’s theoretical
understanding of literature is profoundly influenced by the way in which the
phenomenological movement that Husserl founded became deeply interested in
certain forms of co-givenness involving the structure of the constitution of a
phenomenal unity which cannot be rendered intelligible by appealing to notions
of signification or indication, and in the phenomenological discovery that under
certain conditions, as Stein paraphrases Volkelt, “[t]he experiences we
comprehend in expressive appearances are fused [verschmolzen] with the
phenomena of expression”.31 The beauty of Starobinski’s conception of the
implied author lies in the way he draws upon the phenomenological tradition in
order to find a way of upholding the Romantic conviction in the centrality of
feeling and empathy in literary experience, while recognising aspects of the
interpersonal encounter, and of the relation between appearance and reality, that
Romantics like Keats and Rousseau preferred to ignore, but which turn out, on
the Husserlian account at least, to be constitutive of intersubjectivity itself. It is
in this crucial sense that Starobinski’s account of the implied author turns out to
be pivotal, within the trajectory of this thesis, in linking the purely
phenomenological exploration of intersubjectivity and the imagination discussed
in chapters 2-4 with the investigations in chapters 6-8 of literary theoretical
31 OPE, p.127, Note 102.
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questions pertaining to moral cognition and the relation between ethical and
aesthetic value.
Explaining convincingly just why the pleasure that we take in observing
someone else’s moral virtue is in substantive respects the same kind of pleasure
that we take in the beautiful has proven to require a great deal of
phenomenological work. My approach to this question has required us to spend
some time thinking carefully not only about what it is to have an encounter with
somebody else, but also about what it is to have an experience of beauty.
Kantian thought assisted us significantly in this latter enquiry, especially in
relation to the aesthetic values of external harmony and felt freedom. Yet in the
process of investigating the phenomenology of beauty, certain weaknesses in
Kant’s aesthetic theory have come to light. For one thing, I have argued that
Kant seems to neglect the relevance of intersubjectivity to aesthetic experience,
both in terms of the subject’s relation to an implied artist, and in terms of the
significance of critical discourse in the formation of the judgement of taste.
Secondly, I have also argued that Kant overlooks the phenomenological
centrality of mimesis to the aesthetic experience of both artistic and natural
beauty. My claim that mimesis is relevant to the phenomenology of the
experience of natural beauty relies upon my claim developed in earlier chapters
that authentic empathy, in the Husserlian sense, is in its mature phases given in
the manner of a semblance. This latter phenomenological discovery depends in
turn upon the Husserlian account of the imagination, both in terms of the
reproductive representation found in such acts as remembering and imagining,
and the kind of perceptual representation that takes place during picture-
consciousness. Our investigation into Husserl’s account of the imagination was
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itself prompted by a prior analysis of the Husserlian understanding of
intersubjectivity.
Ironically for the ethicist, it is precisely the kind of aesthetic pluralism
that emerged in the course of my attempt to substantiate the virtuous beauty
position that turns out to be instrumental to my reaching the view that ethicism
is mistaken. In this sense, the relationship between the virtuous beauty argument
and ethicism is more complicated than the ethicist realises. Granted, implied
authorial moral virtue could contribute to the aesthetic value of a literary work
for the reasons that I have identified. However, it does not follow that implied
authorial moral defect must automatically count as a reason for disvaluing the
work aesthetically, if it is contributing to an aesthetic value which logically
precludes virtuous beauty. The relation between ethicism’s cognitive argument
and ethicism is similar. To be sure, sometimes we value a literary work
aesthetically because it conveys thematically relevant moral truth by artistic
means. Yet a work which suggests something false about morality is not ipso
facto pro tanto deficient aesthetically, because conveying moral truth may
conflict irremediably with the aesthetic values that the work supports. Ethicism’s
merited-response argument makes the mistake of assuming that if a literary work
evinces and exhibits an immoral attitude, then it must be prescribing it for the
reader. I concede that a work which is likely to arouse an immoral response in
its readership is susceptible to censure from the merited-response argument, on
the grounds that ethical criteria are applicable to our responses to art. But the
fact that a work could evince an immoral attitude without prescribing it weakens
the ultimate plausibility of the ethicist position.
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